August Bebel and the Development of a Responsible German Socialist Foreign Policy,1878-96

The quotations are from Hajo Holborn , "Russia and the European Political System". Germany and Europe. Historical Essays (Garden City, New York, 1971), 131-2.

During the past fifty years a very extensive literature has grown up around the Flottenpolitik of William II. By 1930 German historical opinion had generally come to accept the view of Friedrich Meinecke that although the Kaiser's policy towards England was Machiavellian and actuated by "vanity and ruthless ambition" a genuine disposition towards an Anglo-German understanding in the years 1898-1901 existed neither in London nor in Berlin (Geschichte des Deutsch-Englischen Bündnisproblems. 1890-1891 (Berlin, 1927), 50-54, 100, 234 and 358. The young Gerhard Ritter argued in that early period that responsibility for the deterioration of relations with Great Britain was almost evenly divided (Die Legende von der verschmähten englischen Freundschaft, 1898-1901 (Freiburg i. Br., 1929), 12-14, 28-29, 33-40), a viewpoint from which the American historians E. N. Johnson and J. D. Bickford ("The Contemplated Anglo-German Alliance: 1890-1901". Political Science Quarterly xlii (1927), 1-57) and, to lesser extent, Sidney B. Fay (The Origins of the World War (2nd rev. ed., N.Y., 1966). 135-41) dissented. After World War II the German historians Gerhard Ritter, Wilhelm Schiissler, Walter Hubatsch, Ludwig Dehio, Rudolf Stadelmann, Willy Schenk, and, most recently, Volker Berghahn, undertook new explorations of published and/or archival source materials relating to the goals and diplomatic impact of German naval policy. Although all of these scholars agreed that the Schlachtflottenpolitik of the Kaiser and von Tirpitz adversely affected Anglo-German relations and augmented the international liabilities of the Reich, there was no consensus as to whether the battle fleet was offensively oriented. Hubatsch contended that, despite its provocative effects, it was rather purely defensive in conception (Die Aera Tirpitz (Göttingen, 1955), 50 and 137), a conclusion with which Schiissler's book of essays agreed (Weltmachtstreben und Flottenbau (Witten, 1957)). The mature Ritter expressed the opinion that while German overseas interests and the purely technical requirement for a better defence of the German coastline certainly justified a more powerful navy, the lop-sided stress upon and accelerated tempo of naval armaments after the Second Navy Law (1900) "made England the cardinal foe of Germany" (Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, ii : Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich, 1890-1914 (Munich, 1960), 124, 181, 185, and 195). Stadelmann was even more decided in affirming German culpability, declaring that Tirpitz intended that the German navy ultimately usurp the dominant position held bv the British navy on all oceans ("Die Epoche der deutsch-englischen Flottenrivalität", in Deutschland und Westeuropa (Schloss Laupheim, 1948), 137). Dehio affirmed that although the Germans "were not seeking supremacy", the mere building of the Schlachtflotte, which was "designed for decisive operations in British coastal waters". constituted "a direct threat to Britain's insular strength" and caused Britain to view Germany as her cardinal enemy, just as the number one power has always regarded the challenger throughout history (The Precarious Balance (New York, 1965), 234). Clearly, said Dehio, the world balance of power for which Germany strove "involved the destruction of English maritime supremacy" and was "a threat to English existence" (Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1959), 81). Schenk and Berghahn have both commendablv summarized the German literature on this topic (Schenk. Die Deutsch-Englische Rivalität vor dem ersten Weltkrieg in der Sicht deutscher Historiker: Missverstehen oder Machtstreben (Aarau, 1967); and Berghahn, "Zu den Zielen des deutschen Flottenbaus unter Wilhelm II", Historische Zeitschrift, ccx (1970). 34-100). Like Dehio and Schenk, Berghahn, who did extensive research in the archives of the Marineamt in Freiburg, felt that Germany was mainly responsible for the collapse of negotiations with England and that the Schlachtflotte with its "greatest offensive-defensive capabilities" constituted per se a threat to Britain's position as the leading naval power in the world (loc. cit., 65-66).

