In this article, the author focuses on Philip Kitcher’s and Alvin Goldman’s economic models of the social character of scientific knowledge production. After introducing some relevant methodological issues in the social sciences and characterizing Kitcher’s and Goldman’s models, the author goes on to show that special problems arise directly from the concept of an agent invoked in the models. The author argues that the two distinct concepts of agents, borrowed from economics and cognitive psychology, are inconsistent. Finally, the author discusses some of the normative implications that arise from adopting economic concepts of agents in the study of science.
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