Abstract
The sociology of religion has not systematically explored the emerging roles of religion in the whole process of the transition to adulthood, especially in the changing contexts of delayed and complicated transitions to adulthood. Seeking to bridge the two different fields of sociology, we identify four directions of research: (1) a multidimensional approach that identifies the different dimensions of religion with varying degrees of relationship to young adults’ lives; (2) a close attention to racial/ethnic variation in the roles of religion for the transition to adulthood; (3) an open inquiry into the changing importance of religion for young adults in a rapidly shifting neoliberal global economy; and (4) the detrimental effects of religion in the transition to adulthood. We call for more research on the increasingly complex relationship between religion and the transition to adulthood.
Introduction
Sociologists and demographers have focused on identifying timing, duration, and order in which young adults accomplish major social roles – such as school completion, job attainment, and establishment of an independent household, marriage, and parenthood – in order to examine the process of becoming an adult (Hogan and Astone, 1986; Shanahan, 2000). The transition to adulthood in the United States and many other parts of the world is taking much longer and is getting harder nowadays than in the past (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Furstenberg et al., 2004; Park, 2016). Along with rising economic inequality, young people are facing difficulties in landing a stable job, which also contributes to delaying and even forging marriage and parenthood. More and more young people return to their parental home or even do not leave their parental home at all until older ages. However, a great deal of research also makes it clear that the transition to adulthood is not uniform across different demographic and socioeconomic groups. Social class, gender, race/ethnicity, and immigrant status shape the pathways to adulthood, making some groups of young people more successful than others in the transition to adulthood (Gonzales and Roth, 2015; Sandefur et al., 2005; Schoon, 2015).
Among the various social factors affecting the transition to adulthood, relatively scant attention has been paid to the role of religion. A limited number of studies has looked into how specific religious groups, for example, Mormons and evangelical Christians, make a faster transition to marriage and parenthood than non-religious or other religion groups of young people (Eggebeen and Dew, 2009; Lehrer, 2000; Xu et al., 2005). Several studies have connected religiosity to various life course outcomes such as marriage, education, employment, and debt (Smith and Snell, 2009; Tevington, 2018). However, they typically consider religion in relation to a specific life course outcome separately, failing to recognize its role in the whole process of transition to adulthood. Rarely discussed is how religion affects the sequence and connection among different markers of adulthood and whether it contributes to or reduces delayed and complicated processes of becoming an adult in contemporary societies.
Of course, numerous studies have examined how individuals maintain or shift religiosity as they transit from youth to emerging adults, often referred to the ages between 18 and 25 (Arnett, 2000; Barry et al., 2010; Barry and Nelson, 2005; Davignon, 2013; Longest and Smith, 2011; Smith and Snell, 2009). 1 They have attempted to identify various factors affecting emerging adults’ declining religious affiliations, such as the role of parents and peers – siblings, friends, and romantic partners, and even the media (Barry et al., 2010, 2012; Davignon, 2013; Smith and Snell, 2009). In addition to studies of religiosity and its change over the life course, other researchers have examined how emerging adults’ religiosity is related to experiences of developmental outcomes and risky behaviors including alcohol, substance use, consumerism, and sexual activities (Burdette and Hill, 2009; Guo and Metcalfe, 2018; Sinha et al., 2007). It is notable that a great deal of literature on emerging adults in relation to religion has heavily focused on the religiosity of young people, without exploration of religion in a broad context of the transition to adulthood. Since many emerging adults do not yet make the transition to marriage and parenthood, it is easily understood why studies of emerging adults do not extensively examine the linkage between religion and various markers of adulthood. Therefore, in order to examine how religion matters for the whole process of becoming an adult from a life course perspective, it is necessary to take the last half of young adulthood from 25 to 34 years into consideration, beyond emerging adults (18–25). In particular, this extension to the early thirties is timely given the increasingly delayed transition to adulthood in many societies. Indeed, scholars who apply demographic approaches to the transition to adulthood typically consider the transition process up to the age of 30 or even later (Furstenberg et al., 2004; Settersten and Ray, 2010).
