This manuscript departs strongly from conventional accounts that ascribe a central role to war and the threat of war in Third World state building. Similarly, it challenges the conventional wisdom that abundant exportable natural resource wealth is likely to provoke institutional atrophy. Instead, it argues that a set of logically prior conditions—the social relations that govern the principal economic sectors and the pattern or intraelite conflict or compromise—launch path-dependent processes that help determine when, and if, either strategic conflict or resource wealth contribute to, or impede, institutional development. The argument is tested in the comparative analysis of the state-building process in two Andean neighbors (Chile and Peru), both of which are situated in similar strategic and natural resource environments but which produced qualitatively different outcomes in terms of state capacity or “strength.”
Classic statements of this perspective for Europe include Otto Hintze, in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992). Attempts to generalize the "war-makes-states" approach to other regions include Miguel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Fernando López-Alves, "The Transatlantic Bridge: Mirrors, Charles Tilly, and State Formation in the River Plate," in The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America, ed. Miguel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 153-76; and Victoria Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 175-205.
2.
See Francesco Giavazzi, Jeff R. Sheen, and Charles Wyplosz, "The Real Exchange Rate and the Fiscal Aspects of a Natural Resource Discovery," Oxford Economic Papers40, no. 3 (1988): 427-50.
3.
See, for example, Michael D. Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Michael Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from 13 Cases," unpublished Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles; Karl, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-61; Karl, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 297-322; Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth" (working paper of the International Monetary Fund WP/99/85, 1999); and Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 7 (2004): 816-41.
4.
That is not to claim, however, that these factors are necessarily irrelevant or that there is no observable correlation between military conflict or natural resource wealth and the efficacy and autonomy of state institutions. Rather, underspecified causal mechanisms and selection effects in empirical analysis have produced misleading findings as to the causal status of war and wealth. Two other very notable departures from the convention wisdoms are those of Hillel Soifer, author of "Authority over Distance: Explaining Variation in State Infrastructural Power in Latin America" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2006), who is developing an excellent, principally institutionalist, approach to explaining state building in Chile and Peru; and Hendrik Spruyt, author of The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), who emphasizes the expansion of trade in explaining European state formation.
5.
This argument begins with Hintze, The Historical Essays, 189, 199; but see also Tilly, Capital, Coercion; Centeno, Blood and Debt; and Hui, War and State Formation.
6.
Ibid., Tilly, 201.
7.
Tilly, Capital, Coercion, 20.
8.
This to differing degrees characterizes, for example, Bruce Porter, War and the Rise of the Nation State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994); Tilly, Capital, Coercion; Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Centeno, Blood and Debt.
9.
Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory," is a notable exception. Hui directly considers the positive and negative long-run institutional consequences of the way in which elites choose to respond to strategic threats.
10.
Youssef Cohen , Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," American Political Science Review75, no. 4 ( 1981): 901-910.
11.
See Thad Dunning , Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
12.
Indeed, with respect to the last, Andrew Schrank has demonstrated that the effects of resource abundance in the United States were critically shaped not by the resources themselves but rather by the social property relationships in which they were situated in different states. Schrank, "Reconsidering the Resource Curse: Selection Bias, Measurement Error, and Omitted Variables" (unpublished manuscript, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 2004).
13.
Selection and measurement problems are not the only issues, for empirical comparisons have also been frequently misapplied. If the claim to be investigated is that natural resource rents induce the creation of "rent-seeking societies" and corrupt bureaucracies, then this can have meaning only if this outcome is more likely in their presence than in their absence. But it is precisely this comparison that is seldom properly addressed-are developing countries that lack natural resources any less likely to suffer endemic corruption and clientelism? After all, given their (ceteris paribus) lower reservation wages, engaging in such activities is less costly. Would anyone be surprised that Haiti, Paraguay, and Kyrgyzstan have ineffective states despite the fact they are "blessed" with an absence of massive exported natural resource wealth? Are they institutionally better off than Ecuador, Bolivia, or Kazakhstan, which have such wealth?
14.
Michael Ross , Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35-37.
15.
