‘Balkansplaining’ Europe: Epistemic resistance and the negotiation of belonging in the post-Yugoslav Balkans

Abstract

The article examines the internalisation of narratives that position the post-Yugoslav Balkans as Europe’s ‘Other’ within the region itself, through the lens of self-colonisation, understood as the adoption of civilising discourses and the disavowal of local pasts in the pursuit of ‘Europeanness’. Drawing on post-socialist and decolonial scholarship, we explore how the post-Yugoslav Balkans not only respond to but actively participate in the production of Europe’s symbolic geography. Using qualitative data from interviews and focus groups conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we examine how citizens articulate, contest, and negotiate visions of Europe across socioeconomic, political, and cultural registers. Our analysis reveals a complex and often ambivalent relationship with Europe, expressed through the concept of Balkansplaining, a decolonial tool that centres lived experiences and regional epistemologies. By focusing on Balkan subjects, we uncover potential spaces of epistemic resistance and alternatives to dominant visions of Europe, thereby opening avenues to reimagine it.

Introduction

‘Europe is ours!’ proclaimed the liberal Naša stranka (Our Party) as the European Union (EU) opened accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in April 2024. As Petrović (2009) explained, similar metaphors have long been used by politicians in the post-Yugoslav Balkans (hereafter also the Balkans) ¹ to describe supposed ideological movement – symbolising both Europe ‘coming’ to the Balkans and its people becoming ‘European’ as they transform themselves in the EU accession process. ‘Coming’ or rather ‘returning’ to Europe was an especially poignant discursive device during the post-socialist transition and almost by default implied ‘exit from the Balkans’ (Lindstrom, 2003). The complex relationship between the Balkans and Europe, including the region’s various representations and the changing dynamics of its self-image, develops through a discourse in which the Balkans are, to borrow from Marina Gržinić (2000), ‘the Matrix of Monsters’: a space positioned between the ‘First’ and the ‘Third’ World, the inner Other of Europe, the mirror reflection of Europe, chronotope of excess (Stošić, 2016: 7).

This image of the Balkans as a cultural and religious ‘Other’ to ‘Europe proper’ has been largely naturalised in both academic and political contexts. In this persistence, we can observe how hegemonic categories often remain unqualified and unstressed, while their negative or deviant counterparts must be explicitly expounded. While the label Europe necessarily includes Western Europe and its white populations, the Balkans must continually be named, fluctuating between a fixed category and an empty space waiting to be defined (Boatcă, 2021: 390). In other words, intertwining the notion of Europe with the project of modernity established the former as a resilient and uncontested notion against which the Balkans appear ambivalent and paradoxical (Mishkova, 2008).

Maria Todorova (1997: 188) established the concept of ‘Balkanism’ to explain this phenomenon, arguing that in the way it was assigned its meaning, the region ‘served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” has been constructed’. Within this process, the metaphorical images of the Balkans constructed from the outside by which the region is stuck in continuous objectivisation, transformed it ‘from space into a negative place’ (Hasanović, 2021: 82–83). In such a spatial interposition, in-betweenness and liminality, ‘the Balkans have been prevented from their own imagining of the future’ (Hasanović, 2021: 82–83). In this article, we address this predicament by turning the lens to the post-Yugoslav Balkans. First, we explore how Balkanism narratives have been internalised and interpreted by local populations, political elites, and scholarly analyses, drawing on the concept of self-colonisation. Second, we examine how these processes shape the imaginary of Europe from the Balkans, and how decolonial and post-socialist perspective can help us understand what it means to exist in the European semi-periphery. ² To do so, our analysis focuses on BiH, which serves here as a microcosm of the Balkans and a fulcrum for Balkanism (Jeffrey, 2008). The liminality of the Balkans is perhaps most evident in BiH, home to three large and several smaller religious communities and ethnic groups where a multicultural kaleidoscope emerges capturing both the ‘worst’ and the ‘best’ of the imaginary Balkans (Juncos, 2005: 90). Throughout history, BiH was considered part of white European civilisation, ‘but not quite’, with representations situating it between East and West, and, in a more contemporary sense, ‘between the EU and its constitutive non-European outside’ (Jansen et al., 2017: 11).

