World-wide, common interest development (CID) and its governance, homeowners’ associations (HOAs), are developing rapidly. However, numerous conflicts have given rise to the need to redefine governmental and market roles in current HOA governance. This paper examines the successful development of the NangKang Software Park (NKSP) in Taiwan and draws conclusions for alternative government and other parties involved in neighbourhood management. There are several factors contributing to NKSP’s success, one being early governmental participation in the institutional design, which assisted in minimising potential conflicts. Another is NKSP’s external property management company, whose rent-seeking incentives were hindered through market competition. A third element of NKSP’s success was its HOA’s human resource management in its industrial neighbourhood. The results from this study suggest that HOA governance may be very suitable for industrial districts and may also provide a globally applicable solution for CID and HOA development.
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