This paper considers farmland conversion for the purpose of urban development as a series of transactions and discusses the determinants of appropriate governance structures for governing farmland conversion in terms of process efficiency. Towards this end, the paper develops a theoretical framework for analysing the process of farmland conversion based on transaction cost economics. The framework covers transactions, transaction attributes, governance structures and performance with the aim of minimising transaction costs. The paper also demonstrates the usability of the framework by creating a corresponding quantitative model for a case study in China. Furthermore, it identifies factors that influence the transaction costs associated with farmland conversion in China and explains why the related governance structures are chosen.
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