Generally believing that the SPD lacked a genuine foreign policy, contemporary scholars have concentrated upon the party's struggle against militarism and imperialism. E.g., see in particular: Milorad Drachkovitch, Les Socialistes Allemands et Français et la Problème de la Guerre, 1870-1914 (Geneva, 1953); Herman Heidegger. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der nationale Staat, 1870-1920 (Göttingen, 1956); Walter Bartel, Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg (East Berlin. 1958); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Sozialdemokratie und Nationalstaat (Würzburg. 1962); Giinter Hennig, August Bebel. Todfeind des preussisch-deutschen Militärstaates, 1891-1899 (East Berlin, 1963); Hans-Christoph Schröder, Sozialismus und Imperialismus. Die Auseinandersetzung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit dem Imperialismusproblem und der "Weltpolitik" vor 1914 (Hanover, 1968); and articles bv Manfred Weien, "Der Kampf der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Reichstag für Demokratie und gegen Militarismus 1878 bis 1894", Arbeiterbewegung und Reichsgründung, ed. by Horst Bartel (East Berlin. 1971); and Waldtraut Opitz, "Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen die neue Militärvorlage, 1892-1893", ibid., 163-201.

Grillenberger's speech in Verhandlungen des Reichstags; stenographische Berichte (hereafter cited as VR), 6th legislative period, 4th session, 6th meeting, vol. i (14 January, 1887), 102.

This questionable inference from the earlier struggle of the SPD against Bismarck's internal policies is drawn by Suzanne Miller, Das Problem der Freiheit im Sozialismus. Freiheit, Staat und Revolution in der Programmatik der Sozialdemokratie von Lassalle bis zum Revisionismusstreit (Frankfurt a.M., 1964), 91.

As early as 1848 Marx had argued that war against Russia would be the making of a unified Germany on a constitutional basis. See D. Ryazanov and V. Adoratsky , eds., Marx-Engels. Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Werke und Schriften, Part I (7) (Berlin 1929-33), 25. See also Engels , " Der europaische Krieg". New York Tribune, 2 February, 1854; and Karl Kautsky , Sozialisten und Krieg (Prague, 1937), 132-3.

Engels. Révolution et contrerévolution en Allemagne (Paris, 1933), 82; and "Die europäische Arbeiter in 1877 ", in Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, eds.. Marx-Engels Werke (hereafter cited as MEW), xix (East Berlin. 1969). 136-7.

Ltr of Engels to Marx, 30 November. 1882. in V. Adoratsky. Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Part III: Marx-Engels Briefwechsel, iv (East Berlin, 1950), 687.

Verhandlungen des konstituierenden Reichstags des Norddeutschen Bundes; stenographische Berichte, 1st leg. per., 26th Meeting, vol. vii (24 April. 1869). 569.

Bebels spoke of the "ineluctable nature of events and of the approaching catastrophe" (1tr to Engels, 28 March, 1881, in Werner Blumenberg, ed., August Bebel. Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Engels (hereafter cited as BBE; The Hague, 1965), no. 32, 106).

In this view Bebel had been fortified by Engels, who in 1879 had written: "Entweder stürzt der Absolutismus, und dann weht sofort... ein anderer Wind durch Europa. Oder aber es gibt einen europäischen Krieg..." (1tr of Engels to Bebel. 16 December, 1879, ibid., no 24. 88).

For a systematic justification of the Social Democratic struggle against the Septennat of 1874, see, for example. Bebel Die Sozialdemokratie im deutschen Reichstag. Tatigkeitsberichte und Wahlaufrufe 1871 bis 1893 (Berlin, 1909). 75-93. At Gotha in 1875 Bebel had made a big point of the charge that wars prejudiced the interests of the masses, who had to shoulder the burden of them physically and financially. See Protokoll des Vereinigungs-Kongresses der Sozialdemokraten Deutschlands abgehalten zu Gotha vom 22. bis 27.Mai 1875, 32-33.

Engels's phrase, in "Das Reichsregiment". MEW, xvii (East Berlin. 1968 ). 507.

Engels , " Die Polen-Debatte in Frankfurt, August, 1848", MEW, ii (East Berlin, 1954), 276-7.

See Norman Rich and M. H. Fischer. eds., The Holstein Papers, ii : Diaries (Cambridge, 1957). 325.

VR, 4th leg. per., 3rd sess.. 4th meeting, vol. i (19 February, 1880), 41-46.

Ibid., 43-46.

Ibid.; see also Bebel's speech in ibid., 11th meeting, vol. i (2 March, 1880). 212.

Ibid., 212-13.

Ibid., 215. It hardly altered the force of the concession that Bebel meant defence by forces recruited on the basis of universal conscription, i.e., the general arming (militia) of the whole people. See Bebel , "Aufruf der sozialdemokratischen Fraktion zur ersten Reichstagswahl unter dem Sozialistengesetz", Sozialdemokrat , 27 October, 1881.

Franz Mehring , Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Part II: Von Lassalles "Offenem Antwortschreiben" bis zum Erfurter Programm ( East Berlin , 1960), 531.

See Otto von Bismarck , Reflections and Reminiscences, ed. by Theodore Hamerow (New York , 1968), 242-3.