Where resource-curse scholars try to fill in the causal mechanisms in their account, they come to strikingly opposed conclusions over whether an abundance of resource wealth produces an excessively strong society or state. Some argue that such wealth produces a set of social actors-especially, entrepreneurs in the export sector-that capture public institutions, render the state incapable of pursuing a coherent "national interest," and make it wholly dependent on the success of the mineral sector (Shafer, Winners and Losers; Karl, Paradox of Plenty). Others suggest that it is typically the state and not society that is too strong, arguing that the availability of vast sums permits politicians to displace private-sector elites, or make them dependent on public distribution, while the high sunk costs associated with natural resource (especially mineral) extraction can weaken business in relationship to the state over time. These twin causal mechanisms that underlie resource-curse arguments are thus diametrically opposed. Either the access to rents empowers the incorporating state or it empowers the rent-seeking society. The antinomic character of the posited causal mechanisms suggests that resource-curse theory is closer to shorthand for an observed correlation than to a causal relationship. We will see later that this observed correlation may itself be deceptive.
16.
Such an elite could be a settler population, a traditional feudal aristocracy, or simply a locally dominant upper class. The notion that rural social relations importantly condition long-term political outcomes is not new, being central to Barrington Moore’s discussion of regime dynamics in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) and Robert Brenner’s explanation of European economic development; see Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe," in The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, ed. T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985). The emphasis here on the role that free versus unfree labor has in the development of state institutions is inspired directly from the recent path-breaking work of Schrank, "Reconsidering the Resource Curse," which focuses on the role of social structure and resource wealth in U.S. economic development.
17.
Moore, Social Origins.
18.
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D.Stephens, CapitalistDevelopment and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
19.
This extreme tax aversion is found even in a context as different as the United States, where Robin Einhorn has shown that taxation was lower where slavery was important; Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 7. Moreover, in comparing slave with free states, she also argues flatly, "American [state] governments were more aristocratic, weaker, and less competent where slavery was a major institution in the economy and society."
20.
My argument does not imply that state building is impossible (or even less likely) in federal systems, for the existence of subnational political units does not itself imply that local elites are not simultaneously effectively incorporated in the overarching national political system. The key question is whether regional interests are meaningfully included in national political institutions in ways that do not permanently benefit or marginalize one elite subgroup or region. While one could hypothesize that federal systems might be more prone to intractable conflicts among competing (regional) elite groups because they reify regional differences, this remains an interesting empirical question that should be addressed.
21.
An absolutist road to political development would do so by making status as a member of a local elite dependent upon administrative appointment, salaried employment, or military service, as defined by the central state. In such contexts, the center has discretion over who has access to such employment-positions are neither purchased nor held as individual property nor inherited-and the resources supporting the positions (and thus status and power) comes from the center.
22.
Doug McAdam , Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 38-39; William Gramson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," American Behavioral Scientist12, no. 2 (1968): 15-21.
23.
See Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 1.
24.
Tanisha Fazal , "State Death in the International System," International Organization58, no. 2 (2004): 311-44.
25.
Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory."
26.
Schrank, "Reconsidering the Resource Curse "
27.
Ibid.
28.
Transparency International: www.transparency.org, accessed 2004. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 CD/ROM.
29.
For example, the recent closure of the last coal mine in France should not suggest to us that France developed economically because it is resource poor, but rather that development is at least in part the cause of its contemporary relative resource scarcity.
30.
We could note, for example, that the United Kingdom was a very important coal and copper producer early in its development; Germany had large coal and copper reserves that helped make it the industrial powerhouse it is today. Indeed, the United States has a deep history of resource-induced development; see Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, "Mineral Resources and Economic Development" (paper prepared for the Conference on Sector Reform in Latin America, Stanford Center for International Development, 2003); and Wright and Czelusta, "Exorcizing the Resource Curse: Minerals as a Knowledge Industry, Past and Present" (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2002).
31.
In contexts where causal dynamics involve critical junctures, cause and ultimate effect are often widely separate in time, and indeed, the "cause" may no longer be present at the time at which the effect is observable.
32.
Indeed, Peru and Chile (the former joined by Bolivia) fought two major wars in the nineteenth century, in the 1830s and in 1879-83.
33.
Obviously, these measures become problematic at much higher levels of development, where the tax take is more of a policy choice than an indicator of the state’s extractive capacity per se.
34.