This disjoint between religion and the transition to adulthood may also reflect the trend for young adults to increasingly detach themselves from religion in Europe, the United Sates, and many other societies (Fuller, 2001; Pew Research Center, 2018; Smith and Snell, 2009). Increasing numbers of young people identify with ‘no religion’ (i.e. ‘nones’) (Baker and Smith, 2009; Hout and Fischer, 2002; Lee, 2012). The declining relevance of religion for contemporary young adults is also evident among studies that focus on subjective aspects of the transition to adulthood. The emerging adulthood literature, which emphasizes the significance of subjective conceptions of young adults in defining adult status over objective transition markers, has highlighted self-development, independent decision-making, autonomy, and individualism to be major socio-psychological features of emerging adulthood (Arnett, 1998, 2001). This emphasis of emerging adulthood on ‘decision on one’s own beliefs and values’ necessarily leads to an expectation of a minimized role of religious beliefs and practices in the transition to adulthood (Arnett et al., 2001; Arnett and Jensen, 2002).
However, the rising share of young people with no religion does not necessarily indicate that religion no longer plays a role in young people’s lives. Rather, it operates uniquely with ‘varying level of religious strength and vitality among emerging adults’ (Smith and Snell, 2009: 100). Moreover, the emerging literature of non-religion studies highlights considerable heterogeneity among those who select ‘no religion’ in census or social surveys, emphasizing that the rise of people selecting no religion should not be simply equated with the rise of secularization (Lee, 2012, 2014). Although some of them are atheists and agnostic, others are still spiritual if not religious. This is also consistent with the trend that although increasing numbers of young adults are not affiliated to institutional religions, some of them still maintain individualized practices such as Bible reading and individual prayers, labeling themselves as ‘spiritual’ than ‘religious’ (Smith and Snell, 2009). Moreover, some studies highlight the significance of religion for certain racial ethnic minority groups, if not for all, and in certain social contexts (Donahoo and Caffey, 2010; Nelson et al., 2004), depending on gender, level of income and education, and religious groups (Smith and Snell, 2009).
We argue that the previous literature’s exclusive focus on religiosity at the expense of institutional and social aspects of religion and under-appreciation of heterogeneous roles of religion for different racial/ethnic groups have contributed to the prevalent view that minimizes the relevance of religion for the transition to adulthood. We know little about how religion interacts with social class, gender, race/ethnicity, and immigrant status in shaping timing, duration, and connections of various transition markers. However, when a broader perspective on religion, which will be discussed in detail below, is taken, various arenas of potential research on connections between religion and transition to adulthood are identified. Moreover, changing the economic and social contexts of neoliberalism across the globe, and the potential detriments of religion, invite scholars to revisit the roles of religion for contemporary young adults’ lives.
In this article, we claim to bring back religion as a significant social force in relation to transition to adulthood, considering the transition markers of education completion, job attainment, marriage, childbearing, and living arrangements as a constellation that needs to be examined as a whole package, in the changing context of delayed, complex, and diversified transitions. On the basis of extensive literature review on the transition to adulthood and sociology of religion, we identify four directions of research that can bridge the gaps between the two fields in sociology: (1) a multidimensional approach that will identify the different dimensions of religion that have varying degrees of relationships to young adults’ life course; (2) close attention to racial/ethnic variation in the way in which religion matters for young people’s transition to adulthood; (3) open inquiry into the changing importance of religion for young adults’ lives in rapidly shifting neoliberal global economy; and (4) the detrimental effects of religion on young people’s transition to adulthood.