Protokoll des Kongresses der deutschen Sozialdemokratie abgehalten auf Schloss Wyden in der Schweiz am 20., 21., 22. und 23 August 1880 Zürich, 1880). 45-46.

See 1tr of Bebel to Kautsky. 31 December, 1883, in K. Kautsky, Jr., ed., August Bebels Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (hereafter cited as BBK; Assen, Netherlands, 1971), 10. Engels had come round to regarding a general war as "a misfortune" (1tr to Bebel, 22 December, 1882, BBE, no. 46, 143).

See Itr of Bebel to Engels, 17 November, 1885, ibid., no. 84, 244-5.

Ltr of Bebel to Kautsky, BBK, 10. For Engels's assessment of the positive results of a major war see his Itr to Vera I. Zasulitch, 23 April, 1885, MEW, xxxvi (East Berlin. 1967), no. 162, 304-5 and his 1tr to Bernstein, in Die Briefe Engels an Bernstein (Berlin, 1925), 123.

Bebel , " Die Sozialdemokratie im deutschen Reichstag", in Karl Drott , ed., Sozialdemokratie und Wehrfrage aus einem Jahrhundert Wehrdebatten (Berlin and Hanover, 1956), 27.

See the Sozialdemokrat (Zurich), 1 January, 1887 and 12 October, 1889.

See Bebel , "Deutschland. Russland und die orientalische Frage", Die Neue Zeit (hereafter cited as NZ), iv (1886), 502-3. See further Karl Grillenberger's speech in VR, 6th leg. per.. 4th sess., vol. i (4 December, 1886), 101.

See 1tr of Engels to Paul Lafargue, 25 October. 1886, MEW, xxvi, no. 291, 558; and 1tr of Engels to Bebel, 13 (-14) September, 1886, in Friedrich Engels Briefe an Bebel, besorgt vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (East Berlin. 1958), no. 41, 141-2; and BBE, no. 95, 286-8. See further Bebel to Engels, 7 December, 1885. BBE, no. 85, 249.

Bebel and Liebknecht accepted Engels's appraisal of Russia's financial predicament. See Engels's discussion of the matter in his 1tr to Liebknecht, 28 December, 1885, in Georg Eckert , ed., Wilhelm Liebknecht, Briefwechsel mit Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels (hereafter cited LBME; The Hague , 1963), no. 159. 290-1.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 30 December, 1887. BBE, no. 109, 316.

In the course of the acrimonious controversy among Blos, Geiger, Vollmar, Grillenberger, Bernstein, Liebknecht and Bebel in 1884-85 over the colonial postal steamship subsidy bill (Dampfersubvention), schism of the SDAP had been narrowly avoided, and Liebknecht and Bebel had come close to rupturing relations with each other. See 1tr of Bebel to Liebknecht, 17 November, 1884. Nachlass Liebknecht. International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), File 65/29-30; Bebel to Heinrich Schlüter, 24 November, 1884. Nachlass Bebel. IISG, File 43/24-2: idem, 15 December. 1884, File 43/30-31; Bebel to Liebknecht, 6 April, 1885. Nachlass Liebknecht. IISG. File 65/38: idem, 28 April, 1885, File 65/39-2-3; Bebel to Schlüter, 19 January, 1886. Nachlass Bebel, File 43/49, where Bebel said of Liebknecht "I am only waiting for a suitable opportunity to denounce him in public"; and Auer, Blos Geiser et al. to Bernstein, 21 June, 1885. Nachlass Kampffmeyer, Archiv der Sozialdemokratie. Bonn, TR 8-2, no. 64.

See 1tr of Engels to Bebel, 13 (-14) September, 1886, BBE, 285-6; Engels to Ion Nådejde, 4 January, 1888, MEW, xxxvii (East Berlin. 1967), no. 1, 6; Engels to F. Sorge, 7 January, 1888, ibid., no. 3, 11: Engels to L. Lafargue, 25 February, 1888, ibid., no. 15, 33-34: and Engels to P. Lafargue, 25 March, 1889, ibid., 171, where he termed war "the most horrible of all alternatives", because it would involve the "general suppression of our movement and entail a period of reaction.... all against the slim chance that out of this bitter war will come a revolution".

Bebel wrote to Engels, 30 December, 1887, BBE, 316: "Bismarck hat auch kein Interesse an einem Krieg ...."

See Bebel , Die S.D. i. d. Reichstag. 250.

Bebel's speech. J'R, 8th leg. per., 1st sess.. 26th meeting, vol. i (25 ,June, 1890). 567-8.