See Tilly, Coercion, Capital; and Kiren Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State," Comparative Politics27, no.1 (1994): 1-25.
35.
Javier Tantaleán , Política Económico-financiera y la Formación del Estado: Siglo XIX (Lima, Peru: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación , 1983), 48.
36.
Until the invention of artificial nitrate fixation during the First World War, guano from the Chincha islands off Peru and nitrates mined from the Atacama Desert were the only cost-effective source of nitrates for use in artificial fertilizers and munitions.
37.
Peruvian government revenue data are from Brian Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-2000 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 693, and are converted to pounds sterling with the exchange rate reported for 1901 by Global Financial Data, A Global History of Currencies, compiled by Brian Taylor. Data are accessible at http://www.globalfindata.com/gh/index.html (accessed June 22, 2005). Chilean data are from Dirección de Contabilidad, Resumen de la Hacienda Pública de Chile desde 1833 hasta 1914 (London: Spottiswoode, 1914).
38.
See Centeno, Blood and Debt.
39.
Tantaleán, Política Económica-financiera.
40.
John Fisher, "La formación de estado peruano (1808-1824) y Simón Bolívar ," in Problemas de la formación del estado y de la nación en Hispanoamérica, ed. Inge Buisson , Günther Kahle, Hans-Joachim König, and Horst Pietschmann (Cologne, Germany: Böhlau Verlag, 1984), 467-77.
41.
Heraclio Bonilla , "Continuidad y cambio en la organización política de estado en el Perú independiente," in Problemas de la formación del estado y de la nación en Hispanoamérica (see note 39).
42.
Alfonso Quiroz , "Financial Leadership and the Formation of Peruvian Elite Groups," Journal of Latin American Studies20, no. 1 (1988): 49-81.
43.
Paul Gootenberg , Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Post-independence Peru (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1989 ), 112.
44.
Guano, the centuries-old accumulation of nitrates in bird excrement on the Chincha islands, was rapidly controlled by the Peruvian state. As it was concentrated on a few offshore islands and extremely easy to extract and commercialize, even a state as administratively deficient as Peru retained effective control over the rents that resulted. See Ronald Berg and Frederick Weaver, "Toward a Reinterpretation of Political Change during the First Century of Independence," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 20, no. 1 (1978): 72-73.
45.
Shane Hunt, "Growth and Guano in Nineteenth Century Peru," in The Latin American Economies: Growth and the Export Sector 1880-1930, ed. Roberto Cortés Conde and Shane Hunt (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 270-72.
46.
Ibid.
47.
Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano, 81, 124.
48.
Jorge Basadre, La multitud, la ciudad, y el campo en la historia del Perú, 2nd ed. (Lima, Peru: Editorial Huascarán, 1947), 236; Hunt, "Growth and Guano," 275.
49.
Vincent Peloso, "Liberals, Electoral Reform, and the Popular Vote in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Peru," in Liberals, Politics, and Power: State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, ed. Vincent Peloso and Barbara Tenenbaum ( Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 194.
50.
Berg and Weaver, "Toward a Reinterpretation ," 76.
51.
Indeed, what direct taxes had existed were largely abolished during the guano boom, and those taxes that were reinstated were typically extremely regressive capitation taxes on the indigenous population. So onerous was this burden that it sparked open rebellion; Berg and Weaver, "Toward a Reinterpretation," 71. At the same time, the very mechanisms used to collect taxes were primitive in the extreme: tax farming was not abolished until the 1890s, and even the abolition of the Indian head tax in this era was replaced by a no-less-burdensome salt tax. See Peter Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes (New York: Oxford University Press. 2000), 205.
52.
Ernesto Yepesdel Castillo, Perú 1820-1920: ¿Un siglo de desarrollo capitalista?2nd ed. (Lima, Peru: Signo Universitario, 1981), 100.
53.
Heraclio Bonilla , "The Indian Peasantry and ‘Peru’ during the War with Chile," in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to Twentieth Centuries, ed. Steve Stern (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 106.
54.
Peter Werlich , Peru: A Short History (Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 115.
55.
Heraclio Bonilla , "The War of the Pacific and the National and Colonial Problem in Peru," Past and Present81 (November 1978): 101.
56.