At the same time, the supposed uniqueness of BiH is somewhat blurred in the contemporary moment, as it becomes increasingly representative of all those ‘for whom possibilities of realizing a viable future are measured by their ability to secure a certain kind of mobility’ (Kurtović, 2021: 2). The emplacement or displacement of BiH from and to Europe thus plays out in both symbolic and practical terms, reflecting the spatial and temporal configurations of belonging and exclusion. Moreover, as Musliu (2021: 92) explained, due to BiH’s institutional structure and international state-building practices which are largely led by the EU, Europe is continuously imagined, negotiated, and performed in different spaces by both local people and EU representatives and other international institutions.

Precisely because of the political and bureaucratic organisation of the country and especially the presence of a High Representative acting as an international institution responsible for implementing the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), neocoloniality is actively operated and performed in BiH (Majstorović, 2019). ³ This is evident in how ‘outsiders actually set the agenda, impose it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse to implement it’ (Knaus and Martin, 2003: 61), leading to the popularisation of sentiments that BiH ‘is the last colony in Europe, where outsiders, who no one elected, have taken leadership’, as expressed by the former Republika Srpska (RS) president Milorad Dodik (Congradin, 2024). Thus, scratching beneath the carefully and artificially created vision of what Europe means or should mean to Bosnians may enable us to uncover potential spaces of resistance and alternatives to dominant visions of Europe.

The article is organised as follows. The first section briefly explains data collection and empirical background. We then examine how Balkanism discourse has been solidified in the European imaginary of the Balkans and, subsequently, how this has been internalised by political elites and ordinary people. In the analysis, we draw on the concept of self-colonisation to explore its implications for evolving visions of Europe from the Balkans. Here we also introduce the idea of Balkansplaining as a decolonial tool that reclaims one’s agency and authority to speak. In the third section, we present our empirical analysis, examining how Bosnian people utilise and interpret different ideas of ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ across specific socioeconomic, political, and cultural constellations. We conclude by reflecting on the practice of Balkansplaining and why such an exercise may uncover new and changing relationalities emerging from Europe’s semi-peripheries.

Fieldwork

This article draws on empirical data collected through interviews and focus groups conducted in BiH between 2018 and 2021, within two overlapping research contexts: the Horizon 2020 project RePAST and a related doctoral project. ⁴ A total of 20 in-depth interviews and nine focus groups were conducted. Both projects investigated how historical legacies, identity formations, and collective memory influence post-conflict political imaginaries. This article engages only with material thematically linked to imaginaries of ‘Europe’ and related value frameworks, with specific focus on the normative dimensions of European integration and the ways in which these references shape social and political subjectivities.

The research instrument comprised open-ended questions, enabling in-depth exploration of participants’ views. Key questions included: ‘What does Europe mean to you personally?’ ‘Do you feel that BiH belongs to Europe, and why?’ and ‘How do you perceive the role of the EU in your everyday life or local community?’ These questions were situated within broader discussions of identity and perceived political and cultural cleavages. Religious identity was not addressed through direct questioning, as the research aimed to prioritise political, civic, and normative aspects of European belonging. However, participants were free to introduce religion, and religious references occasionally emerged, particularly when intertwined with ethnic identities. The decision not to foreground religion was methodological, reflecting a deliberate focus on secular and political imaginaries of Europe. Participants were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling, with initial contacts established via local organisations, educational institutions, and community networks. No interviewees were personally known to the researcher prior to recruitment. The sampling strategy was designed to ensure diversity across several dimensions, including ethnic affiliation (Bosniak, Serb, and Croat), place of residence (Federation of BiH (FBiH) and RS), age, and gender. In view of BiH’s interethnic dynamics, focus groups were composed as ethnically homogeneous to facilitate open and honest discussion. Particular attention was given to underrepresented or socially specific groups.

Data analysis combined inductive and deductive thematic approaches. Analytical attention focused on negotiated meanings of Europe and European integration, as well as the norms, values, and affective positions that emerged in both collective discussions and individual narratives. Focus groups were designed to capture collective meaning-making and group dynamics, while interviews provided insight into personal experiences, reflections, and emotional orientations. Together, these data sources offer a grounded understanding of how Europe is imagined, contested, and reconfigured across different social and ethnic contexts in contemporary BiH. By turning the lens on Balkan subjects, we aimed to destabilise various forms of self-colonisation and critically assess how invocations of Europe in the region may contribute to processes of imagining and re-imagining it.