Bridging sociology of religion to the transition to adulthood: four research arenas
A multidimensional approach to religion
Past research on religion and adolescents tend to focus on religiosity affecting individuals’ behaviors and views of the world. Individual religiosity, operationalized by religious affiliation, religious attendance, private devotion (e.g. prayer and Bible reading), religious salience (e.g. importance of religion), religious efficacy (e.g. answer to prayer), otherworldly beliefs (e.g. God, angels, demons), and religious friends (e.g. number of close friends who are religious) (Desmond et al., 2018), is a foremost factor to understand juvenile drug, alcohol and tobacco use, and various delinquencies (Free, 1994; Sinha et al., 2007), life course adaptation and coping skills with parents’ divorce (Shortz and Worthington, 1994), and decision-making concerning sexual activities (Burdette and Hill, 2009; Petersen and Donnenwerth, 1997; Thornton and Camburn, 1989). Religiosity is also related with young adults’ intentions for family formation and pro-family attitudes (Eggebeen and Dew, 2009; see Hertel and Hughes, 1987). The overall consensus across these studies is that young adolescents who frequently attend religious services with stronger faith display less risky behaviors and follow traditional life passages and trajectories.
Not to mention, prior studies have made it clear that there are mutually overlapping and co-determining relationships between individual, familial, and religious institutional-level factors. For example, religious attendance and participation in youth group ministries reinforce young people’s religiosity and personal values (Donahoo and Caffey, 2010; Eggebeen and Dew, 2009). Parents’ religious fervor and affiliation are also important to understand young adults’ religious socialization. In such settings of biological two-parent families, young people are more likely to maintain religious identity following parent role models (Desmond et al., 2010). However, the approach to religion with exclusive focus on religiosity tends to overlook the multidimensional and multileveled features of religion. When we discuss young adults’ transition experiences, particularly, it is vital to take a broader perspective on religion that highlights networks and connections among people. As an institution, religion is not only about individuals’ beliefs but also about networks and communities that connect people who share religious beliefs (Hill, 2014).
Religious communities are places of abundant human and social capitals that young people can draw upon in their transition to adulthood to achieve life course milestones such as employment and marriage. Various religious groups engage in activities to create vibrant social capital within and outside of congregations, albeit in different forms and degrees. For example, due to a wide range of activities uniting members, conservative evangelical Protestant communities are more likely to foster internal cohesion of communities (Iannaccone, 1994), which eventually strengthen participants’ social networks. Meanwhile, Mainline Protestants and Catholics participate in ‘the wider civic community and progressive social betterment programs’, resulting in their ties to the broader societies (Putnam, 2000: 77). Overall, regardless of denominations, religiously involved people tend to develop social capital and learn transferable civic skills (e.g. management and public speaking skills) and moral values (e.g. altruism). Church attendees tend to report larger, thick social resources and ties such as more frequent telephone and in-person contacts and enhanced perceptions of the supportive quality of their relationships (Bradley, 1995).
Although not directly about young adults, evidence from studies of youth suggests that religious networks in congregations offer relatively dense relational resources which youth can employ for their psychological, intellectual, and social development. Especially, religious organizations foster intergenerational interactions that allow youth to access to other adult members and build ‘extra-familial trusting relationships’ of care, accountability, oversights, and control (Smith, 2003: 25). This kind of resources from religious congregations can be useful for young adults to make transitions across diverse social roles. Engagement in religious activities can foster opportunities for socializing and making friendships, and chances for volunteer work and community engagement, all of which are related to emotional and mental wellbeing and relationship skills of young adults.
Of course, as Robert Putnam (2000) shows in his seminal work, church membership has declined in the United States, and therefore the role of religious institutions for creating and maintaining social capital has likely weakened. However, meeting at religious services is not the only way people are connected through religious networks. Even if they do not attend the same services, religious networks in various degrees of closeness and tightness may still operate to share information, moral guide, and religious experiences. In fact, given their mobility, technology use, and social network sites (SNS) use (Miller et al., 2013), young people may prefer extended, loosely connected religious ties, facilitated by social network sites (SNS), to closed and tightly connected ties through regular attendance at religious services (Pempek et al., 2009). These loosely connected religious networks and communities not only reinforce shared beliefs, offer opportunities to promote identity expression and intimacy development, but also offer a platform to circulate practical information, useful knowledge, and strengthen supportive peer groups which young adults can rely on for smooth transitions (Pempek et al., 2009). Ultimately, the information shared through ‘weak’ ties may be beneficial for young adults to access to job-related opportunities, business information, and other practical tips about housing, living arrangement, financial investment, and so on. Encouraged are more empirical studies that will illustrate how young adults draw on religious networks and communities to deal with practical issues in everyday life beyond religiosity.
