Abstract
Contracting with private corporations to construct and/or operate prisons has become a commonly proffered response to problems of prison overcrowding and limited corrections resources. The involvement of private for-profit corporations in corrections has implications for who participates, how they participate, and where participants influence corrections policy making, as well as for the dynamics of that process. Or, in the language of political science, the participation of private corporations in corrections has consequences for the corrections subgovernment and for monitoring and accountability within that subgovernment. This article describes likely changes in the corrections subgovernment as a consequence of the privatization of prisons. The article is primarily theoretical, with the expectation that this subgovernment model will subsequently be tested empirically. Suggesting issues of monitoring and accountability that may arise with changes in subgovernment politics, it recommends that the National Institute of Justice convene interested parties to address these concerns.
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