Abstract
The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order. Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, the analysis of populism’s implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise review of the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the article is devoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzing the components of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism, intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others. However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper also provides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. The main argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.
Introduction
Liberal international order is in bad shape. An increasing number of literatures have been dedicated to the fate of the so-called liberal order, the relative decline of American hegemony, and more recently on populism. 1 The study of populism and liberal international order are interrelated in that the two are mutually affecting. The academic debate on the viability of liberal international order, particularly with the rise of non-western powers and the relative wane of the US hegemony, has been further magnified with the increasing tide of populism in the West. Most glaringly, two major episodes that troubled the Western world in 2016, Brexit and the Trump presidency, undermined the normative foundation of the postwar liberal order. These murky episodes seemed to signal alarming bells in the West since both the states are leading champions of liberal internationalism. However, the fate of liberal democracy in Western democracies like Hungary and Poland had already been haunted by the specter of populism thereby undermining the liberal ordering.
While some scholars are skeptical of the populist challenge to liberal democracy and liberal order, the opinions are diverse. 2 In this context, this paper attempts to reflect on the impact of Western populism on liberal international order (LIO). In this article, LIO implies the order of the West. 3 The underlying argument is that populism has its own limitations, and LIO has the capacity to survive the populist tide. In order to facilitate the analysis, a benchmark is taken by appraising the indicators constituting the components of liberal international order as defined by ‘structural liberalism’. 4 Therefore, this study does not address populism and liberal order broadly, rather confined its analysis to the Western world.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first part discusses the diverse concepts of populism and liberal international order, and tries to relate their concepts into the analysis. The next section takes the potential implications of populism on the liberal international order (of the West) by using ‘structural liberalism’ as an analytical framework. In the last section, I provide some arguments on ‘populism weakness’, outlining the limits of populism in upending the foundation of liberal international order.
Defining populism and liberal international order
Before rushing into the analysis of the interplay of populism in the West and liberal international order, it is worthwhile to delineate certain understanding of the concepts of these two terms. Both terms have no clear and specific definitions, partly because of their diverse dimensions and partly due to diverse interpretation by scholars. The usage of the terms can be problematic if there is no certain understanding accorded according to the way they are purposely used.
Populism can be conceptualized in different understandings: as a ‘political opportunism’ in terms of contract between politicians and voters, as a ‘political strategy’ in terms of gaining power, as an ‘anti-establishment’ in terms of mobilizing against the elites, or as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ in the sense that the political position of the populist is different from the established ideologies such as socialism. 5 However, all these aspects together form the dominant thinking of populism. One scholar views populism as a discourse in international relations – a self-standing phenomenon, with its distinct logic of political contestation emerged as a response to the representational gaps between power and society or between official power and unaddressed demands of the people. 6 Thus, in normative term, the discourses of antagonism and opposition generated by the populists vis-à-vis the universalist character of established international norms justifies populism as a distinct discourse in international relations. 7 The international relations scholar Joseph Nye defines populism as the resistance to elites, including the type of institutions and commentators that have supported the liberal international order over the past seven decades. 8
In terms of agenda, Francis Fukuyama defines populism having three main characteristics on the part of populist regime. First, creating popular policies usually in the realm of social policies such as price subsidies, free medical clinics, and generous pensions schemes; second, setting legitimacy in defining the people by excluding own people in order to portray the real people; and finally, promoting personality cult with the creation of image of a true leadership that reach out to the people directly. 9 To another academic, populism reflects a deep suspicion of the prevailing establishment which, in the view of most populists, does not just rule in the common good but conspires against the people, and that the people, however defined, are the true repositories of the soul of the nation. 10 William Galston interprets populism as having the principles of sovereignty and democracy but compromising the aspects of constitutionalism as well as dividing the people into ‘real’ and ‘outsiders and corrupt elites’. 11 According to the American journalist Fareed Zakaria, populism means different things to different groups but all versions share suspicion and hostility toward elites, mainstream politics, and established institutions; it considers itself as speaking for the forgotten ordinary person and often imagines as the voice of genuine patriotism. 12
Of all the interpretations on populism, the concepts defined by scholars like Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Muller are not only convincing but form the dominant thinking of its idea. Mudde defines populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the ‘general will’ of the people. 13 He also famously puts the populist surge as an illiberal democratic response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies. 14 The political scientist Jan-Werner Muller holds the populists not merely anti-elitist but also anti-pluralist since they only claim to represent the true people. 15 Muller contends that the danger to democracy is not anything but populism itself – a degraded form of democracy that promises to make good on democracy’s highest ideals. 16 One of the persuasive arguments he highlights is the incongruent comparison of ‘illiberal democracy’ with democratic inference as populism itself is anti-democratic. In Democracy Rules, Muller reiterates the populists’ narrative of claiming themselves as the only ‘real people’ or ‘silent majority’ and dividing the citizens as much as possible. 17
However, new studies begin to shed light on alternative understandings of its concept. For instance, Paris Aslanidis, while appreciating the understanding of populism from ideological perspective, considers alternative framing of its concept through discursive frame – populism as a ‘discourse’. 18 On the other hand, Cynthia Miller-Idriss sits in the middle of ideological perspective and discursive frame while emphasizing on strategy by conceptualizing populism as a rhetorical strategy to help achieve ideological goals. 19 Discarding the familiar idea on populism from the perspective of ideology or discourse, Kurt Weyland takes populism as a political strategy adopted by leaders/politicians for particular ends. 20 This conception almost discards the conventional thinking on populism and draws toward rational choice approach.