Religion as a meaningful resource for minority young adults
We call for close attention to the importance of religion for young adults, which may vary by race/ethnicity and immigrant status in multicultural societies. The portrait of emerging adulthood, primarily characterized by self-development, identity exploration, experiment, and delayed adulthood and thus by a tenuous relation with religion, may not well reflect unique experiences of racial/ethnic and immigrant minorities. The account fails to capture the various struggles and challenges that minority young people face in their transition to adulthood as well as strategies that they employ to deal with those challenges.
In particular, considering the greater involvement of racial/ethnic minority youth than their White peers in religion by regularly attending religious services and participating in various religious activities in the United States (Bankston and Zhou, 2013), it is not difficult to anticipate a more substantial role of religion for racial/ethnic minority young adults’ transitions than for their White peers. Racial and ethnic variation in the roles of religion for individuals’ lives is clearly marked in a report from a social survey: 75 % of Blacks in the United States think that religion is very important in their lives, followed by Latinos (59%), which makes a contrast from Whites (49%). For these minorities, religious institutions may serve as a place from where they can pull resources; 83% of Blacks attend religious service at least once or twice a month or a few times a year, followed by Latinos (74%), Asians (68%), which is higher than Whites (66%) (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Consistent with these statistics showing higher percentages of racial and ethnic minorities toward religious commitment, some studies suggest that religion may be more visible for racial/ethnic minority young people’s lives. Research on college students finds that Black students commonly relied on religion to cope with the stresses associated with college life (Johnson et al., 2003). The religious version of intellectual and personal growth fulfills their aspirations in colleges while Korean American students grapple with racist images of the upwardly striving immigrants on campus (Abelmann, 2009). For international students studying abroad in the United States, religious organizations provide various resources for arrival and their cultural incorporation; recent Chinese students and scholars’ conversion to Christianity shows that young people are attracted to evangelical churches as it preserves Chinese moral values and ethnic culture (Wang and Yang, 2006).
These findings are adequately in line with the literature that examines how religious communities offer various supports to and shield racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants from a larger society, thus facilitating their adaptation and integration in a society. Religious institutions function for minorities as a shelter for relieving stress, community in which to exchange job and business opportunities, place of practical support, assistance for migrant settlement, and education for their children (Alba et al., 2009; Min and Kim, 2005). For example, Korean ethnic congregations help Korean immigrants gain a sense of comfort and security from racial prejudice and discrimination (Min, 2010). Korean churches strengthen their ethic boundaries and preserve ethnic culture by transmitting Korean culture, offering language classes, ethno-cultural activities, and ethnic food, and sacralizing Korean traditional morality (Chong, 1998; Min, 2010; Min and Kim, 2005).
This buffering role of religious institutions has a particular meaning for racial/ethnic minority young adults who are multiply disadvantaged. A marginal status can be magnified in the intersection of race, class, and other categories, and religion can remain as a viable resource for multiply marginalized groups to mitigate and compensate for their disadvantaged positions. For instance, Nanlai Cao (2005) showed how church serves as a place that facilitates socialization for marginalized youth in the United States. His study finds that the working-class Chinese youth considers church as ‘a nurturing surrogate family that compensates for the weakness of immigrant families and the lack of parental resources’ (Cao, 2005: 183). Zhou and Bankston’s (1998) work of Vietnamese youth in New Orleans demonstrates that young people are penetrated into ethnic culture and networks in church, which in turn promote extra oversight and support for their schoolwork, boosting academic achievement, and shielding them from inner-city youth subculture.