Cf Gustav Seeber , "Wahlkämpfe. Parlamentsarbeit und revolutionäre Politik", in Marxismus und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, ed. bv Die Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Zentralinstitut für Geschichte (East Berlin. 1970), 277. A large majority of the SDAP (SPD) Reichstag delegation (including Ignaz Auer, Carl Grillenberger, Wilhelm Blos, Karl Frohme. Ludwig Viereck and Max Kavser) believed the reformist road to power was the proper one. See Miller, op. cit, 89-91 and 193; Weien , "Der Kampf der d.S.D.", op. cit, 378-9; Kurt Brandis , Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie bis zum Fall des Sozialistengesetzes ( Leipzig, 1931), 64: Reinhard Höhn , Sozialismus und Heer, i: 1878- 1890 (Zürich, 1959 ), LI; Hans-Josef Steinberg , Sozialismus und die Sozialdemokratie. Zur Ideologie der Partei vor dem I. Weltkrieg (2nd ed.; Hanover, 1969), 29-30 and 33; Reinhard Jansen , Georg von Vollmar. Eine politische Biographie (Düsseldorf. 1958). 21. Bebel himself dissented from the position of the Socialist majority in that he believed in the imminence of an irreparable crisis in feudo-bourgeois society, which would render superfluous all talk about a legal solution of the social question. See Bebel to Engels. 8 June. 1884. BBE, no. 63. 184; 7 December. 1885, ibid., no. 85, 249: and 9 March. 1886, ibid., no. 89, 262.

VR, 7th leg. per., 5th sess., 5th meeting, vol. i (30 October, 1889), 45.

"Vom politischen Horizont", Sozialdemokrat , 12 October, 1889.

"Vom Hexenkessel der europäischen Diplomatie", ibid., 22 June, 1889. Engels agreed with this view. See Itr of Engels to Vera I. Zasulitch, 3 April, 1890, MEW, xxxvii, no. 178. 375.

See Bebel's speech in VR, 7th leg. per.. 2nd sess., 13th meeting, vol. i (16 December, 1887), 300.

Bebel's pathetic conviction, amounting to an article of faith, that Germany's partners in the Dreibund would sustain the beleaguered Reich on pinions of steel was not shared by all Socialist leaders. Eduard Bernstein's Sozialdemokrat on 28 July, 1888, 16 December, 1888, and 24 August, 1889 expressed grave doubts as to the value of the Dreibund, which, to his way of thinking, had been hopelessly crippled by the mutual antipathy between Rome and Vienna.

VR, i (16 December, 1887). 300.

Ibid. In a 1tr to Engels, 8 March. 1888, BBE, no. 112, 321, Bebel wrote: "Kommt es zum Kriege, so wird England, nach meiner Meinung, auf keinen Fall feindlich gegen Deutschland auftreten, und damit hat Deutschland wesentlich gewonnen. Militärisch wird es mit Frankreich und Russland fertig ...."

VR, 8th leg. per., 1st sess., 26th meeting, vol. i (25 June, 1890), 567.

Ibid., 568.

Ibid.

"Kriegsgefahr und Klassenherrschaft", Vorwarts, 12 September, 1891.

VR, i (25 June, 1890), 568.

See "Vom Hexenkessel der europäischen Diplomatie", Sozialdemokrat, 22 June, 1889; "Zur Umkehr", Vorwärts, 16 January, 1891; and Bebel's speech of December 1892 in Zurich, "Rede des deutschen Reichstags abgeordneten August Bebels gehalten in Kaserne Zürich III", in Bundesarchiv Koblenz, File 1/90-4 (12), 38.

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Erfurt vom 14. bis 20. Oktober 1891 (Berlin, 1891), 285.

Ibid., 187. Despite differences in their estimates of the Russian peril the two antagonists at Erfurt, Bebel and Vollmar, were inspired by fervent devotion to the ideals of Western Civilisation. Cf. Jansen, Vollmar, 91. However, Vollmar said that Bebel would welcome one more war if it were only directed against Russia for the liberation of mankind (Protokoll zu Erfurt, 284).

For affirmations of Socialist patriotism see "Die Vaterlandslosen", Sozialdemokrat, 26 May, 1888; "Die Sozialdemokratie und der Patriotismus", ibid., 17 February, 1889; and "Die Nation sind wir !", Vorwärts, 13 January, 1892. As was confirmed by the confidential reports of agents of the foreign office, the peacefully loyal attitude of the SPD was illustrated in the May Day celebrations of the early 1890s. E.g., see Auswartiges Amt, Europa Generalia, no. 82, Geheim. "Betreffend die Sozialdemokratie", iii, 21 April-5 May, 1890; vi, 22 May, 1891-31 March, 1893; and xii, 1 April, 1892-22 August, 1893. See especially the 1trs of the agent in Munich to Caprivi, 2 May, 1890, iii, no. 70, the agent in Dresden, 4 May, 1892, vi, no. 92; and the agent in Munich, 17 July, 1892, xii, no. 86.