Falling in similar line with Mudde’s definition, Vedi Hadiz and Angelos Chryssogelos, in a study, conceives of populism as a political tendency that seeks to separate ‘the people’ of an imagined ‘heartland’ from allegedly rapacious and corrupt ‘elites’, while asserting that the latter are responsible for the social and economic problems perceived to beset the people or the nation. 21 In similar perspective, Mark Copelovitch and Jon Pevehous also follows the understanding of populism from Mudde and Kaltwasser. 22 Analyzing the interplay of populism and international relations, Sandra Destradi and Johannes Plagemann identifies certain populist traits of centralization and personalization in foreign policy decision making as they (populists) try to differentiate their international relations away from exclusive alliances while reinforcing a trend toward multipolarity and centrality of specific thick ideologies. 23
Despite its diverse conceptual understandings defined in terms of ‘political strategy’, or ‘discourse’, or a ‘thin-centered ideology’, I refine the concept, its underlying meaning, as a phenomenon that is deviated from the principles, norms, and practices of liberal internationalism. As such, I do not strictly differentiate between ideology, discourse, or strategy in understanding populism, rather focus on the implication it has spawned on liberal international order. In approaching international relations, populism can be understood as a strategy by political leaders to gain power, or satisfy certain goals like limiting internationalism or liberal glut, or as a thin-ideology marrying with other ideologies like nationalism, or as a discourse in global politics or international relations. Thus, the diverse understandings of populism can be applied in the context of analyzing Western populism and its implications on the liberal order.
Next, I discuss the concept of liberal international order, which is also problematic as the concept has ontological and epistemological issues. To conceive of an international order as a singular thing and that there is such a thing as ‘the liberal international order’ does not make proper sense unless the elements of LIO are identified, at least, in terms of political liberal governance, economic liberalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism. 24 However, in a simple logic, liberal international order is the offshoot of liberalism as applied to the international realm in which the foundational ideas are based on international institutions, constitutional democracy, and economic interdependence. 25 Hans Kundnani finds a tension in the LIO concept but understands the elements that make up the order in terms of security order (rules-based), economic order (openness), and human rights order (implicit of political democracy). 26 John Ikenberry, one of the leading theorist on LIO, neatly defines the logic of liberal hegemonic order based on open markets, economic security and social bargain, multilateral institutional cooperation, security binding, western democratic solidarity, and the provisions of human rights, all of which are facilitated under the American hegemonic leadership. 27
However, for an international order to be liberal, ‘rules-based’ is not the sufficient prerequisite, rather the comprehensive components of liberalism viz. political, economic, and internationalism have to be the essential elements. 28 Tanja Börzel and Michael Zürn distinguishes the transformation of LIO from a thin post-World War II international order of liberal multilateralism (LIO I) to post-Cold War international order of post-national liberalism (LIO II). 29 This implies the intensification of liberal ordering process that transcends beyond nation-states. Even John Mearsheimer, a staunch realist, comprehends the liberal international order through creating three main tasks – expanding liberal international institutions, creating liberal international economy, and extensive promotion of liberal democracy. 30
Throughout these understandings, there is a common core that underpins the concept of LIO through the basic components/elements that make up the order. That is, three key institutions are inevitable to explain the idea of LIO: first, the establishment of multilateralism through international institutions; second, the promotion of free trade and of global market economy; third, the rule of liberal democracies. In other words, LIO consists of three forces of liberalism – institutional, economic, and political.
However, its conceptual, theoretical, and empirical reality is seriously under challenge within the IR scholarship. For instance, a realist observation considers that the viability of liberal international order could be maintained in a unipolar world but that is not the case today as the world has become multipolar. 31 Another perspective sees that the LIO concept is theoretically weak since it fails to explain the institutional binding, hierarchy, and political convergence of the member states; it is also a partial order as it fails to incorporate non-western states like China inside the order. 32 A critical theory analysis questions the legitimacy of liberal order since the order is based on hierarchy, racialism, and imperialism. 33 The constructivist scholar Amitav Acharya defends the idea of liberal order but insists that the age of American hegemony has ended while the world has become ‘multiplex’ as diverse non-western ideas and norms are shaping in the evolution and transformation of global order. 34 Another sophisticated critique of liberal order concerns with the ontological question of the order since the one founded after the postwar has been marked by coercion, illiberalism, multiplicity of orders, and more of lacking ordering in the true sense of the term. 35
Despite the various labels of criticism put against the theoretical and empirical concept of LIO, this study largely relies on ‘structural liberalism’ as an analytical framework. IR scholars Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry introduced the concept of liberal international order defined in terms of ‘structural liberalism’ in their article ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’ published in the Review of International Studies. This article, probably the first scholarly work on LIO, examined the durable peace of the postwar period in the Western world. Not merely because of the originality of this conceptual development but more with the compelling framework of analysis provided through its logical conceptualization of the Western liberal order, it is prudent to use this framework in analyzing the Western liberal order. 36 As the components of ‘structural liberalism’ includes the three key foundations of liberal order – institutional (through NATO security binding), economic (through economic openness), and political (through civic identity), this study nearly captures other schools of thought analyzing LIO. That is, the basic features of LIO encompassing political liberalism, multilateralism, and free market economy are respectively corresponding with or inclusive of civic identity, NATO’s security co-binding, and economic openness.