Of course, implications of religious institutions are not limited to racial/ethnic minority or immigrant young adults, but can be extended to disadvantaged young adults in general. For instance, the transition to the adulthood literature has documented struggles and challenges that working-class young adults in the United States experience in their transition to college, workplace, and family (Furstenberg, 2008; Meier and Allen, 2008; Staff and Mortimer, 2008). The literature highlights the importance of social programs and institutions, such as military, alternative national service programs, and community colleges, for those disadvantaged young people to bridge their transitions from secondary school to higher education and labor force (Furstenberg et al., 2004). In the same way, religious institutions can form beneficial venues for less affluent, vulnerable young adults, serving as a springboard for them to achieve other milestones in their life course. In short, previous studies have not systematically examined the heterogeneous roles of religion for young people’s transition to adulthood. Even if religion might lose its relevance for the transition to adulthood for the racial/ethnic majority and advantaged young adults, it may still be an important resource for the racial/ethnic minority and disadvantaged young adults, not only spiritually but also socioeconomically.
The importance of religion in the neoliberal global economy
The shifting neoliberal global economy and its impacts on social life provide a new context to reconsider the relevance of religion for the transition to adulthood. In the United States and in many other economies, stable lifelong careers have been undermined and replaced with careers with lower security, more frequent job changes, and an ongoing need for new training and education (Côté, 2010). The global economic change has resulted in an increase of individual choices, with the notion that individuals are solely responsible for their own successes and failures (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991). Especially, youth scholars pay considerable attention to destandardized, individualized, and diversified biographies with weakening of fixed scripts for the younger population (Côté, 2010). University graduates are pushed to seek a postgraduate degree to be more competitive in the labor market as well as to endure lengthened job-seeking periods by participating in continuous trainings such as internship and language training experiences (Yoon, 2014). Young people are expected to ‘individualize’ their life projects, by embarking on self-styled career and lifestyle trajectories (Côté, 2010). The ideals of neoliberal subjects, characterized by self-control and self-development, have become global. Studies of university students in South Korea show how students vigorously participate in self-development such as language learning, world travel, and career planning (Abelmann et al., 2009) and aspire for global cultural capital to better position themselves for their career development (Kim, 2011).
In this context of the rising demand for individual responsibility and preparation for stiff competition and socioeconomic success, religiosity may increase its significance in mediating young adults’ emotional wellbeing and accommodation in the lagged transition to adulthood. Some young adults undergo developmental ‘stagnation’ and employ passive approaches to their individualization (Schwartz et al., 2005), feeling ‘formless, alienated, disconnected, and disenchanted’ along with the fragmentation of communities and networks (see Erickson, 2001). When individuals feel pressured by neoliberal expectations of entrepreneurial, individualized behaviors and weakened communal solidarity, ‘social resilience’ becomes important (Hall and Lamont, 2013). What individuals need is the psychological energy and resources to deal with structural insecurity and rising inequality (Hall and Lamont, 2013). This situation sets up a backdrop where religious support plays a role in alleviating young people’s alienated feelings, trauma, and other stressful feelings.
The psychological qualities of relaxation, reduced anxiety, comfort, and gratitude that religion offers may serve as cultural resources of social resilience, assisting young people to cope with the various shocks and traumas of neoliberalism. Religious institutions serve as one source of resilience, offering strong bonds across generations, close personal relationships, and an intimate connection with God (Wuthnow, 2014). Smith and Snell (2009) show that greater self-reported religiousness is associated with greater subjective wellbeing, greater feelings of gratitude and purpose in life, and greater sense of control over life in emerging adulthood. In response to African Americans’ traumatizing emotional experiences led by market-driven commodification in media and economic disparities of job loss and unemployment, a Christian church in New York offers a healing ritual for African Americans that helps them to respond with psychological resilience. This case of the Maafa Commemoration, rituals of remembrance, workshops, lectures, worship, and prayer, shows a powerful practice for African Americans to recover from the emotional trauma of fear, helplessness, and loss of control (Johnson, 2016). Although it is not directly related to neoliberalism, young American adults who experience events such as parental marital dissolution can regain meaning structure and moral direction through religious narratives (Mooney, 2014). Also, Catholic college students believe that their education in Catholicism has helped them to stay mentally strong in the face of adversity such as parental divorce (Dalessandro, 2016).