This view is set forth in the 1tr of Engels to Bebel, 29 September (1 October) 1891, BBE, no. 164, 437-41; MEW, xxxix (East Berlin, 1968), xxi.

See Bebel's speech in VR, 8th leg. per., 2nd sess., 54th meeting, vol. ii (28 February, 1893), 1329. What the SPD was abjuring in opting for peace may be divined from Engels's 1tr to Bebel, 29 September, 1891, BBE, 441: "Siegen wir, so kommt unsere Partei ans Ruder. Der Sieg Deutschlands ist also der Sieg der Revolution, und wir müssen ihn, kommt's zum Krieg, nicht nur wünschen, sondern mit allen Mitteln befördern." Bebel, furthermore, had earlier reached the conclusion that the desired Russian revolution could only come about through war. See 1trs of Bebel to Engels, 30 December, 1887, ibid., no. 109, 316; and 8 March, 1888, ibid., no. 112, 221.

E.g., see "Die französische Allianz", Vorwärts, 22 March, 1891, which spoke of the "happily extremely improbable prospect of war". At Erfurt in 1891 Vollmar had even conjured up an apocalyptic vision of a possibly permanent peace (Protokoll zu Erfurt, 187-8).

See 1tr of Engels to F. Sorge, 18 January, 1893. MEW, xxxix, no. 5, 10.

See the speech of Paul Singer, co-chairman with Bebel of the Central Committee of the SPD, at the Halle Convention, in Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Parter Deutschlands abgehalten zu Halle vom 12. bis 18.Oktober 1890 (Berlin, 1890), 81. See also Bebel's speech in Protokoll zu Erfurt, 161. For characteristic justifications of the party's antimilitarism, see further the following articles: "Militär-Sozialismus", 16 November, 1891; "Die Etatsdebatten im Reichstag", 2 December, 1891; "Zur Naturgeschichte des Militarismus", 2 February, 1892: "Der Militarismus auf der Anklagebank", 18 February, 1892; and "Krieg im Frieden", 21 May, 1892, all in the Vorwärts; as well as Max Schippel. "Die Parteien und die Militärfrage", NZ xi (1892), 207-10; and "Militarismus und Militärvorlage", ibid., 279-84.

See Bebel's speeches in VR, 8th leg. per., 1st sess.. 88th meeting, vol. iii (13 March, 1891), 2036-40; 120th meeting (17 November, 1891), 2899. 2900 ; 172nd meeting (15 February, 1892), 4214-26; 2nd sess., 62nd meeting (9 March, 1893), 1522-25; and 72nd meeting (21 March, 1893), 1774-77. On specific reactions to the Sexennat itself see Bebel in ibid., 8th leg. per., 2nd sess., 14th meeting, vol. i (13 December, 1892). 303-12; and Mehring, "Zur Militärvorlage". NZ, xi (1892), 809-12.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 27 January, 1892, BBE, no. 187, 495.

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Berlin vom 14. bis 21. November 1892 (Berlin, 1892), 132. Singer told the delegates: "Wir sind Feinde des Militarismus und werden denselben so lange bekampfen, bis er zerschmettert am Boden liegt" (ibid., 131). A summary of the fight that the SPD Reichstag delegation conducted against the Sexennat of 1892 is given in Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Köln a. Rh. vom 22. bis 28. Oktober 1893 (Berlin. 1893), 76-79.

VR, 9th leg. per., 2nd sess., 64th meeting, vol. i (27 November, 1893), 105-6; see also Bebel, Die S.D.i.d. Reichstag, 438.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 31 January, 1893. BBE, no. 254, 653-4: and Vorwärts, 25 January, 1893, which reproduces Bebel's speech before the Reichstag Military Committee.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 31 January. 1893. BEF, 654; see also Engels to Bebel, 9 February, 1893, MEW, xxxix, no. 16, 27.

Ltr. of Engels to Bebel, 9 February, 1893, BBE, no. 255. 657.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 11 February, 1893, ibid., no 256. 662; see also 1tr of Engels to Bebel, 9 February, 1893, MEW, xxxix, 28-29 and 554 n.44.

Rede im Kasino Zurich III, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. File 1/904 (12), 36-37

Bebel, Die S.D.i.d. Reichstag, 450-1.