Florencia Mallon , "Nationalist and Antistate Coalitions in the War of the Pacific: Junín and Cajamarca, 1879-1902," in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness, 232-279 (see note 51); Bonilla, "The Indian Peasantry."
57.
Gavin Smith, Livelihood and Resistance: Peasants and the Politics of Land in Peru ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 71.
58.
Basadre, La multitud, 215.
59.
Manuel Burga and Alberto FloresGalindo, Apogeo y crisis de la república aristocrática: Oligarquía, aprismo, y comunismo en el Perú, 1895-1932 (Lima, Peru: Ediciones Rikchay Peru, 1979), 8.
60.
Yepes del Castillo, Perú, 186; and Albert Berry, "International Trade, Government, and Income Distribution in Peru since 1870," Latin American Research Review25, no. 2 (1990): 41.
61.
Peter Klarén, "The Social and Economic Consequences of Modernization in the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1870-1930," in Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Kenneth Duncan and Ian Routledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 241-42.
62.
Klarén, "Social and Economic Consequences," 243.
63.
See, most importantly, Jeffery M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Paige, Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
64.
Quiroz, "Financial Leadership ," 76.
65.
Indeed, those guerrilla leaders under Cáceres control paid with their lives for their patriotism; they were publicly executed on his orders in June of 1884. See Bonilla, "War of the Pacific," 114.
66.
Klarén, Peru, 213-15.
67.
Yepes del Castillo, Perú, 186; Berry, "International Trade," 41.
68.
Burga and Flores, Apogeo y crisis, 27.
69.
Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram have documented Peru’s exceedingly slow long-run growth rate, estimating it at roughly 1 percent a year between 1890 and 1975; see Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 321. Berry has pointed out the uncharacteristically small size of the Peruvian state into the 1940s, even after the substantial expansion of the second Leguía government (1919-30); Berry, "International Trade," 53.
70.
Yepes del Castillo, Perú, 177.
71.
On the last, see Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 89.
72.
Graham Stuart, "The Administration of President Leguía of Peru," American Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (1928): 416-20.
73.
Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 139.
74.
Jorge Basadre , "Para un esquema histórico sobre las elecciones peruanas: La ruptura del consenso legal (1919-1929) y la aparente transformación radical en el sistema (1931)," Revista de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas40, nos. 1-3 (January-December, 1976): 138.
75.
Berry, "International Trade ," 53.
76.
Hernán RamírezNecochea, Balmaceda y la Contrarrevolución de 1891 (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1969), 35.
77.
Rudolf Gómez, The Peruvian Administrative System (Boulder: University of Colorado, Boulder Bureau of Governmental Research, 1969), 37, 40, 52, 55. Local government was, even by this comparison, was even more stunningly underdeveloped. Not only were these governmental units uncooperative with the central authorities-as late as 1964, only 85 of 1,728 municipalities filed budget documents as required-but most effectively provided no real services.
78.
Abraham Lowenthal, "The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered," in The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, ed. Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press1983), 419.
79.
Centeno, Blood and Debt, chap. 1. It should be pointed out that this capacity is quite independent of developmental strategy. The Chilean state was quite capable of undertaking state-led developmental efforts at least since the presidency of Balmaceda (1886-91) and most extensively in the era of import-substituting industrialization initiated under the Popular Front governments (1938-52), and these efforts continued until the fall of Salvador Allende in 1973. At the same time, effective arms-length market regulating institutions were created during the neoliberal turn initiated by the military government of General Pinochet (1973-89), which were markedly strengthened in the posttransitions Christian Democratic and Social Democratic governments of the Concertación (1989-2007).
80.
Arnold Bauer, Chilean Rural Society: From the Spanish Conquest to1930 (Cambridge , UK: Cambridge University Press. 1975), 80-81.
81.
Harold Blakemore, "From the War of the Pacific to 1930," in Chile since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45.
82.
On land inequality, see Comite Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola, Chile: Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-económico del sector agrícola (Santiago, Chile: CEPAL/ IICA/FAO/OEA/BID, 1966); on rural protest levels, see Brian Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
83.
Arnold Bauer and Ann Hagerman Johnson, "Land and Labour in Rural Chile, 1850-1935 ," in Land and Labour in Latin America (see note 59), 88.