Instead of providing emotional and social support to deal with economic and psychological challenges associated with neoliberal economic conditions, in contrast, religious organizations can actually embrace and disseminate the notions and discourses of result-oriented material success and class mobility that parallels with neoliberal ideology. Through the ‘gospel of prosperity’ and ‘positive thinking’, megachurch services and programs provide young people with motivations and agency to pursue and strive for socioeconomic mobility (Chong, 2015). In fact, megachurches attuned to market logic, emphasizing personal improvement and positive mindset, have drawn many young professionals who aspire for the socioeconomic transition from working to middle class within an achievement-oriented culture in East Asia. A study by Terence Chong (2015) shows that Pentecostal megachurches in Singapore appealed to aspiring working or lower middle class young people, as they hope for upward mobility with a strong sense of agency. In short, either opposing or embracing neoliberal ideas of economic success and self-development, religious organizations may play an important role for young people to navigate changing economic contexts influenced by neoliberalism.
This growing relevance of religion for individuals in the context of neoliberalism becomes even more evident when spirituality is considered along with religion. We fully recognize the increasing numbers of individuals with no religion worldwide, but also notice that there are sizable populations of ‘spiritual but not religious (SBNR)’ in various societies. Many sociologists pay attention to the growing number of individuals and young adults who still identify, pursue, and practice spirituality although they do not belong to organized church 2 (Barry and Abo-Zena, 2014; Smith and Snell, 2009). Even if many emerging adults do not attend organized church, they can still pursue personal journeys and experiences to connect to God, read the Bible, pray, and aspire toward spiritual fulfillment and refreshment (Smith and Snell, 2009). Importantly, the share of US adults who ‘feel a deep sense of spiritual peace and well-being’ has slightly increased between two large-scale surveys conducted in 2007 and 2014 (Pew Research Center, 2014). Millennials who were born in 1981–1996 were not exceptional in this trend of increased spirituality. Overall, the changing economic and social contexts associated with neoliberalism have certainly opened up a new possibility for religion, when it is understood broadly in relation to spirituality, to regain its significance for contemporary young adults.
Detriments of religion for transitions to adulthood
Our discussion of religion in relation to the transition to adulthood mostly focuses on potentially ‘positive’ impacts of religion for young adults to make the transition to adulthood. However, equally important is the concern about ‘the detriments of religiousness’ (Magyar-Russell et al., 2014). A commonly suggested theme in the previous literature is the development of extreme views or potential prejudice toward out-groups (Johnson et al., 2012; Magyar-Russell et al., 2014). Christian college students’ self-reported religiosity is associated with more negative attitudes toward out-groups (e.g. Muslim, gay men) compared to in-groups (Johnson et al., 2012). This suggests that belonging to a religious group requires an implicit agreement to exclude difference and otherness, which may prevent openness to broader non-religious groups and opportunities for transition to adulthood.
This attitude may lead to another consequence that religion brings to young adults: self-segregation. By limiting themselves in the network of likeminded people, religiously committed young people may experience self-segregation and isolation (Abelmann, 2009). For instance, Nancy Abelmann (2009) discusses how Korean American students at a public university in Chicagoland remain in their comfort zone surrounded by coethnic groups and church friends. An unintended consequence of social constellation surrounding religious circles might be a possible segregation of young adults from other social and cultural groups. The tight network based around a religious organization may in turn diminish their access to various information and opportunities offered in other social settings.