The Balkans are (not) Balkans are Europe

References to the complex relations between Europe and the Balkans have long been established by a range of scholars working within Balkan studies, especially through their engagement with Said’s Orientalist approach and the translation of postcolonial theory as a means of explaining the peripheralisation of the region and its people (Baker, 2018; Bjelić, 2011; Goldsworthy, 2002; Mishkova, 2018). This scholarship challenged the conventional understanding of the Balkans within European discourse as a region ‘at odds with “European” values and traditions’ (Juncos, 2005: 89). Such entanglements of meaning created space for changing identifications with ‘Europe’ as an arena of modernity, civilisation and whiteness, and ‘the Balkans’ as something opposite, different, alien (Baker, 2018). This thinking was steadily internalised by political elites in the Balkans, especially after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Razsa and Lindstrom (2004: 630) showed how such rhetoric was used to legitimise the struggle for independence and the necessary ‘emancipation from its Balkan burden and its return to its rightful place in Europe’. In the imagery used by local figures seeking to shed the Balkan label, places within the region are depicted with varying degrees of ‘Balkanness’ or, conversely, proximity to the ‘true’ Europe.

Balkanism discourse thus functions hierarchically, both spatially and temporally, determining interdependent levels of sameness and difference. The crucial point of differentiation lies in EU membership – once a Balkan country joins, it not only escapes the Balkan label but also gains the legitimacy to deploy colonial discourse, as EU membership ‘creates a shared “reservoir” of discursive patterns for producing “otherness” when referring to those who are not part of the united Europe’ (Petrovič, 2011: 3). The interchangeable use of the terms EU and Europe is what Velikonja (2005) called the ‘original sin’ of the new Eurocentrism, which appropriates the geographical and historical name of the European continent, while the Europeanisation process serves as the main means of legitimising the construction of its new symbolic geography. ⁵ This symbolic geography is not confined to state borders but also operates within states, creating internal hierarchies of Europeanness and Balkanness. The insistence on proving one’s European character captures much of the Balkanism discourse but also a political and identity schism that emerges with its internalisation.

On this, Kiossev (2011) used the term self-colonisation to describe cultures that have succumbed to the cultural and political power of Europe or the West, without being invaded or turned into colonies in reality. In this process, they have been made into a semi-periphery, in which they recognise cultural supremacy of Europe and claim its place within it. This internalisation can give rise to what Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992) called ‘nesting orientalism’, a hierarchical reproduction of the original West–East dichotomy within the Balkans themselves. Avoiding a ‘culture of backwardness’, each group or nation assumes a standard rooted in an idealised Europe, constructing its own ‘Other’ as more ‘backward’ or less European, thereby reinforcing the region’s overall marginalisation while attempting to escape it. Here, political elites turn themselves and their compatriots into modern people – Europeans, part of the ‘enlightened humankind’ (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, 1992).

Patterns of self-colonisation can largely be observed operating on two levels (Ţichindeleanu, 2017). First, there is the full integration of the Western, European civilising perspective in political and social narratives across the region. This is most dramatically reflected in the appropriation of xenophobic positions, particularly towards people of colour, migrants, and refugees in Europe. Hence, we can observe the Balkans in terms of ‘white enclosures’, which perpetuate European patterns of racial and colonial continuities (Rexhepi, 2022). Such dynamics complicate the usual framing of the Balkans as existing ‘beyond’ the racial dynamics of Western Europe, pointing to Kalmar’s (2022) idea of ‘white but not quite’. Through the process of self-colonisation, the Balkans assert claims to whiteness essential to their self-representation, and as a means of drawing boundaries between themselves and their own ‘Others’ (Mark et al., 2024: 2). Second, these narratives are often marked by a kind of ‘memory erase’, an attempt to ignore or overlook the past as everything from what is seen as negative and futile (Ţichindeleanu, 2017). As a result, Balkan countries are not merely seeking to shed the ‘Balkan’ label in geographical or political sense, but also in a cultural and historical one. This dynamic of self-colonisation is also poignantly evident in the widespread distancing from and disregard of Yugoslav heritage, which functions as a symbolic vessel for the broader Europeanisation process. In practice, this involves rejecting any connection to the Yugoslav past while adopting the EU memory framework to demonstrate alignment with EU norms, thereby affirming their European identity (Trošt and David, 2023: 83).