The five elements of the Western liberal order as defined by structural liberalism are the security co-binding of member states through institutions like NATO, legitimate American hegemony in which the allies have the leverage to influence the hegemon, tying of Germany and Japan into its order, economic openness by maintaining a capitalist economy, and a common civic identity defined in terms of political democracy, market economy, ethnic toleration, and political freedom. The components interact and mutually reinforce each other forming a complex composite and the overall interaction of the elements defines the structure of the liberal international order. 37
However, structural liberalism has its own weakness in explaining the configuration of the Western liberal order. For instance, the inclusion of Germany and Japan in the analytical framework of the order becomes obsolete given their relative positions as liberal democracy. Also, it fails to explain the role of other major liberal institutions like the European Union. As such, this paper also draws on other theoretical schools of liberalism like institutional interdependence and cooperation (institutional liberalism) and preference theory (liberal), which are particularly reflected in the section that analyzes the resilience of LIO (limitations of populism). 38 Therefore, acknowledging the drawbacks of structural liberalism in fully conceptualizing the Western liberal order, this paper also broadly takes the three main aspects of liberalism, explained above, as its core concept. As such, LIO is characterized by the rule of liberal democracy, open and integrated market economy, and the cooperation and interdependence of the Western institutions. 39
Populism haunting the Western liberal order?
Liberal international order, being a theoretically slippery concept and having various components, and populism, having different dimensions and understandings, there can be no agreed formula in assessing the relationship between them. Measuring the impact of populism on liberal order is, thus, problematic as the enterprise rests on analyzing various indicators as well as subject to one’s understanding and interpretation. Having said that, there are specific indicators that can be taken into account while assessing the components of liberal international order as outlined by structural liberalism.
On NATO
Although there is no specific benchmark to determine the impact of populism on NATO, some key indicators that mark its resilience are its continued existence, membership, funding, populists’ rhetoric and actual policies, organizational functions (such as regular summits, military exercises and drills) and the basis of security community (reflected in leaders’ remarks, people’s perceptions, or the commitments espoused by member states). 40 What foreign policy effects do populist governments put on the functioning and state of existence of NATO? The answer is largely negative because there have been no substantial changes on NATO’s existence and its overall operation. There is no question that populist leaders are undermining the security alliance, both in essence and practice, from time to time. During the Trump period, the unwillingness of his administration in reaffirming the US commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty – that an attack on a member state entails an attack on the alliance – undercut the alliance’s spirit. Similarly, Orban’s slightly deviated position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine undermines the collective stance of NATO. 41
However, it is certain that NATO survives the tide of populism in the West. Populists’ presumed threats are more of rhetoric and voices rather than practical changes. For instance, despite Trump’s earlier rhetoric on NATO, such as labeling it obsolete and threatening to leave the organization, the reality was the contrary. 42 What made Trump critical of NATO was because of the fact that he dealt with international organizations on transactional approach. Indeed, Trump’s contempt of NATO made the alliance stronger. 43 In spite of increasing populist appeals, NATO not merely outlasts but more of increasing its membership and sustaining itself as the postwar security institution. The accession of Montenegro and North Macedonia during the skeptical Trump period suggests the mere populist’s disparagement of the security alliance without adverse consequences. Similarly, while the Brexit led the UK out of the EU, it remains inside NATO.
On the question of funding, free riding of member states at the expense of the US had been a conventional trend before populism gained momentum. But there have been relative increases in the funding share of certain members. Countries like Poland and Greece, with strong appeals of populism, have in recent years met their NATO spending targets. 44 Likewise, Hungary, the most ingrained site of populism, has increased its fair share of spending, though not fulfilled the 2% threshold throughout its Orban days. 45 A study on the consequences and implications of the rise of populism in Europe does not reveal a turning point for the future of European defense cooperation. 46 In the case of the US, the US administration during Trump neither shrank its funding nor diminished its troops contribution. 47
The collective response of NATO member states and the voices of key political figures (including of populist regimes) on the issues of deterring common external challenges like terrorism and Russian threats illustrate the relevance of the organization. 48 Despite populist tendencies, the impulse for the security community is felt by the NATO peoples. One such explanation is the endorsement of the alliance by the people of NATO member states. A number of surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in different periods (2018, 2020, and 2021) similarly revealed the backing of NATO by the majority people of its member states. 49 Another manifestation for endorsing NATO is the statements of leaders. For instance, the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked that the preservation of NATO was in the fundamental interest of Europe, even more so than during the Cold war. 50 Even Viktor Orban, the leading European populist figure, made the commitment of extending its continued support for the alliance. 51
Apart from these markers, NATO’s dynamic existence is shown through its regular meetings, summits, and the various agendas carried with them. All these highlight that populism does not create substantial undesirable effects on the security binding of the US and its allies. This resilience is due to the alliance’s attribute of acting as a cornerstone of liberal international order with a reflection of continuity in US foreign policy characterized by longevity, institutional collaboration and coordination, and as a history of US hegemonic leadership and engagement. 52
On penetrated US hegemony
Trump accelerated the waning influence of American hegemony. Slogans like ‘America First’ itself devalued the normative foundation of American hegemonic position in the liberal order. His verbal rebukes, in platforms like the social media and press conferences, of the American allies and their leaders signified the retreat of a legitimate American authority. For instance, placing conditions in defending an ally in case of an attack by adversaries undercut the liability of a responsible hegemon.