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 28 February, 1893, BBE, no. 259, 670.

VR, 9th leg. per., 2nd sess., 6th meeting, vol. i (17 November, 1893), 108.

See Max Schippel , Sozialdemokratisches Reichstags-Handbuch (Berlin, n.d.), 903.

VR (17 November, 1893), 108-9. See also Liebknecht's speech in ibid., 9th leg. per., 2nd sess., 72nd meeting, vol. iii (15 March, 1894), 1862-64; and his article "Gegen Krieg und Militarismus", Vorwärts, 1 April, 1894.

See 1tr of Engels to Paul Lafargue. 22 January. 1895, MEW, xxxix, no. 205, 392-3. Engels's influence continued to be reflected in articles in the party's central organ, e.g., "Die Gemeingefährlichkeit des Militarismus", 8 September, 1893; "Gegen Krieg und Militarismus", 1 April, 1894; and "Der Militarismus", 13 March, 1895, all in Vorwärts.

In the editorial "Zur Polenfrage", ibid., 2 October, 1894, it was denied that Germany would ever "begin a war of conquest ... against Russia".

Ltr of Bebel to Engels, 17 July, 1895, BBE, no. 318, 805.

See "Zur Polenfrage", 3 August, 1894; "Zur Polenfrage", 2 October, 1894; and "Finis Poloniae", 24 October, 1895, all in Vorwärts.

"Zur Polenfrage", ibid., 3 August, 1894, 1-2. A tiny group of Socialist left-wingers opposed sacrificing the Polish masses to their reactionary noble landlords merely for the sake of erecting "a buffer state against Russian barbarism". See 1tr of Ignaz Auer to Karl Kautsky, 23 July, 1896. Nachlass Kautsky. IISG, File 224, no. 4/2.

Bebel , " Die Ernahrung unserer Armee im Kriegsfalle", Vorwärts, 2 October, 1895.

It should be noted that at this time the SPD, no more than any other German party, had any concrete knowledge of the fact that the Franco-Russian military convention had gone into effect at the beginning of 1894. See Friedrich Haselmayr, Diplomatische Geschichte des zweiten Reichs von 1871-1918, iv: Ein Jahrzehnt wechselvoller kaiserlicher Politik, 1890-99 (Munich, 1961), 143.

See Nikolai Owtscharenko , "Zur Herausbildung der aussenpolitischen Konzeption der Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen die imperialistische 'Weltpolitik' an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert", in Marxismus und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung. Studien zur sozialistischen Bewegung im letzten Drittel des 19ten Jahrhundert, ed. by Die deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (East Berlin, 1970 ), 531; and Antoni Czubinski , Stanowisko Socialdemokracji Niemieckiej wobec Polityki Kolonialneji II Rzeszy w Latach 1876-1914 (Poznån, 1966), 126-33. The Hohenlohe ministry, of course, retreated before the imperious will of the Kaiser and Tirpitz. See Manfred Rauh , Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus im wilhelminischen Reich. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien , xlvii ( Düsseldorf, 1972), 220-1; and J.C. Röhl , Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), 227-9.

Owtscharenko , loc. cit., 547-8; and Erich Matthias , Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Osten, 1914-15. Eine Ubersicht ( Tiibingen , 1954), 5.

E.g., see Bebel's speech in VR, 9th leg. per., 3rd sess., 64th meeting, vol. iii (19 March, 1895), 1580-85, and such articles as "Weltpolitik", Vorwärts, 31 January, 1896; and "Italien, Afrika und der Sozialismus ", ibid., 15, 17 March, 1896.

E.g., see especially Alexander Helphand (Parvus), "Die Goldwährung in Russland", NZ, xiv ( 1895-96), 246-9; "Russland im Jahre 1895", Vorwärts, 15 January, 1896 ; "Die Blutweihe der Zarenkönig", ibid. , 2 June, 1896; "Russische Finanzmanöver", ibid., 18 July, 1896; "Zar und Bombenbaron ", ibid., 19 September, 1896; and " Von der Nationalitätenfrage ", ibid., 15 July, 1897, which latter article graphically described Russian oppression of the Ukrainians.

VR, 9th leg. per., 4th sess., 39th meeting, vol. ii (13 February, 1896), 940.

Ibid., 942.

Ibid., 943.

Ibid., 942.

Ibid., 944.

Ibid.

Naval allocations increased from 86.259.999 marks in the budget of 1896-97 to 116,974,000 in that for 1897-98 (Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Hamburg vom 3. bis 9. Oktober 1897 (Berlin. 1897), 56).

VR, 4th sess., 39th meeting, ii, 945.