By examining the identified patterns of self-colonisation among both ordinary people and political elites, and by exploring potential alternatives for theorising the Balkans and its inhabitants, we argue that Balkan studies would benefit from engaging with literature addressing the question of the East, or what Martin Müller (2020: 738) termed the ‘Global East’. ⁶ This is a space held together less by political unity, economic cooperation, or even a shared experience of socialism, and more by a ‘shared feeling of simultaneous difference and resemblance to an amorphous Europe’ (Müller, 2020: 738). Engaging symbolically and intellectually with the peculiarities of this position aligns with the emerging decolonial wave that has developed more seriously in the last decade (Boatcă, 2013; Karkov, 2015; Kušić, 2021; Manolova et al., 2019; Ţichindeleanu, 2011). Engaging decoloniality in the context of the Global East means, as Tlostanova (2012: 132) suggested, beginning with ‘geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge growing out of the local histories, subjectivities and experiences of eastern and south-eastern Europe’. This presumes a shift in emphasis ‘from universalist applications of ready-made discourses and travelling theories /. . . / to pluriversal and pluritopic intersubjectification, paying attention to various local histories’ (Tlostanova, 2012: 132).

To achieve this, Ţichindeleanu (2011: 1) argued for ‘the continuous public creation of an epistemic space of resistance and alternatives to both capital and coloniality, articulated from the location of Eastern Europe’. ⁷ In the remainder of the article, we adopt a similar approach by turning to ‘Balkansplaining’ to explore imaginaries of Europe as reflected by the people of BiH grappling with questions of belonging and exclusion. In doing so, we draw inspiration from various attempts at ‘Yugosplaining’ as ‘counter forms of westsplaining’ (di Gallo et al., 2020) to which post-Yugoslav scholars and people have long been subjected (Hozić et al., 2020). ⁸ Building on this, Balkansplaining is conceived as a decolonial tool for reclaiming the right to speak, rooted in lived experience, and situated knowledge. It functions as a subversion of imposed patterns of westsplaining, recognising the expertise and agency of people from the region while highlighting how frequently they have been denied both. It asserts that, rather than the Balkans being continuously westsplained, value lies in the possibility of Balkansplaining Europe itself – from a position of epistemic authority and regional expertise.

Patterning of self-colonisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

To understand perceptions of Europe from the perspective of BiH, we can identify three main themes: (1) socioeconomic views, (2) political views, and (3) cultural views. Beginning with the socioeconomic view, both interviews and focus groups revealed three predominant perspectives: ‘pragmatic’, ‘critical’, and ‘rejectionist’. While these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they reveal distinct modalities of positioning towards Europe in the socioeconomic realm. In doing so, they challenge any linear understanding of ‘pro-European’ sentiment as a single or stable category, illustrating instead the diversity of orientations shaped by lived experience, structural conditions, and affect. The pragmatic view reflects a functional appreciation of Europe, particularly its perceived economic stability, institutional efficiency, and rule of law. Interviewees expressing this view emphasised the benefits of European integration in terms of labour mobility, education, investment, and administrative standards. However, their assessments remained grounded in concrete comparisons rather than affective projections. Europe was seen as ‘working better’ rather than as a utopia. This view is most commonly expressed by residents of the FBiH. They often describe the EU as the ‘crème de la crème’ and see it as an ideal model for political, economic, and social systems that BiH should aspire to emulate (FGA-01; I-06; I-09). Some interviewees emphasised values such as ‘work, order, and discipline’, ‘safety, strength, and unity’ (I-05), and associated the EU with images of ‘luxury, monumental buildings, travel, and wealth’ (FGR-02). These sentiments also highlight self-colonising tendencies, through which a sense of inferiority manifests. This attitude hinges on the naturalised idea that the only way to achieve a well-functioning society is by completing the process of Europeanisation.