However, universities, as secular institutions with curricula reinforcing diversity and pluralism, are places where most young adults find dating partners, friends, and older adults who influence their future employment. Previous studies have found that young people experience a cognitive dilemma when living in pluralistic secularism, self-doubts about values, and tensions and conflicts between religion and science (Dalessandro, 2016; Longest and Smith, 2011; Magyar-Russell et al., 2014; Smith and Snell, 2009). With competing narratives in secular culture and institutions, many emerging adults are expected to navigate various religious traditions, science, and even doubt with a certain degree of exploration and questioning (Magyar-Russell et al., 2014). While some emerging adults embrace and negotiate religious tolerance, other groups such as evangelical Protestants may experience more struggles. For example, emerging adults who hold the exclusivist belief that the only way to Heaven is through a belief in Jesus, are more likely to believe that religion and science are not compatible (Longest and Smith, 2011). On the other hand, groups such as Catholic college students do not perceive that their religious identities impede their integration into secular campus life. They use strategic and ambivalent actions to display their religious identities (Dalessandro, 2016). The recent rise of non-religious population that is composed of considerably heterogeneous groups (Lee, 2012) may make it harder for religious-committed young people to navigate the school, economic, and other social systems and thus may increase the danger for them to further segregate from others in a society.
Prejudice and stereotypes against minority groups whose religions and cultures are different from the dominant religion and cultural belief in a society pose serious challenges and difficulties for those minority young adults. For instance, studies have documented limited opportunities for education and the labor market because of the discrimination that some second-generation Muslim young adults face in Western Europe due to widely dispersed anti-Muslim sentiment, Muslimophobia, in the region (Abbas, 2007; Foner and Alba, 2008; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). Various types of cultural stereotypes, especially toward Islam, can reinforce institutionalized discrimination and unfavorable treatment of Muslim rituals and practices (Foner and Alba, 2008). Also, Muslim-American emerging adults experience racial discrimination, policing within communities, and psychological distress, which became more conspicuous after 9/11 (Sirin and Fine, 2007; Sirin and Katsiaficas, 2011). The challenges and disadvantages that young adults from some religious groups, especially Muslims, deal with suggest that the ultimate impact of religion on transition to adulthood depends upon the specific societal and cultural environments in which the religion is embedded.
Discussion
This article has reviewed previous research on the transition to adulthood and sociology of religion, suggesting four areas that request future research. First, we claim a multidimensional approach on religion to better understand the relevance of religion for young adults. Religion is not all about personal religious belief, commitment, and a sense of belonging to religious communities, but a social institution that encompasses various hidden and invisible ties strengthened through interactions among lay members and leaders, young adults and older adults, and religious members and non-religious members, and even by social media and other mediums. By looking at an entire process of the formation of human and social capital, we can enhance our understanding of religion, especially the multifaceted roles of religion in shaping young adults’ lives.
Second, close attention needs to be paid to the relationship between racial minority youth and religion. Despite the overall decline of the religious population, the ethnic church has been successful in maintaining the status quo because of its various services and resources by which multiply marginalized people can pull through and compensate for their disadvantaged social positions. In addition, we highlighted a growing role of religion for young adults’ lives in the rapidly changing neoliberal global economy. The macro-social structure, especially neoliberal market economy, has increased inequalities and competition for job attainment, eventually resulting in the accelerated individualization and a sense of alienation. Religion can come to play in the delayed process of transition to adulthood, by offering valuable psychological resources to young adults.
Finally, we have discussed the potentially negative and detrimental impacts of religion on young adults during their transition to adulthood. Religion may promote self-segregation of young adults by making them stay in their comfort zone. We also noted discrimination and stereotypes against a specific religious group that could constrain opportunities of young adults with a religious belief in their transitions to adulthood. The whole picture of religion in relation to transition to adulthood can fully emerge only with an appreciation of both the positive and negative effects of religion on young adults’ lives.
Does religion matter for contemporary young adults’ transitions? Although trends unequivocally suggest declining religious commitment among young adults nowadays in many parts of the word, the answer to the question may depend on what religion is, for whom religion matters, and what the economic and social contexts of religion are. For studies of neighborhood effects, Sharkey and Faber (2014) claimed that researchers should ask ‘where, when, why, and for whom residential contexts matter’ instead of ‘Do neighborhoods matter?’ We propose that the same shift in research questions is needed to better understand how religion matters for the transition to adulthood.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work is supported by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2016-LAB-2250002).
Notes
Author biographies
Address: Department of Sociology, Kyung Hee University, 26, Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 02447, Korea.
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Address: Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
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