Ibid., 63rd meeting (18 March, 1896), 1543.

Eduard Bernstein , "Kreta und die russische Gefahr", NZ, xv (1896-97), 13.

Liebknecht , " Zur Weltlage", Vorwärts, 13 August, 1897. On the same line see his speeches in VR, 9th leg. per., 4th sess., 198th meeting, vol. vii (26 March, 1897), 5280; and ibid., 5th sess.. 76th meeting, vol. iii (27 April, 1898), 1985.

E.g., see Bebel's authoritative pronouncements in ibid., 4th sess., 59th meeting, vol. ii (13 March, 1896), 1430-9; ibid., 60th meeting (14 March, 1896), 1430-9; ibid., 60th meeting (14 March, 1896), 1467-72; ibid., 61st meeting (18 March, 1896), 1540-44; ibid., 5th sess., 70th meeting, vol. iii (26 March, 1898). 1787-91; ibid., 10th leg. per., 1st sess., 6th meeting, vol. i (16 December, 1898), 89-104; and Liebknecht's speech in ibid., 9th leg. per., 5th sess., 7th meeting, vol. iii (27 April, 1898), 1981-5.

See "Die innere Lage in den Staaten des Dreibundes", Vorwärts, 15 June, 1895; "Die Dreibund Krisis", ibid., 5 July, 1896; and "Bismarcks Indiskretionen", ibid., 4 November, 1896 .

Conversely, the Marxist origins of German Socialist foreign policy have been asserted by the East German Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED: Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Kapitel III (East Berlin, 1966). 147 and 173.

Volker Berghahn , one of the recognized authorities on Flottenpolitik, wrote, in disagreement with the late Gerhard Ritter, that in foreign affairs the naval program of Tirpitz and the imperialist capitalists was a mixture of defensive and offensive elements, "the latter, however, being veiled to far greater extent than has hitherto been supposed" ("Zu den Zielen des deutschen Flottenbaus unter Wilhelm II". Historische Zeitschrift , ccx. no. 1 (1970), 98).

This thesis is developed in Eckart Kehr, Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur preussisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by H. U. Wehler (2nd ed., Berlin, 1970).

These hypotheses were set forth by Kehr in his "Die deutsche Flotte in den neunziger Jahren und der politisch-militarische Dualismus des Kaiserreichs", in ibid., 117 and 123; and idem, " Englandhass und Weltpolitik. Eine Studie über die innenpolitischen und sozialen Grundlagen der deutschen Aussenpolitik um die Jahrhundertwende". ibid., 157.

This phrase, distinguished from the later "grosse" Sammlungspolitik of Tirpitz and Biilow, was first employed by Volker Berghahn in his article, " Das Kaiserreich in der Sackgasse", Neue Politische Literatur , xvi (1971).

The stability of the Junker-heavy industry alliance. especially in later years, has been questioned by Hans-Jürgen Puhle , Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (Hanover, 1966), 155-64, and by Helmut Kaelble. Industrielle Interessenpolitik in der wilhelminischen Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1967), 146. On this see James J. Sheehan , "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Eckart Kehr's Essays on Modern German History". Central European History, i, (1968 ), 172-73.

As Wolfgang J. Mommsen in his article, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914". Central European History , vi (1973). 8, avers, this viewpoint of Kehr's is today shared to greater or lesser degree by Helmut Böhme, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Dirk Stegmann and Volker Berghahn. See in this connection especially Stegmann's Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbande in der Spiztphase des wilhelmirtischen Deutschlands, Sammlungspolitik, 1897-1918 (Cologne, 1970); Berghahn, Der Tirpitzplan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II (Düsseldorf, 1971); idem, "Flottenrüstrung und Machtgefüge", in Das kaiserliche Deutschland, ed. by Michael Stürmer (Düsseldorf, 1970); and Bohme, "Thesen zur Beurteilung der gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Ursachen des deutschen Imperialismus", in Der moderne Imperialismus, ed. by Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Stuttgart, 1971). More recently Winfried Baumgart has sharply questioned the validity of both the capitalistic safety valve theory and the primacy of domestic policy (Deutschland im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, 1890-1914. Grundkrafte. Thesen und Strukturen (Frankfurt and Vienna. 1972)).

Cf. Kehr , "Englandhass", op. cit., 157.

See W.H. Maehl , "The Triumph of Nationalism in the German Socialist Party on the Eve of the First World War", in German Militarism and Socialism (Lincoln, Nebr., 1968), 63-104.

See Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiser-lichen Deutschlands (Diisseldorf, 1961), 184-7, 523.

