Abstract
The concept of evil adds complexity to our moral analysis and judgement of social and political phenomena, but the language of evil can be abused, either to exclude persons or groups from our universes of moral obligation, or to subvert fragile international and domestic moral orders and the conditions for human moral agency and responsibility. Despite these dangers the concept of evil is indispensable for identifying acts and states of affairs that violate our most basic moral ideals and expectations. Recognition of evil leads to three distinct but interrelated questions: who is to blame? How could such evil happen? And how can it be prevented from recurring? Answering these questions requires an account of agents, structures and their relationship. Acknowledging that agents and structures are mutually constituted need not absolve agents of moral responsibility; rather, it is vital to refining judgements of moral responsibility, and understanding how various social and political evils occur, as well as how to prevent their future recurrence.
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