This article explores the interface between public deliberation and interest politics. It empirically examines how and when actors with vested interests support and oppose processes of direct citizen deliberation, such as citizens’ juries. An analysis of four cases finds that interest groups and activists respond to citizen deliberation in a variety of ways from cooperative engagement to disruptive disengagement. The research suggests that partisan actors are most likely to support citizens’ forums when the ideational and political context offers instrumental reasons to go public. The article explores what this strategic approach to public deliberation implies for the practice and theory of deliberative democracy.
See Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democracy Theory,”Annual Review of Political Science6 (2003): 307-326.
2.
and Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. Robert. E. Goodin and Phillip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), 128-142.
3.
and Samuel Freeman, “Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment,”Philosophy and Public Affairs29, no. 4 (2002): 371-418.
4.
and William H. Simon, “Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy,” in Macedo, Deliberative Politics, 49-57.
5.
Quoted in Mark E. Warren, “The Self in Discursive Democracy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 167-200, at 189.
6.
and Melissa S. Williams, “The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 124-152.
7.
and Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. James F. Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 383-406.
8.
Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds., Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
9.
See Mark P. Petracca, “The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics,” in The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed, ed. Mark Petracca (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), 3-31.
10.
and John Gastil and Peter Levine, eds., The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-first Century (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005).
11.
and Simon Joss and John Durant, Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe (London: Science Museum, 1999).
12.
This term is borrowed from Fung’s discussion of microregulation in deliberative institutions. See Archon Fung, “Deliberation before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust world,”Political Theory33, no. 2 (2005): 397-419.
13.
This particular element is what differentiates citizens’ forums from more aggregative procedures, such as the deliberative poll where the focus is on the quantitative assessment of deliberative public opinion. See James Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1997).
14.
See Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance,” in Associations and Democracy, ed. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (London: Verso, 1995), 7-98.
15.
and Mark E. Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 82-84.
16.
Jane Mansbridge, “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation,” in Petracca, The Politics of Interests, 32-57.
17.
Archon Fung, “Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes and Realities,”Annual Review of Sociology29 (2003): 515-539.
18.
Mansbridge, “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation.”
19.
Cohen and Rogers, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance.”
20.
Mansbridge, “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation.”
21.
and Michel Pimbert and Tom Wakeford, Prajateerpu: A Citizen Jury/Scenario Workshop on Food and Farming Futures for Andhra Pradesh, India (London and Sussex, UK: International Institute for Environment and Development [IIED] Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 2002).
22.
Rosemary Rowe and Michael Shepherd, “Public Participation in the New NHS: No Closer to Citizen Control?”Social Policy and Administration36, no. 3 (2002): 275-290.
23.
and John Parkinson, “Why Deliberate? The Encounter between Deliberation and New Public Managers,”Public Administration82, no. 2 (2004): 377-395.
24.
See also John Gastil, By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy through Deliberative Elections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
25.
and Albert Weale, “Can We Democratize Decisions on Risk and the Environment?”Government and Opposition36, no. 3 (2001): 355-378.
26.
and Parkinson, “Why Deliberate?”
27.
John Parkinson, “Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy,”Political Studies51, no. 1 (2003): 180-196.
28.
The German interviews were conducted in Berlin, Dresden, Karlsruhe, Munich, and Stuttgart between January and March 2003. For more on methodology, see Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Public Deliberation and Interest Organisation” (PhD diss., Australian National University, Canberra, 2004), ch. 3.
29.
and David Marsh and Rod W. Rhodes, eds., Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
30.
This typology was developed on the basis of organizations present in the cases. It is based on the primary motivating interest of the organization rather than on features such as organizational structure, membership, or internal communication. Data on these microorganizational features were not collected as part of the empirical research.
31.
I consider disability groups under public interest organizations because they not only are focused on supporting their members, but also typically have an outward community orientation in terms of public education and advocacy.
32.
Support groups are not included in this comparative figure because they were only present in one case.
33.
The “dominant” response is the majority response within a case study for a particular type of interest organization. For example, the dominant response of government organizations in the GeneTech case was passive disengagement since three out of five organizations responded in this way.
34.
What is not captured in this figure is the dynamic nature of the responses. For example, some organizations initially refused to participate, and then, as a kind of peer pressure effect took hold, they changed their mind and came on board when they learned that other players were also engaging. Alternatively, some groups agreed to participate but then vetoed when the forum date closed in. In those cases where responses shifted over time, I made an assessment of the overall response. For example, consider the reaction of the Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) to the consensus conference in the GeneTech case. Initially, the AFGC declined to participate, but as the project developed it changed its position, and in the end was keen to present to the citizens. I categorized the dominant response of AFGC as “sceptical participation.”
35.
See Warren, Democracy and Association.
36.
Warren, Democracy and Association, 170-170.
37.
and Warren, Democracy and Association.
38.
There were four primary motivations for choosing cases from Australia and Germany. First, there is significant variation between these two nations with respect to political institutions, national policy styles, and interest group systems. Second, the two countries have experimented with different deliberative design models. Third, Germany and Australia have taken contrasting policy trajectories in dealing with modern risks, particularly with respect to ecological issues. Fourth, the country selection was motivated by a desire to conduct a comparative study that stepped outside the confines of Anglo-American political science. To this end, the empirical research draws on both German and English interviews and texts.
39.
See Lyn Carson, Stuart White, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and Jane Palmer, “Community Consultation in Environmental Policy Making,”The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs3, no. 1 (2002): 1-13.
40.
and Hendriks, “Public Deliberation and Interest Organisation,” ch. 4.
41.