Hence, the pragmatic vision of Europe is necessarily linked to the imagined regression of the Balkans, of BiH – Europe is the direction that BiH must take. However, not all interviewees shared this outlook. A more critical view emerged, particularly among those living in RS. They pointed out that the EU is not a utopia, emphasising that life there requires hard work just to sustain oneself (FGA-03; I-05; I-13). Those expressing opposition to EU membership often highlighted several concerns. They argued that the EU hinders the export of agricultural products such as fruit, vegetables, and meat from BiH (FGN-1). In addition, they feared that joining the EU would lead to increased taxes, ultimately lowering the standard of living for citizens (FGN-03). One interviewee (I-04) went further, asserting:

I absolutely hold that Europe can help BiH, but it does not want to. Europe needs for BiH to stay as it is now, simply to have an alibi for certain things. For example, let us say, and maybe someone will take this the wrong way, BiH as disorderly as it is currently, is perfect for smuggling drugs. This current BiH suits them. They always need some kind of hot spot to divert public attention from their problems, so they always throw Bosnia under the bus to forget problems in Brussels.

The quote indicates how Bosnian people grapple with contentions that treat regions such as the Balkans as a ‘problem space’ – and becoming more like the West – as the only solution (Lim, 2022; Müller, 2020). Importantly, as this interviewee identifies, this process conceals largely exploitative relationships with the geopolitical power centres (Boatcă, 2012). This was further illuminated by another interviewee, who emphasised the following (FGN-06):

BiH is transformed into one common space, into one common territory of many different kinds, as in Africa – a shared land with two shared tribes, where Europeans have drawn borders to live in two different lands, without any early historical justification, so that, we are in Europe physically, but in most other ways, we are treated as if we are not.

Therefore, Europe is seen as a complex that both rules and rejects, imposing its own visions of what BiH should be and doing so to suit its own interests. To solidify existing hierarchies and justify the nature of relations vis-à-vis BiH and the Balkans, the EU must continuously represent the region as somewhat odd. As Kuus (2007: 152) explained, not impossibly foreign, but ‘as a half-way house between Europe and Asia: not simply backward, but a learner, an experiment and a testing ground’. In practice, such a position for the region and BiH in particular, creates a strong sense of resentment and victimisation, eventually uncovering a broader problem with credibility and mistrust (Daviddi, 2023).

The second set of views revolves around political perspectives, focusing primarily on issues of sovereignty and legitimacy. Two predominant viewpoints emerge here. The first sees EU membership as a potential solution or a means of reforming the institutional framework of BiH, enabling the country to ‘move forward’. This sentiment was particularly evident among four respondents who suggested that the EU would compel BiH to implement new laws and improve its constitution, addressing core issues that have plagued the country (FGA-05; FGP-03; I-05; I-09). Within this discourse, the idea of EU membership carries the expectation of institutional transformation, targeting the foundational aspects of BiH’s post-war sociopolitical life as established by the DPA. The discourse illustrates the reproduction of colonial relations designating the Balkans as periphery in need of supervision, where the EU accession process is understood not only as a profound transformation but one which requires guidance (Petrovič, 2011).

This view, largely expressed by residents of the FBiH, contrasts with the perspectives on sovereignty and legitimacy held by residents of RS. The distinct political status of RS, perceived as an exclusive homeland for Serbs, shapes these narratives. For residents of RS, EU membership is seen in two opposing ways: either as an opportunity to solidify the existence of RS or as a potential threat to its autonomy. These divergent views reflect the complex interplay between the political aspirations of different entities within BiH and their perceptions of the EU’s role in shaping the country’s future (I-06; FGE-02; FGS-03). These are further fuelled by identity-driven arguments rooted in historical grievances. One respondent highlighted a narrative of past injustices, arguing that neither BiH in general nor RS specifically should join the EU due to the harm inflicted on Serbs by EU member states during historical conflicts. They referenced the bombing of Serbia and the resulting casualties as evidence of a hostile EU stance towards Serbs (FGO-02). ⁹ This historically charged narrative is crucial as it illustrates how historical memories and perceived past wrongs are used to justify a rejectionist stance towards the EU and European integration for BiH. It underscores the depth of distrust towards the EU and the belief that integration would not safeguard, but rather threaten, the distinct identity and existence of RS. More importantly, it uncovers a significant fallacy regarding the view of semi-peripheries as static entities, ignoring their relational complexity and the varieties that may exist within peripheral selves (Majstorović, 2021: 16–17). In this case, the presence and activities of the EU vis-à-vis BiH are generating ontological insecurity in respondents from RS, who subsequently understand Europe as a proxy for the Bosnian cause and therefore as the embodiment of the ‘Other’ (together with Bosniaks) antagonised against the Bosnian Serb ‘Self’ (Kočan and Zupančič, 2022). A good example of this is the following argument made by one of the interviewees (FGN-07):