Indeed, Trump substituted the US from being a ‘liberal hegemon’ to a ‘coercive hegemon’ or the ‘illiberal hegemon’. 53 Trump’s ostensible support of Brexit and the seeming contentment of a fracturing EU, urging Britain for a no-deal Brexit and fantasizing about other European members following the path of Britain begs serious questions on the role of American leadership. 54 As Trump had cynical views on transatlantic relations, the credibility and legitimacy of American leadership in the Western political order was seriously under challenge. Leadership is based not merely on material aspects but more of ideational. The normative decline of the US position during Trump could be defined more in ideational terms than material since the Trump US was drifted from liberal principles, values, and norms.
On matters of decentralization of power and nature of executing decisions, the Trump period characterized top-down and core-periphery structure without efficient restraint both by domestic agents and foreign partners. While the decentralization of the American polity into multiple power centers, a distinct feature of liberal polity, within the country suffered huge setbacks with the monopolization of decisions into Trump’s hand, the subordinate actors in the system had no defense mechanism of registering or defending their interests with the hegemon. The unchained and unconstrained American presidency which had existed before Trump’s period exploded since he took office as there were no successful domestic checks and balances by the Congress and the Bureaucracy; its external allies (Western partners) also had no leverage to influence in the US decision making. 55
The termination of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was a glaring example. Other cases include Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal. The issue of Trump’s imposition of metal tariffs on the EU was another illustration. In all these instances, neither the multiple sources of decision making and power centers within the US administration or domestic civil society nor the US allies in Europe had the capacity to prevent such decisions. These unilateral decisions clearly exemplified the absence of two way of communication between the hegemon and the allies. Furthermore, the hegemon was not guided by liberal principles in dealing with its liberal counterparts. In such contexts, the US abandoned reciprocity and legitimacy while its decisions were not based on consensual, cooperative, and integrative relations.
At the same time, looking from another perspective the rise of populism has not much changed the stability of American position inside the Western political order in the sense that the United States still maintains the postwar position. The US under Trump could not be interpreted to act like as an intimidating hegemon since the US unilateral decisions were not typical of Trump period only as it acted without consulting its allies on many occasions before. 56 Nor the member states of the Western political order lost their leverage to voice dissents toward their hegemon. When Trump began speaking about US troops withdrawal from Germany, officials from the latter criticized and regretted the decision saying it would weaken NATO as well as destroy the German-American alliance. 57 Such a voice reaffirmed the desire of preserving status-quo – of continued American leadership by its allies. Therefore, the United States’ hegemonic position is still maintained irrespective of the internal challenges posed by populism.
On Germany and Japan
The resurgence of Germany and Japan into the sort of belligerent states in the current context sounds absurd. 58 Even the populist tendencies in both the states are trivial. While Japan is virtually immune from the recent tide of populism, Germany is relatively vulnerable. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), having secured favorable positions in German politics in the last few years, poses increasing challenges in its stable liberal democracy. However, populist parties’ gains including AfD’s influence in German politics is relatively marginal. One can be optimistic considering its populist state of affairs. For instance, the state apparatus has been constantly taking measures to control the activities of the party, meaning its activities have been put under constant check. 59 Besides, the German populist parties are more inclined to the agenda of anti-immigration, anti-Islamism, and Euroscepticism. Also, the populist appeal in the country has declined relatively compared to the past few years. 60 In spite of the populist surge in Europe, Germany remains as a far more stable liberal democracy with a peaceful constitution.
Both Germany and Japan, thus, are able to maintain the role and status of partial great powers but without reversing to pre-war hawkist states. This may be due to the shaping of the two countries’ political environment held by domestic constraints as well as rendered by American authority or partly by stable economic conditions. Assuming that Germany’s future politics is dominated by populist parties like AfD or the other, it is highly unlikely that the country will reverse its political-military strategy, incompatible to liberal democratic framework. The argument is that Japan and Germany have continued to follow pacifist constitutions and refraining from adopting belligerent policies like possessing nuclear weapons. 61 In brief, the surge of populism in the West has negligible impact on the stable liberal democratic positions of Germany and Japan.
