1. James Barnes, Marshall Carter, and Max Skidmore, The World of Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1980); see also Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism,”International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325-47; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451-97.

2. See Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 33-75, 54.

3. Cf. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,”World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 324-48; Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,”International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 69-108.

4. On learning, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide,”European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 4 (1997): 473-95; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Haas, “Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations,” in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). On hegemonic power, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,”International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283-315. On moral entrepreneurship, see Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,”International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 479-526.

5. See Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-38.

6. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989); March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,”International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 943-69; Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald L. Jepperson, “Institutions, Institutional Effects and Institutionalism,” in Powell and DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 143-63.

7. See Thomas Risse et al., eds., The Power of Human Rights.

8. This part draws on Thomas Risse, “ `Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics,”International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000).

9. See Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security.

10. Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); Michael Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992). See also Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn, “Argumentatives Handeln bei internationalen Verhandlungen: Moderate Anmerkungen zur post-realistischen Debatte,”Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3, no. 2 (1996): 341-66.

11. See Jon Elster,” Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante,” in R. Malnes and A. Underdal, eds., Rationality and Institutions (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992); Elster, “Introduction,” in Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-18; Lars G. Lose, “Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Diplomatic Societies: Communication and Behavior in the Real World” (paper presented at the Femmoller Workshop, 24-28 June 1998); Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Jarle Weigard, “Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?”Scandinavian Political Studies 20, no. 3 (1997): 219-41; Thomas Gehring, “Arguing und Bargaining in internationalen Verhandlungen: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Ozonschutzregimes” (paper presented at the Sektionstagung Internationale Politik der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, Arnoldshain, 18-20 February 1996); Volker von Prittwitz, ed., Verhandeln und Argumentieren: Dialog, Inter-essen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996); Thomas Saretzki, “Wie unterscheiden sich Argumentieren und Verhandeln?” in von Prittwitz, Verhandeln und Argumentieren: Dialog, Interessen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik, 19-39.

12. James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,”International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 387-423; Gerald Schneider, “Rational Choice und kommunikatives Handeln: Eine Replik auf Harald Müller,”Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 1, no. 2 (1994): 357-66; Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross, “Communication in Coordination Games,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2 (1992): 739-71; Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk,”Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 3 (1996): 103-18.

13. See Otto Keck, “The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 1 (1987): 139-63; Keck, “Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ist eine Verbindung von Rational-Choice-Theorie und Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns möglich?”Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 2, no. 1 (1995): 5-48.

14. Frank Schimmelfennig, Debatten zwischen Staaten: Eine Argumentationstheorie internationaler Systemkonflikte (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995); Schimmelfennig, “Rhetorisches Handeln in der internationalen Politik,”Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen 4, no. 2 (1997): 219-54; Schimmelfennig, Rhetorisches Handeln in internationalen Menschenrechtsdebatten: Wie menschenrechtsverletzende Regierungen sich recht-fertigen (Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, 1998); see also Fearon's notion of “discussion,” James D. Fearon, “Deliberation as Discussion,” in Elster, Deliberative Democracy, 44-68.

15. See also Elster, “Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy, 2.

16. Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981); Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992); Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995); Habermas, “Replik auf Einwände,” in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 475-570; for applications in international relations theory, see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Harald Müller, “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln: Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorien,”Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 1, no. 1 (1994): 15-44; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Reden ist nicht billig: Zur Debatte um Kommunikation und Rationalität,”Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 2, no. 1 (1995): 171-84. Habermas uses the term communicative rationality. Since communications are all-pervasive in social action and interaction, I prefer the terms argumentative or discursive rationality since the goal of communications is to reach argumentative consensus on validity claims of norms or assertations about the world.

17. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1, 385 [my translation]; for the following, see also von Prittwitz, ed., Verhandeln und Argumentieren; Saretzki, “Wie unterscheiden sich Argumentieren und Verhandeln?”; Lose, “Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Diplomatic Societies”; Eriksen and Weigard, “Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?”

18. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 391; see also Karl-Otto Apel, “Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik,” in Apel, Transformation der Philosophie. Band 2: Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), 358-435.

19. Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990); Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung; see also Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordanian Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

20. Lose, “Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Diplomatic Societies,” 9.

21. See, for example, Michel Foucault, Dispositive der Macht (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1978); Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 53-72; Nancy S. Love, “Foucault and Habermas on Discourse and Modernity,”Polity 22 (1989): 269-73; Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985).

