This article examines methodological individualism in terms of the theory that invariance under intervention is the signal feature of generalizations that serve as a basis for causal explanation. This theory supports the holist contention that macro-level generalizations can explain, but it also suggests a defense of methodological individualism on the grounds that greater range of invariance under intervention entails deeper explanation. Although this individualist position is not threatened by multiple-realizability, an argument for it based on rational choice theory is called into question by experimental results concerning preference reversals.
Camerer, C.1995. Individual decision making. In The handbook of experimental economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, 587-703. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cubitt, R., A. Munro, and C. Starmer. 2004. Testing explanations of preference reversal. Economic Journal114: 709-726.
4.
Elster, J.1985. Making sense of Marx. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5.
Elster, J.1989. Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
6.
Grether, D., and C. Plott. 1979. Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review69: 623-638.
7.
Guala, F.2005. The methodology of experimental economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Hausman, D.1992. The inexact and separate science of economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
9.
Hausman, D., and J. Woodward. 1999. Independence, invariance and the causal Markov condition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science50: 521-583.
10.
Hempel, C.1965. Aspects of scientific explanation. New York: Macmillan.
11.
Holt, C. A.1986. Preference reversals and the independence axiom. American Economic Review76: 508-515.
12.
Hoover, K.2001. Causality in macroeconomics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
13.
Hoover, K., ed. 1995. Macroeconomics: Developments, tensions and prospects. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
14.
Jones, T.1996. Methodological individualism in proper perspective. Behavior and Philosophy24: 119-128.
15.
Kincaid, H.1986. Reduction, explanation, and individualism. Philosophy of Science53: 492-513.
16.
Kincaid, H.1996. Philosophical foundations of the social sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
17.
Kitcher, P.1984. 1953 and all that, a tale of two sciences. Philosophical Review93: 335-373.
18.
Kitcher, P.1989. Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In Scientific explanation, vol. 13 of Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, edited by P. S. Kitcher and W. Salmon, 410-505. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Little, D.1991. Varieties of social explanation: An introduction to the philosophy of social science. Boulder, CO: Westview.
21.
Lucas, R.1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. In The Phillips curve and labor markets, edited by Karl Brunner and A. Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
22.
Mill, J. S.1856. A system of logic. New York: Harper & Brothers.
23.
Paige, J. M.1975. Agrarian revolution: Social movements and export agriculture in the under-developed world. New York: Free Press.
24.
Pearl, J.2000. Causality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
25.
Pettit, P.1993. The common mind: An essay on psychology, society, and politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
26.
Roth, A.1995. Introduction to experimental economics. In The handbook of experimental economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, 3-109. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
27.
Salmon, W.1984. Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28.
Salmon, W.1989. Four decades of scientific explanation. In Scientific explanation, vol. 13 of Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, edited by P. S. Kitcher and W. Salmon, 3-219. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
29.
Sawyer, R. K.2002. Nonreductive individualism part I—supervenience and wild disjunction. Philosophy of the Social Sciences32: 537-559.
30.
Scott, J.1985. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
31.
Segal, U.1988. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom?American Economic Review78: 233-236.
32.
Seidl, C.2002. Preference reversal. Journal of Economic Surveys16: 621-655.
33.
Simon, D., D. Krawczyk, and K. Holyoak. 2004. Construction of preferences by constraint satisfaction. Psychological Science15: 331-336.
34.
Slovic, P.1995. The construction of preference. American Psychologist50: 364-371.
35.
Steel, D.2004. Can a reductionist be a pluralist?Biology and Philosophy19: 55-73.
36.
Tversky, A., P. Slovic, and D. Kahneman. 1990. The causes of preference reversal. American Economic Review80: 204-217.
37.
Udehn, L.2001. Methodological individualism: Background, history, and meaning. New York: Routledge.
38.
Van Bouwel, J.2004. Individualism and holism, reduction and pluralism: A comment on Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle. Philosophy of the Social Sciences34: 525-535.
39.
Van Fraassen, B.1980. The scientific image. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
40.
Watkins, J. W. N.1957. Historical explanations in the social sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science8: 104-117.
41.
Woodward, J.1999. Causal interpretation in systems of equations. Synthese121: 199-257.
42.
Woodward, J.2000. Explanation and invariance in the special sciences. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science51: 197-254.
43.
Woodward, J.2003. Making things happen: A causal theory of explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44.
Zahle, J.2003. The individualism-holism debate on intertheoretic reduction and the argument from multiple realization. Philosophy of the Social Sciences33: 77-99.