The first thing that comes to my mind when I say Europe is hypocrisy, as it was shown to us enough times throughout history. From the Turkish invasion of the Balkans onwards, what Europe has done for us and what we did for it, is not the same. But it is as it is /. . . . / This is what I first think of when I see Europe, an unstable region, with too many nations, overpopulated, with too many ambitions, spilling their neo-imperialist tendencies on us through some cultural smears.

The growing rejection of EU membership within RS is spurred by the largely Eurosceptic politics led by its political leaders, chiefly Dodik. According to him, the behaviour of the EU towards BiH shows where the latter stands for most European countries, while all the ‘lies and scams’ of the EU explain why ‘RS wants partnership with Europe, but it does not agree to subjugation’ (Dodik in SS, 2024). These attitudes also reflect how the imposition of the DPA and questions about its fair and just implementation, guaranteeing the existence of RS, are used to validate political rhetoric which brands Europe as an imperial power and even as an aggressor and invader (Jeffrey, 2008). Such sentiments are further aggravated by the complex and deep settlement of European and international institutions in the country and the large presence of various foreigners (stranci) who have influenced collective perceptions of Bosnians about themselves and the West or Europe. As Tarabusi (2020: 75–76) explained, ‘internationals constitute a significant social experience for post-socialist BiH residents’ and the resulting dynamics of this experience also influence representational forms through which Europe is envisaged by the latter. If Boris Tadić (2013), the former Serbian president argued that ‘the Balkans in Europe need Europe in the Balkans’, this is perhaps not very applicable to BiH, where the EU has come to assert itself as the ‘custodian’ of its past and present (Rexhepi, 2018). A good example of this is provided by the following statements from two interviewees (FGN-07; FGN-08):

I always joke that I live closest to Europe because the Croatian consulate is near my home. Europe is always showing off; its people are not necessarily wiser, cleverer, or stronger, but they are simply fortunate to live in well-structured and orderly societies. ¹⁰

This Europe is not so good for us; we do not fit into it at all. While Europe has progressed and moved forward, experiencing the industrial revolution, we had only the plough. They are somehow ahead of us, or perhaps they are to blame for leaving us behind, being selfish in certain historical circumstances. They have made us backwards in terms of development.

In this sense and reflecting on the cultural perspective as the third area of analysis, two key themes emerge: (1) the perception of BiH citizens as part of the EU’s cultural framework and (2) the multicultural nature of the EU. Here, respondents focused more on how they believe the EU perceives and represents them within its cultural landscape. Some respondents expressed feelings of exclusion, stating that they ‘do not feel European or part of the broader EU process’ (FGN-03), and that the ‘EU does not see them as Europeans’ (FGO-03). In this context, one of the interviewees argued the following (I-3):

I think Europe has this great wall when it comes to the Balkans, especially Bosnia. I do not want to say it is religion-related, but at the end of the day, it seems as if it is. Everything that happens, seriously, it goes back to religion. ‘Why are we not here?’ ‘You have to be more multicultural’. We really are, it is Sarajevo, I mean . . . or ‘You have conflicts’. Of course, we were at war, but everyone is truly trying to move forward. There are plenty of us, all of my friends, everyone is like ‘hey, let us go, move on’, we all try to be progressive . . . Expectations are for Europe to lower that wall and abolish the limits and barriers that are constantly being put up, because I have a feeling as if they’re afraid that, if they allow the Balkan to enter Europe, that it will let the scum in. There are some good people over here!