22. To quote Habermas (Habermas, “Replik auf Einwände,” 553): “I do not assert that a valid consensus can only be achieved under conditions of the ideal speech situation. Communicative daily practice is embedded in a sea of cultural taking for grantedness, i.e., of consensual certainties.... As soon as one component of this naively known and pre-reflexive background is transformed into the semantic content of a verbal utterance, the certainties enter the conditions of criticizable knowledge: They may become subject of dissent. Only when this dissent is persistent enough to provoke a discursive treatment of the disputed issue, this becomes an instance of which I assert that a reasoned consensus cannot be achieved unless the participants in the discourse assume that they persuade each other only on the basis of better arguments. If one side uses privileged access to arms, wealth, or prestige in order to wring agreement from the other by way of sanctions or rewards, none of the participants will doubt that the conditions for argumentation are no longer satisfied” (my translation).

23. See Shelly Chaiken, Wendy Wood, and Alice H. Eagly, “Principles of Persuasion,” in E. T. Higgins and A. Kruglanski, eds., Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (New York: Guilford, 1996): 702-42; Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody, eds., Political Persuasion and Attitude Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

24. See Elster, “Introduction.”

25. See also Schimmelfennig, “Rhetorisches Handeln in internationalen Menschen-rechtsdebatten.”

26. See Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

27. See Thomas Risse et al., eds., The Power of Human Rights.

28. On this definition, see Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders.

29. Alison Brysk, “From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina,”Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 3 (1993): 259-85; Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change, and Democratization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

30. See Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”

31. See David Black, “The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa,” in Thomas Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights, 78-108; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

32. Anja Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines,” in Thomas Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights, 134-171.

33. Sieglinde Gränzer, “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” in Thomas Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights, 109-33.

34. Audie Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa,”International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 451-78; Klotz, Norms in International Relations.

35. Kenya's President, Daniel Arap Moi, in a speech in May 1991 (FBIS/Daily Reports, 6 May 1991); FBIS-AFR-91-087, p. 4, quoted from Hans Peter Schmitz, “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” in Thomas Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights, 39-77, quote from p. 60.

36. Daniel C. Thomas, “The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe,” in Thomas Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights, 205-33; Black, “The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa”; Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines”; Schmitz, “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda.”

37. See Schmitz, “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda”; Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines”; Gränzer, “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” for details on the following.

38. “Human Rights Situation in Kenya—The Way It Is,”Daily Nation, 1 May 1996, quoted from Hans Peter Schmitz, “Communications between the Kenyan Government, the Human Rights Community, and United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms” (unpublished manuscript, European University Institute, 1998).

39. Schmitz, “Communications between the Kenyan Government, the Human Rights Community, and United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms.”

40. The following relies on Anja Jetschke, “Government Rhetoric: Indonesia and the Philippines” (unpublished manuscript, European University Institute, 1997); Jetschke, “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Processes of Argumentation: Indonesia 1970-1985” (unpublished manuscript, European University Institute, 1999).

41. Details in Jetschke, “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Processes of Argumentation.”

42. For the following, see Jetschke, “Government Rhetoric: Indonesia and the Philippines.”

43. See Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines.”

44. United Nations ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 48th Session, Summary Record of the 25th meeting (E/CN.4/1992/SR.25, par. 53-54), quoted from Jetschke, “Government Rhetoric: Indonesia and the Philippines.”

45. Nobel Peace Prize winner José Ramos Horta at the 1997 session of the Human Rights Commission, quoted from Jetschke, “Government Rhetoric: Indonesia and the Philippines.”

46. I owe this expression to Fritz Scharpf.

47. Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines.”

48. For the following, see Sieglinde Gränzer, “Staatliche Menschenrechtsdiskurse in Marokko” (unpublished manuscript, European University Institute, 1998).

49. Interview with Danish TV, 2 February 1988, quoted from Gränzer, “Staatliche Menschenrechtsdiskurse in Marokko,” 8 (my translation).

50. The first quote is taken from a speech to the nation, 8 May 1990; the second from the Throne speech of 3 March 1990, both quoted from Gränzer, “Staatliche Menschenrechtsdiskurse in Marokko,” 6, 10 (my translation).

51. Interview with Le Monde, 2 September 1992, quoted from Gränzer, “Staatliche Menschenrechtsdiskurse in Marokko,” 4 (my translation).

52. See Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns; Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung; Elster, “Introduction,” 12.

53. See Jetschke, “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines.”

54. See Schmitz, “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda.”

55. See Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights,” in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, eds., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139-67.

56. See also Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders.

57. See Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights.

58. See Chaiken et al., “Principles of Persuasion.”

International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area

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