VR, 10th leg. per., 1st sess., 120th meeting, vol. iv (12 December, 1899), 3323.

Bebel maintained that no increase in the size of the fleet would be necessary in a war against Russia and France, "where the decision would be reached on the land" (ibid., 10th leg. per., 1st sess., 204th meeting, vol. vii (6 June, 1900), 5817).

Thus Vollmar wrote in 1900: "If Germany will not be the coadjutor of England, she will have to stand alone against the assault of Russian imperialism" ("Der russische Imperialismus und Deutschlands China-Abenteuer", NZ, xix (1900-01), 235).

Interestingly enough, the English Socialist H. M. Hyndman had written to Bebel in 1896 that there was nothing permanent about Anglo-Russian antagonism: "The mistake that I think your statesmen have made is supposing that England must fight Russia because of conflicting interests in Asia. This is not so. We can come to terms with Russia ...." See Hyndman's 1tr to Bebel. 14 February, 1896. Nachlass Bebel, IISG, File 110/1-2.

VR, 9th leg. per., 5th sess., 8th meeting, vol. i (11 December, 1897), 159.

Bebel blamed Bernstein for throwing a bone of contention into the ranks of the party "at a time when all our forces should be marshalled against the foe" (Bebel to Bernstein, 24 May, 1901. Nachlass Bebel. IISG, File 6/16).

In 1908 Bebel's wife was operated on for cancer, After fearful suffering, she died in 1910. The first traumatic shock is evident in Bebel's letters of 1908 (e.g., to Kautsky, 25 February. 1908. BBK, no. 141, 195; and Bebel to Luise Kautsky, 28 February, 1908, ibid., no. 142, 195). Ferdinand Simon, the physician son-in-law of Bebel, also fell gravely ill in 1908 (Bebel to Luise Kautsky. 11 October. 1908. ibid., no. 147, 199) and died in 1912, with devastating consequences for the psychological and physical well-being of his wife Frieda, who herself had been gravely ill eight times in the preceding four years. With respect to himself, Bebel wrote Luise Kautsky on 11 October, 1908 (ibid) : "One of my physicians ... says my pulse is very poor. He spoke with more reserve to me personally. But all three [physicians] categorically demanded: withdrawal from all parliamentary and agitational activity. I could still recover at present; but in a little while it would be too late. A fine prospect."

VR, 12th leg. per., 1st sess., 61st meeting, vol. ccxxix (29 November, 1907), 1906.

Ibid., 52nd meeting, vol. ccxxviii (13 May, 1907), 1612.

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Mannheim vom 23.- 27. September 1906 (Berlin, 1906), 230-4. Similarly at the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart in 1907 the German section successfully polemicized against the motion, brought in by a majority of French Socialists, imposing the obligation of the general strike. See Internationale-Sozialistenkongress zu Stuttgart vom 18. bis 24. August 1907 (Berlin, 1907), 66. Again, due to German demands, motions on behalf of the general strike were beaten down at the international congress at Copenhagen in 1910 (see Kautsky, Sozialisten und Krieg (Prague, 1937), 347) and at the extraordinary international Socialist congress at Basel in 1912 (Ausserordentlicher internationaler Sozialistenkongress zu Basel am 24 und 25. November 1912 (Berlin, 1912), 49-52). At the SPD Convention at Essen in 1907 an irate Bebel made his famous defiant declaration: "If it comes to war with Russia, which I regard as the foe of all culture, of oppressed peoples everywhere, and the most dangerous enemy of Europe, particularly of us Germans, then I, old man that I am, would be ready to shoulder a rifle and go off to war against Russia" (Protokoll iiber die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Essen vom 15 bis 21. September 1907 (Berlin, 1907), 255).

Protokoll ... zu Jena vom 14. bis 20. September 1913 (Berlin, 1913), 174, 337-8, and 420-7. The purely transient coalition between Left and Centre, established the preceding year at Chemnitz, was forever broken in 1913 at Jena. In a letter to Kautsky on 11 July, 1913, shortly before Bebel's death, the latter wrote that if the SPD were to call a general strike it would only reveal to its detriment the practical limits of the party's strength (BBK, no. 298, 349).

VR, 12th leg. per., 2nd sess., 217th meeting, vol. cclxviii (5 December, 1911), 8356.

See R.J. Crampton , "August Bebel and the British Foreign Office", History, Iviii (1973), 218-32.

Ibid., 220, citing a dispatch of Angst to Tyrrell in the F.O., 24 September, 1910.

Cf. ibid., 227 and 231.

BBK, no 284, 335.

Crampton, loc. cit., 226, citing a dispatch of Angst to Tyrrel, 14 February, 1913.