On economic openness
The liberal school of thought which postulates that economic openness tends to create more democratic societies becomes questionable. Although the rest of the West had transformed themselves into liberal democracies after the end of the Cold War, the liberal economic order generated profound disruptions throughout the West undermining the Western political order. The nature and scale of openness of the Western economies are threatened with the rise of nationalist protectionism. The Schengen Agreement and the Euro act the engines of economic openness as well as sow the seeds of its own problems. The Trump presidency which impaired the transatlantic economic relations, the UK’s Brexit, and anti-immigrant policies adopted by the EU member states like Hungary and Poland are more than enough to justify the flaws of economic openness.
Realist powerful explanation of ‘relative gains’ seems to hold on populist’s agenda and there are reasons to believe that the populists act on the logic of relative gains consideration. 62 The irony is that liberal international order, assumed to generate a favorable economic order and a democratic political environment, rather breeds populism which then threatens the features of economic openness. A report found that counting the EU as one, a total of fifteen governments, in the period between January 2017 to November 2019, enacted policies that distorted more than 10 billion dollars of trade on 73 occasions during the tide of populism while Trump’s trade wars and foreign reaction to them accounted for 14 instances of such protectionism. 63 The most setback to economic openness in the transatlantic relations was the imposition of aluminum and steel tariffs by the Trump administration to its allies including the EU and Canada, putting more tariffs than China, and the reciprocal retaliatory tariffs of the EU on American products. 64 Even though trade war had predated the Trump presidency, the impact of populist-nationalist agenda on the transatlantic economic relations during the Trump period magnified, threatening the economic bond of the US-EU relation.
On the other hand, to robustly affirm that populism in the West has weakened the economic openness of Western political order rests on interpretation and it is matter of magnitude, not of substance. After all, the European Union has been expanding its membership, while other integration schemes like the Schengen Union and the Eurozone remain effective. 65 Although Trump, Brexit, and populism in the continental Europe threatened the openness of economies, the very structure and nature of an open market in the West endures. If the central agenda of Trump’s period was dominated by isolationism and populism, no radical changes in US foreign policy occurred except for creating the room for strengthening the Western alliance. 66 For instance, while the total investment in the EU by the United States is three times higher than in all of Asia, the EU investment in the United States is roughly eight times the amount of EU investment in both China and India, thus making the EU-US investments the real driver of the transatlantic relationship. 67 Also, the Trump-era tariff row on steel products and aluminum between the United States and the EU came to an end even though the US still puts it in the United Kingdom due to the Northern Ireland question. 68 In terms of mobility, even the UK after Brexit is not likely to make radical immigration policy. 69 As such, the economic relations between the US and its Western allies remains one of the strongest in the world economy.
On civic identity
Of all the threats populism poses on liberal order, the undermining of civic identity of the West is the most worrisome. The theory held by structural liberalism that a common civic identity of the West – founded on the principles of political democracy, market economies, constitutionalism, tolerance of diversity, individual dignity and personal freedom, and business and commodity culture – strengthens the liberal international order is imperiled with the rise of populism. 70
The very foundation and principles of Western democratic identity are constantly under attack as populist narratives and policies undermine the values of political democracy, rule of law, open market, tolerance, and personal freedom. Glaring cases are evident in Viktor Orban’s dismantling of the foundations of liberal democracy with the government’s attack on the constitution, interference in the judiciary, the media, suppressing opposition, and many more. 71 The relocation of the Central European University from Budapest to Vienna triggered by the Fidesz government, probably due to the tussle between Orban and the liberal philanthropist George Soros, undermines academic freedom that underpins the West’s spirit. 72 The same is true for Poland, the United States, and elsewhere where the ruling government are populists. A study identifies the politics of Orban and Kaczynski’s with Caesarean politics based on patronage, party state capture and identity politics thereby undermining political pluralism and rule of law while facilitating democratic backsliding. 73 Trump’s attack on the media, dismantling of transatlantic relations, intolerance of ethnic groups, and Britain’s fear of social assimilation with the people of other EU member states are contradictory with the values of a common civic identity of the West.
The West’s political values of constitutional government, checks and balance, individual rights, freedom of the media and judiciary, role of opposition, sense of political pluralism, and secularism are seriously weakened. In economic aspects, the principles of an open market economy are dented with protectionism, bilateralism, considerations of relative gains, and immobility of people. In this respect, a common Western identity based on shared norms and community spirit is supposedly replaced by Hungarian national identity, Polish Christian identity, America First identity, and the like. It turns out that a common civic identity neither binds the West nor the Western world conforms to common values and principles.
