Defining the business elite to consist of the directors of approximately one thousand of the largest British companies, it is proposed that those who serve simultaneously on two or more of these boards constitute a distinct class segment. Because the interlocking-directorship network that is the foundation of this segment overarches nearly all large firms, and because its members have an exceptional span of experience and influence in corporate matters, it is anticipated that the dominant segment plays a leading role in carrying the collective needs of large enterprise to both government and the non-profit sector. This thesis is examined using information collected from a variety of sources on 1,972 directors of 196 large companies. It is found that dominant segment members are far more likely than other company directors to serve on advisory and governing bodies associated with a variety of government and non-profit organizations. It is also found that dominant segment members disproportionately enter these governing circles because of their favourable position in both the formal business associations, exemplified by the Confederation of British Industry, and informal associations of business leaders, most visibly manifest in exclusive-club networks. The observed patterns suggest that the dominant segment is positioned to promote the class-wide interests of all large companies. Some revision is required in the prevailing conceptions of the relations between big business and the state.
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