The quote shows this interviewee actively trying to reject an essentialist understanding of BiH and its people, perpetuated through representations of violence and backwardness. Engaging with the original dichotomy of Europe as rational, multicultural, peaceful, and BiH as irrational, prone to conflict, and regressive, they uncover the system of prejudices embedded within the European discourse on the Balkans. In this sense, there is a prevailing sentiment that Europe is not accepting of BiH despite all the efforts of its people. Moreover, a strong theme here is the impossibility of the affirming BiH’s European character – no matter how much you work towards it, Europe as an imagined vision is always slipping away. These claims are further emphasised by some participants arguing that the EU views them as ‘savages’ and the Balkans as a ‘jungle’ (FGR-05). Such a view is best exemplified by the following argument made by one of the interviewees (I-8):

Europe failed to defend European values in BiH, Europe did not show itself as Europe. Europe did not respect its values. ‘Europe’ was divided and has provoked our values in our country as well. ‘Europe’ has behaved towards us as if we are Zulu people.

The invocation of the ‘Zulu’ people points to underlying racialised undertones internalised by Bosnians themselves. Susan Sontag (2003) wrote about this some time ago, explaining why people from BiH reject comparison between their conflict and those in Rwanda or Somalia: ‘undoubtedly there was a racist tinge to their indignation – Bosnians are Europeans, people in Sarajevo never tired of pointing out to their foreign friends’. As Baker (2018) argued, these are sensitive identifications by people from the region, expressing rejection of being treated ‘like a third world country’ – as the EU and the West are perhaps pushing them into the ‘Third World’, they are working hard to distance themselves from it (Petrović, 2009). In this sense, joining the EU would assert this distinction, as illustrated by interviewees who supported EU membership, citing the value system and personal freedoms associated with it as significant motivations (I-17). They believed that membership would affirm a broader cultural belonging for people of BiH within the European framework (I-14). Overall, this cultural frame highlights a tension between feelings of exclusion and alienation from EU’s cultural identity and the desire for the benefits and values associated with European integration. It reflects diverse attitudes towards cultural identity and belonging, influenced by both internal perceptions and external representations. One of the interviewees went even further by stating (FGN-06):

Europe is the continent on which we live, where our land is located, and where our nation and other nations that were part of Yugoslavia are found. In other respects – whether politics, sport, culture, or economics – there are significant differences. I believe that the Serbs and the peoples of Yugoslavia are more akin to Africa than to Europe. In a unique way, we are colonised by them in our own land; we are the peoples they are colonising, crossing borders with, imposing politics and economics on, and dictating how we should live our lived. Over the past 30 years, Europe has unilaterally become a capitalist powerhouse that oppresses everyone around it, including the Balkans and all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, not just the Serbs. There is no difference between us and the Asian or Arab peoples.

While the previous discussion framed BiH as an object and the EU as a subject, some interviewees reversed this perspective by engaging with the EU’s multicultural character. One participant framed EU’s multiculturalism as a positive example, describing it as an ‘achievement that could serve as an ideal for how different ethnic groups can coexist peacefully’ (BA-4). In contrast, others offered more critical views. One respondent highlighted a perceived disconnect between the self-perception of Serbs as an ‘old European nation’ and what they see as the reality of contemporary Europe. They stated that visiting countries such as France felt more like visiting Africa or Asia than Europe, expressing concern over what they perceived as a lack of order due to cultural changes (FGN-02).

Similarly, another respondent suggested that traditional European identities are at risk of being replaced, claiming that in 10 to 20 years, there would be no more French or Swedish peoples due to the influx of foreigners (FGS-02). This sentiment was echoed by a participant who cited Germany as an example, noting that the country previously identified 6 million Turks and has since welcomed millions more migrants, which they described in securitised terms as ‘militarised migrants’ (FGN-03). These concerns were linked to fears about how EU integration might affect the national and ethnic identities of BiH’s constituent groups within the broader European community (FGE-04; I-11). In this way, references to new migrants and EU’s multiculturalism are used to reinforce BiH’s claim to Europe. This relies on the opportunity to reproduce the ‘otherness’ of those even further from Europe’s core, achieved by appropriating colonial discourse with undertones of racism, xenophobia, and prejudice.