These deviations from the norms, values, and practices of liberal democracy through the hollowing out of judicial independence, undermining of media freedom, weakening of checks and balances, intolerance of diverse ethnicities, and defiant positions on liberal international institutions in Hungary, Poland, erstwhile United States, and elsewhere in the Western populist world undermine the basic element of the liberal order – political liberalism or the rule of liberal democracy. As such, it is questionable that the civic identity strengthens the liberal international order, nor the order can harmonize in regrouping the common identity. As no political order can exist without a substantial sense of community and shared identity, it is doubtful to think of a resilient Western political order since the ‘glue’ that binds the West is eroding. 74
Summarizing the analysis above, no definite conclusion can be drawn. However, out of the five elements of liberal international order, three have witnessed relative erosion compared to the other two. NATO’s security binding and the position of Japan and Germany are relatively invulnerable to the populist tide but the legitimacy of American hegemony and a sense of civic identity of the West are undermined. Economic openness is more or less hampered. Therefore, no precise conclusion can be drawn with regards to the impact of populism on the Western liberal order. For instance, even though NATO can survive the tide of populism, it cannot be refuted that the security co-binding of the US and its European allies faced an internal crisis because of Trump. On the other hand, while the American hegemony has lost its legitimacy, the United States still remains as the leader of the transatlantic world. And to claim that a common civic identity of the Western world is undermined because of populism is also refutable since the West is held by many commonalities: the ‘West’s spirit’ – democratic values, individualism, commodity culture, market orientation, and the like. 75 Although haunted by populist wave, the West still hold on to the foundation and values of the US-led liberal order (multilateralism, open economy, American leadership, and political democracy) and of liberalism in general. 76
Therefore, the implication of populism on the Western liberal order is more of the magnitude rather than an inflection point. The fact that the postwar liberal order survives more than seven decades, widening its horizon after the Cold War and enduring another three decades amidst turbulent times, suggests that the liberal order can tackle multiple challenges. Theoretically, structural liberalism is a useful analytical framework to explain the features of the Western liberal order.
The limitations of populism vis-a-vis liberal international order
Populism is detrimental to liberal democracy. Populist’s rhetoric and policies are contradictory to liberal democratic norms and practices. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that populist backlash is not an enduring threat to the Western liberal order as the latter is the composite structure, which is deeply embedded and highly institutionalized. The member states are bound by the structure, and the damages inflicted by populism can be rejuvenated. Although populist governments attempt to distance themselves from the LIO institutions, necessity bind them. For instance, the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries refused the EU mandate to share the quota of immigrants but at the same time remain in the Schengen Union. The same is true for the Trump administration when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was dissolved to be replaced by almost similar treaty – the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
A study by Sandra Destradi and Johannes Plagemann on the foreign policy implications of populist governments in the Global South reveals that these far-right governments do not utterly reject internationalism either by abandoning liberal institutions or halting providing global public goods. 77 This analogy implies the limitations of populists’ arrogance to the liberal order. Liberal order has been designed to foster cooperation, minimize differences, and face common challenges. While the contemporary challenges compel states to bind themselves through multilateralism, it is also extremely difficult for the populist states to exit from the established liberal institutions and regimes. The lengthy and complicated process of Brexit is a glaring example. Besides, liberal order is not a singular thing, rather composed of various institutions, rules, practices, and norms that tie the member states by one aspect or the another. Populism cannot evade this complex interlinking structure.
Globalization has led to the creation of enormous wealth discrepancies, job loss, and curtailment of national sovereignty. 78 The British journalist Edward Luce compares the discontents of the Western global cities like tropical islands surrounded by oceans of resentment. 79 The vast scale flow of immigrants into Europe and the United States poses mounting challenges to social fabric and national identities. The hyper-globalized economies and extreme surrender of national policy decisions to international institutions like the EU furthermore dilute national sovereignty. As conservative political parties both in the left and the right increasingly failed to represent the voices of the losers of liberal order, populism gained momentum and promised to represent the true people of their respective societies. 80 Walter Russell Mead claims that Western elites failed to understand the deep roots of identity politics in the human psyche and the necessity for those roots to find political expression in both foreign and domestic policy arenas. 81
But the question lies in the competence of populist governments in addressing the flaws of liberal order. Populism is appealing to the losers of liberal order but not sustainable in the long run. There is no question that liberal order creates various flaws that undermine the foundation of the order. However, rejuvenating the liberal order lies with liberal democracies, not with the populist regimes because, for one reason, there is no way for the populists to solve the complex problems of the interdependent world. Tanja Borzel and Michael Zurn analytically discuss the varieties of contestations of the post-national liberal order (LIO II) while pointing out the liberal biasness in understanding the causes of liberal crisis. 82 Here, the alternative framings of LIO make sense but any configuration of international order entails institutional cooperation amongst the nation-states, which forms the very basis of liberal internationalism. Furthermore, the varieties of contestations in the post-national liberal order does not imply the collapse of the Western liberal order.
