Abstract
This article offers a `cognitive map' of interpretations of chance, within the Weberian paradigm, as revealed by twentieth-century writers from the United Kingdom, the United States and France. It notes the tension between the opposing definitions of chance as `residue' and chance as an important explanatory element in social development models. It describes how the predominant view of chance as `residue' between the 1940s and the 1960s was challenged from the 1950s and has been replaced, for many writers since the 1980s by the acceptance of the importance of chance for understanding the indeterminate nature of reality. While chance remains undertheorised in sociology the writings of a number of key authors have been used to suggest crucial features which distinguish social chance from other forms of chance and enable the former to be defined more carefully. Social chance, it is suggested is `unforeseen chance'. It consists of two main categories: `chance impacts' and `chance outcomes of interaction', the latter category, itself, made up of two sub-types: `agonistic chance' and `aggregated chance'. The article concludes with brief references to developing agreements among sociologists over appropriate levels of analysis, conditions and outcomes associated with the analysis of social chance.
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