Conclusion

This article has examined the multifaceted and often contradictory ways in which Europe is imagined from within BiH, revealing how these imaginaries are shaped or influenced by processes of self-colonisation. Through a decolonial lens and grounded empirical analysis centred around the idea of Balkansplaining, we have shown that it is difficult to speak of an essentialist understanding of Europe in BiH, just as it is difficult and unnecessary to speak of a uniform, straightforward Balkans. The region’s otherness is marked by ambiguity, by the flux, and in-betweenness. With the diversity of ideas about Europe expressed by people in BiH, we see that the semi-periphery ‘is not a homogenous container where everyone is marginalised’, but rather, on closer inspection ‘we see a polarised society’ made up of different people, worldviews, fears, and frustrations (Majstorović, 2019: 147). What emerges is a complex mosaic of views and opinions about Europe and, almost always, about BiH itself. Our interviewees expressed deeply rooted grievances about Europe, which almost always related to what Europe lacks: deeper understanding of the region, solidarity, openness, and acceptance. They challenged the widely accepted view of Europe as fair, open, advanced, and wise.

Instead, a vision of Europe as hypocritical, aggressive, and calculated emerges. From this perspective, differing dynamics of self-colonising narratives become apparent. On the one hand, some interviewees emphasised the inherently European character of BiH, portraying EU integration as a vehicle for the final affirmation of the country’s rightful place in Europe. For them, that BiH is proudly European was beyond question. On the other hand, others sought to justify the various ways in which BiH is or could be European enough. In contesting inherited Balkanisms, these interviewees attempted to challenge dominant narratives, yet in doing so reaffirmed their existence. What unites these perspectives is an intimate yet fragile relationship with Europe as an arena of contention and anxiety. The culmination of these self-colonising narratives came with the perpetuation of the very orientalising, colonial discourses to which they themselves feel subjected. One of the most prominent ways of affirming BiH’s European character involved references to ‘the Other’, found in refugees and migrants – those perceived as threatening European culture.

An important aspect of these dynamics is how they manifest differently among various ethnic groups in BiH due to disparities in citizenship – particularly, the significant number of Bosnian Croats (as well as members of other ethnic groups) who hold dual citizenship, granting them access to the rights and benefits of EU membership. This legal and symbolic proximity to Europe reproduces internal hierarchies within BiH, where EU citizenship becomes a marker of privilege and mobility, often unavailable to other ethnic groups. Consequently, those with EU citizenship may be perceived both externally and internally as more ‘European’ than other residents of BiH, reinforcing a stratified system of belonging. This situation reflects a form of ‘citizenship hierarchy’ that spatially and ethnically fragments Europeanness within BiH’s borders, further complicating imaginaries of Europe across the population.

At the same time, the critical narratives explored in this article reveal a complex interplay between resistance to dominant European discourses and the potential reproduction of exclusionary or parochial logics. While some interviewees reject the imposed teleology of Europe as civiliser, such rejection can also shift towards culturally or politically isolationist claims, marked by nationalist rhetoric or forms of essentialism. Moving forward, this tension between resistance as a decolonial gesture and rejection as a withdrawal into ethno-national closure, must be carefully navigated. Recognising this ambivalence is crucial for a nuanced reading of self-colonisation: it reminds us that resistance to Europe’s symbolic dominance does not automatically translate into progressive or inclusive imaginaries. Rather, it reflects the volatile space in which semi-peripheral subjectivities negotiate their positions between imposed subalternity and contested sovereignty.

By centring the experiences and discursive practices of Bosnian citizens, we have argued for the importance of Balkansplaining as a decolonial tool for delivering a critical epistemic intervention – one that challenges both dominant representations of the region and those produced from within it. Such an approach invites rethinking of Europe from its semi-peripheries, not necessarily as a fixed solution to any political or social issue, nor as the only path forward our inquiries into European matters, but because of its potential as a contested space of negotiation, exclusion, and epistemic resistance. The article seeks to contribute to ongoing debates on knowledge production and epistemic supremacy, moving beyond binary understandings of ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ by taking seriously the knowledge and agency embedded in the complex and entangled realities of the Balkans.