In this context, it is worth analyzing the foreign policy implication of populist regimes on liberal order. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, for instance, find that there is no single populist foreign policy, and the effects on internationalism depend on the position of the populist party but not a complete rejection of liberal internationalism. 83 Angelos Chryssogelos also finds variability in populists’ foreign policies, with the far-right inclined to anti-liberal outlooks like nativism, anti-immigrant stance, or sovereign autonomy, but not necessarily isolationism or trade protectionism. 84 These studies on the relationship between populist regimes or parties and their foreign policies highlight that the populists’ approach to internationalism are the results of hyper-globalization. Nevertheless, the populists do not espouse a complete rejection of interdependence or liberal multilateralism. Another mechanism of retreat from the Western liberal order is finding alternative channels such as regional cooperation amongst the populist regimes through organizations like the Visegrad Group. However, this alternate mechanism will be too limited in scope and ephemeral in time. Aliaksei Kazharski examines the trajectories of the Visegrad Group amidst their illiberal path but finds that the member states are tightly bound to the Western liberal order on many dimensions. 85
As such, the prospect of overcoming the flaws lie in regrouping the liberal order, and populism is one such a lesson for streamlining the liberal order. The reinvigoration of LIO (here, the Western liberal order) face unsurmountable problem with the end of American hegemony or the decline of the West on one side, and the rise of multiple modernity on the other. 86 However, the durability of Western liberal order can be reinforced independent of global structural changes and power-shifts. This means that Western LIO can remain as a ‘thick layer’ of liberal ordering. Western liberal order is different from a broader global liberal order in which the Western order can be thickly bound unlike the thin global liberal order. In brief, addressing the problems generated by the superfluity of liberal ordering means more reinvigoration of liberal order. 87
The populists’ promises are also more of rhetoric. For instance, Trump’s agenda of building walls and Orban’s nationalization of certain industries without ameliorating the conditions of workers are some illustrations of the populists’ false promises. 88 Populists’ false propaganda and lies are the ultimate causes of their debacles as majority of the people can differentiate between populist and democratic agenda. From the unfulfilled promises of workers’ safety to improving health insurance schemes, Trump’s speechmaking is now uncovered. 89 Moreover, populist regimes are subject to intense criticism from the society. Viktor Orban had enough power in amending the constitution, and Trump succeeded in revoking the US from a couple of international treaties. Nevertheless, the resisting forces and voices against the right-wing politics are never nonexistent. At the same time, suppressing civil societies and the media, and the agencies of own governments certainly invite backlash and international condemnation.
In the European contexts, populism is primarily driven by the migration crisis and the curtailment of national sovereignties. However, the European populist regimes are largely bound by the LIO mechanism even as they disapprove certain elements of the order. It is not refutable to claim that populism undermines the liberal order but it is also true that the basic foundation of the order remains resilient. The well-established practices and norms of liberal democratic societies cannot be upended abruptly, rather than a prolonged deterioration. Moreover, populist surge to power and successful mobilization of the people on a larger scale takes time. Amongst the established populist governments, Hungary is the one only that follows a radical path. If Poland falls under the same category with Hungary, the rest of the populist parties in the continental Europe have failed to successfully mobilize their positions. 90
It is also mistaken to conceive of durable and continuous rule of populist-nationalist governments. Except for a few strongholds such as the regimes of Orban or Kaczynski, no other strong populist parties can constantly hold on to power in the West. Even so, the continued electoral success by the populists in countries like Poland and Hungary illustrates the resilience of liberal institutions. 91 In the US, the Biden administration has reversed the course of US foreign policy to its earlier grand strategy of engaging the world. Meanwhile, the UK has sustained its long tradition of maintaining as a liberal democracy despite a short hiccup of Brexit. 92 In this regard, since the UK had long been a Eurosceptic, it would be mistaken to consider that other EU members will also follow the similar course. 93 In mainland Europe, Marine Le Pen, Norbert Hofer, Geert Wilders, and their counterparts have to garner immense support and mobilize themselves in order to found their strong platforms. The underlying claim is that it is not easy to abruptly establish a populist regime with strong ideological support from the people on a mass scale unless there are severe discontents besetting the Western society or undermining public’s trust in liberal democracy. The current populist surge in the West is the manifestation of discontents, but not ripe enough to dismantle the resilient foundations of liberal democracy the West has sustained for many decades. Although populist constant revival is not negligible, the apprehensions clouded the West post 2016 are then salvaged with the forces of liberalism. Despite the mayhems, the chief patrons of liberalism such as the US and the UK remain liberal democracies while in mainland Europe, populist establishment is restricted to a few Central Eastern European countries.
Equating the populist surge with historical contexts such as the rise of radical nationalism is also misguided. The rise of nationalist sentiments in the early decades of the 20th century like Italian Fascism or German Nazism reflected aversion for liberal democratic principles as well as hostility toward other nation-states (like against France or Britain). Contrary, today’s populist tide, in general, does not represent itself as entirely anti-liberal and anti-democratic. 94 The political theorist Nadia Urbinati contends that populism should not be confused with authoritarianism or fascism, and while a populist is not yet a dictator, the populist disfigurement of democracy remains within democratic bounds. 95 While fascism is the consequence of democracy in crisis, the right-wing populism or populism of any kind is merely a symptom of democracy in trouble with potential remedial measures. 96 Also, it would be incongruous to compare Orban’s Hungary or Trump’s US with that of Xi Jinping’s China or Putin’s Russia. As authoritarian regimes are even partially bound by the liberal order, it is not convincing to claim that populism in the West inhibit the liberal ordering process absolutely.
The populist voices do not necessarily demand the obliteration of liberal democracy rather than a rejection of undemocratic liberalism – the creation of losers and winners. This means that the upsurge of populist phenomena is a reaction to the flawed system of liberal order. Supposing that the existing populist regimes are inclined to illiberal tendencies, there is also the possibility of establishing alternative forms of populism like anti-establishment populists but embracing both liberal and democratic convictions. 97 However, liberal order facilitates the interaction of liberal democracies with illiberal democracies as well as with undemocratic liberalism. There is no such a rigid framework and principle that only uncontested liberal democracies have the stake in liberal ordering and much of it depends on how the system is organized and reformed.