84.
Cristóbal Kay , "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System, 1850-1973," in Land and Labour in Latin America (see note 59) , 104.
85.
Bauer and Johnson, "Land and Labour," 96.
86.
Even Loveman, who is at pains to document that the Chilean countryside was not entirely quiescent, makes it clear that little protest occurred until the agrarian reform era of the 1950s and 1960s, and almost none of it was violent; Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside.
87.
Simon Collier , "The Historiography of the ‘Portalian Period’ (1830-1891) in Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review57, no. 4 ( 1977): 681-82.
88.
Simon Collier , "From Independence to the War of the Pacific ," in Chile since Independence (see note 79), 21-22.
89.
Karen Remmer , Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 214.
90.
This last point is crucial, for it changes the game of politics from a one-off to an iterated game. While one or the other faction at different times was politically ascendant, the rules of political competition made it clear that this dominance was always subject to compromise, renewal, or replacement, and in no case could a single political figure govern indefinitely.
91.
Harold Blakemore , British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886- 1896: Balmaceda and North (London: Athlone Press for the University of London Institute of Latin American Studies , 1974); Blakemore , "War of the Pacific"
92.
Carmen Cariola and Osvaldo Sunkel, "The Growth of the Nitrate Industry and Socioeconomic Change in Chile, 1880-1930," in The Latin American Economies, 137-254 (see note 44).
93.
Alberto Edwards V., La Fronda Aristocrática: Historia Política de Chile, 8th ed. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacífico, 1976 [1927]).
94.
Ricardo Krebs, "Orígenes de la Conciencia Nacional Chilena," in Problemas de la Formación del Estado y de la Nación en Hispanoamérica (see note 39).
95.
S. Collier, "From Independence"
96.
Blakemore, British Nitrates, 4.
97.
Remmer, Party Competition; Blakemore, British Nitrates. Indeed, Remmer points out that this indicates a strong underlying unity among different parts of the Chilean upper class, as well the fact that there was no meaningful social reform implicit in what the Chileans call the "Revolution of 1891."
98.
Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Ratcliff, Landlords and Capitalists: The Dominant Class of Chile ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 176.
99.
William F. Sater , A History of Chile, 1808-1994 ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 137.
100.
Blakemore, British Nitrates, 1.
101.
Ricardo Donoso, Desarollo Político y Social de Chile desde la Constitución de 1833 (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1942), 17-19.
102.
For example, see Mario Góngora, Ensayo Histórico sobre la Noción de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX, 8th ed. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 2003), 66; Krebs, "Orígenes," 110-17; Frederick Nunn, "Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920," Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 2 (1970): 301; Donoso, Desarollo Político, 21.
103.
See Michael Monteón, Chile in the Nitrate Era: The Evolution of Economic Dependence, 1880-1930 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 19.
104.
Luis Ortega , "Nitrates, Chilean Entrepreneurs and the Origins of the War of the Pacific," Journal of Latin American Studies16, no. 2 ( 1984): 347.
105.
Peru was immediately dragged into this conflict as a consequence of the mutual assistance treaty it had concluded with the Bolivians.
106.
Ortega, " Nitrates," 343-44.
107.
Cariola and Sunkel, "Growth of the Nitrate Industry." Alberto Edwards, writing in 1928, referred to "the splendid administrative organization, the fundamental solidity of which Chile gave such an eloquent display in the War of the Pacific. . . . Peru and Bolivia were necessarily defeated by a country better organized"; Edwards, La Fronda Aristocrática, 165.
108.
Blakemore, " War of the Pacific," 41.
109.
Markos Mamalakis , The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).
110.
John Bowman and Michael Wallerstein, "The Fall of Balmaceda and Public Finance in Chile: New Data for an Old Debate," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs24, no. 4: 448.
111.
Cariola and Sunkel, "Growth of the Nitrate Industry," 147-59.
112.
Blakemore, "War of the Pacific," 61.
113.
Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
114.
Einhorn, American Slavery , 2008.
115.
On the tax capacity of the English state, see Deborah Boucoyannis, "Land, Courts, and Parliaments: The Hidden Sinews of Power in the Emergence of Constitutionalism, Volume 1" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2005), 105.