If the populist regimes have isolationist agendas, political realities rendered by the contemporary global challenges entailing interdependence force them into cooperation. As the outlook of isolationism is not productive in the long run, populists’ retreat from the liberal order will be momentary. Besides, the apprehensions that populism has serious implications for institutional cooperation are sometimes unjustified claims rather than practical realities. For instance, two NATO experts James Sperling and Mark Webber find that Trump’s contempt of NATO is more of voice rather than exit. 98 In another study on state withdrawals from international organizations, Inken Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas find that nationalism or populism is not necessarily the prime factor for withdrawals. 99 In a simple logic, how can contemporary states survive without institutions, regimes, trade, and investment? Or does it sound logical to assume that Western states will abandon the basic foundations of liberalism and democracy? In this sense, the US or any European state might become populist, reversing certain aspects of liberal international order, but the fundamental values and principles of a liberal democratic society, say the civil liberties cannot be compromised. In sum, the possibility of disengaging the complex links, practices, values, and norms of the multifaceted liberal order is questionable. Taking the case of UK, Brexit made the UK out of the EU but it does not mean the UK descents into an illiberal democracy. In this regard, it is worth introspecting that many UK voters are still regretful of Brexit. 100
In the West where the attribute of liberalism is strong, it is easy to cast the populists as aberrant for deviating from certain liberal practices, norms, and values without taking into consideration distinct histories, structure of societies, and respective national security challenges. In this regard, liberalism has to find its own boundaries. To portray a leader or regime as populist – the enemy of liberal order – without contemplating specific contexts is mistaken. As an example, the CEE countries are generally labeled as populists, say, for taking anti-immigrant stance or for being Eurosceptic without identifying underlying causes and their views on liberal internationalism. Viktor Orban is quoted as saying, ‘We need the EU and the EU needs us’, further asserting the EU should give up ‘nightmares’ of the United States of Europe. 101 On the issue of leaving his Fidesz party support to the European Parliament, he comments, ‘Now – without the EPP – we must build a European democratic right that offers a home to European citizens who do not want migrants, who do not want multiculturalism, who have not descended into LGBTQ lunacy, who defend Europe’s Christian traditions, who respect the sovereignty of nations, and who see their nations not as part of their past, but as part of their future’. 102 These statements imply that Orban is not a downright anti-liberal but issues like that of the migration crisis compel the Hungarian stand. Therefore, to march toward an ultimate liberal path instigates moderate illiberal backlash but not the demise of liberal order.
As the Western world has been rooted in the political culture of liberal democracy, the populists cannot garner the support of larger sections of the society. Apart from the challenges rendered by the unfettered market, large scale immigration, and unrestrained surrender of national sovereignty to international institutions, it makes no sense for the West to abandon the inherent ideals integral at the core of liberal democracy. No matter how threatening the impending challenges are, the populists cannot gain lasting bases championed by the majority. This means lacking legitimacy of a prolonged populist regime. Finally, established democracies in the West or the ‘West as a unit’ have encountered numerous predicaments in the past – the two Wars, the Cold War, radical nationalism, financial crises, and the like. Populism is merely a manifestation of certain discontents in the liberal ordering process.
Conclusion
The narrative of Francis Fukuyama on the ideological progression of liberal democracy, though misread by many, is not fallacious as there is no potential alternative that can govern the world to the extent and potentials liberal democracy does. 103 Authoritarian regimes and Islamic radicalism remain as big challenges for liberal democracy but not as promising and appealing as the latter. Unfortunately, the presumed threats to the Western liberal order rather come from within as ‘populist tide’ creating volatile cracks in the individual elements that make up the liberal international order. From trade to security issues, populist disruptions are felt in the West. NATO’s identity and the legitimate role of American leadership in the Western political order had been undermined during the Trump administration. Economic openness is more or less hampered. More troublesome is the undermining of a sense of common civic identity of the West. All these manifestations are the signs of waning of liberalism and democracy in the Western world.
However, we need to distinguish the threats populism poses on liberal democracy and to the liberal international order since the latter is the multifaceted structure. Although being illiberal or anti-democratic, the populist regimes cannot disengage from multilateralism. In spite of the populist tendencies, the creation of a hardline populist regime is extremely difficult. While populist leaders and governments try to evade the practices and norms of liberal internationalism, necessity compel them to remain within the liberal structure. Also, the interlinking structure of liberal ordering makes the populist regimes difficult to exit from the various channels of liberal internationalism. Finally, populist regimes cannot face contemporary challenges in the long run as liberal democracy does, and so their prolonged rule is questionable.
To be dismissive of the presumed threats of populism is imprudent. Nevertheless, the trajectories of reinvigorating the Western liberal order are conceivable. Identifying the areas of streamlining the liberal order is beyond the scope of this paper; one such area lies in developing substantive policies that will make globalization serve the interests of middle and working-class citizens. 104 If the fate of liberal democracy is increasingly vulnerable with the tide of populism, the fate of liberal international order is relatively immune taking into account its interwoven resilient structure. As the Western liberal order has endured for more than seven decades adapting and overcoming multiple challenges, so too it will outlast the tide of populism.
Footnotes
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