The consensus conference centred on the use of gene technology in the food chain: from the field; to animal feed; to food manufacturing, processing, and distribution; and then onto the consumer. This included genetically modified foods (GM foods) as well as broader applications such as genetically altered microorganisms and enzymes used in food processing.
42.
and Carole Renouf, “Rebirthing Democracy: The Experience of the First Australian Consensus Conference”Consuming Interest79 (1999): 16-19.
43.
For more on this case, see Bürgergutachten zum Verbraucherschutz in Bayern (Citizens’ report on consumer protection in Bavaria) (Munich: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Gesundheit, Ernährung und Verbraucherschutz, 2002), http://www.stmugv.bayern.de/de/verbraucherschutz/buergergutachten/buergergutachten.htm (accessed July 17, 2006).
44.
and Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen Deliberations,” in Gastil and Levine, The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, 80-110.
45.
The German Hygiene Museum in Dresden (Deutsches Hygiene-Museum Dresden) focuses on the biological, social, and cultural aspects of human life.
46.
For more details on this case, see Silke Schicktanz and Jörg Naumann, eds., Bürgerkonferenz: Streitfall Gendiagnostik (Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich, 2003).
47.
and Hendriks, “Public Deliberation and Interest Organisation,” ch. 8.
48.
Interview with executive director, Avcare, Canberra, 2002.
49.
and Edmund Stoiber, “Errichtung eines Staatsministeriums für Gesundheit, Ernährung und Verbraucherschutz” (“The establishment of a state ministry for health, nutrition and consumer protection”), press statement, Bavarian State Ministry for Health, Nutrition and Consumer Protection (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Gesundheit, Ernährung und Verbraucherschutz), Munich, January 15, 2001, http://www.bayern.de/Presse-Info/Reden/2001/01-15.html (accessed May 8, 2003).
50.
Interview with senior bureaucrat, Bavarian State Ministry for Health, Nutrition and Consumer Protection, Munich, 2003.
51.
Interview with head of public relations and news media department, Bavarian Social Association (VdK), Munich, 2003.
52.
See Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1921; reprint, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin: 1996).
53.
Electro-smog campaigners seek to reduce the amount of electromagnetic radiation emitted from electronic devices and their supporting infrastructure (e.g., mobile phones and transmission/receiving towers). They claim that electromagnetic radiation is harmful to the health of humans, animals, and plants. See http://www.buergerwelle.at (accessed November 5, 2004).
54.
Interview with chairman of Bürgerwelle, Munich, 2003.
55.
See Carsten Stark, “Germany: Rule by Virtue of Knowledge,” in Democracy at Work: A Comparative Sociology of Environmental Regulation in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States, ed. Richard Münch, with Christian Lahusen, Markus Kurth, Cornelia Borgards, Carsten Stark, and Claudia Jauß (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 103-128.
56.
Interview with representative from the public health insurance group Kaufmännische Krankenkasse (KKK), Berlin, 2003.
57.
Ibid.
58.
Interviews with two doctors specializing in genetics, Dresden and Berlin, 2003.
59.
Interview with scientific expert (requested anonymity), Berlin, 2003.
60.
Renouf, “Rebirthing Democracy.”
61.
See Alastair Crombie and Colin Ducker, “Evaluation Report: Phase 2,” in The First Australian Consensus Conference: Gene Technology in the Food Chain, commissioned by the Consensus Conference Steering Committee (Canberra: Consensus Conference Steering Committee, 2000), 23-25.
62.
Interview with representative from Avcare, Canberra, 2002.
63.
Interview with representative from agricultural lobby group (requested anonymity), Berlin, 2003.
64.
E-mail correspondence from Uwe Kullnick to Carolyn Hendriks, March 8, 2003.
65.
BITKOM is the German Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (Bundesverbande Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue Medien).
66.
Interview with representative from the Australian Food and Grocery Council, Canberra, 2002.
67.
Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association (PACIA), “Stop Press: Latest Developments on CDL in NSW,” in PACIA, Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association Member News (Sydney: PACIA, 2000).
68.
For more on this incident and the CDL case, see Hendriks, “Institutions of Deliberative Democratic Processes and Interest Groups.”
69.
See Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, “Power and Reason,” in Fung and Wright, Deepening Democracy, 237-255, at 252-53.
70.
Interview with representative from a disability interest organization (requested anonymity), Berlin, 2003.
71.
Interview with representative from GeneEthics Information Service (GID), Berlin, 2003.
72.
Interview with senior policy adviser from the Office of Gene Technology Regulator, Canberra, 2003.
73.
Interview with representative from the Bavarian Food Processing Council, Berlin, 2003.
74.
Interview with a representative from the Interessengemeinschaft Selbstbestimmintesleben, a disability interest organization, Berlin, 2003.
75.
Interview with Hilmar Sturm, organizer of the citizens’ conference, Munich, 2003.
76.
See Ulrich Willems and Thomas von Winter, eds., Politische Repräsentation Schwacher Interessen (Political representation of weaker interests) (Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich, 2000).
77.
and Iris Marion Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,”Political Theory29, no. 5 (2001): 670-690.
78.
and Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,”685-687.
79.
Interview with representative from the Australian GenEthics Network (GEN), Melbourne, 2003.
80.
Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.”
81.
Ibid., 687.
82.
This provides empirical support for arguments presented in Fung, “Deliberation before the Revolution.”
83.
For more on the influence of participation on deliberative forums, see Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Participatory Storylines and Their Impact on Deliberative Forums,”Policy Sciences38, no. 4 (2005): 1-20.
84.
quoted in Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, “Collaborative Policymaking: Governance through Dialogue,” in Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society, ed. Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33-59, at 34.
85.
By political opportunities I am referring both to the formal arrangements established for interest intermediation, and to the informal avenues used to influence policy outcomes.
86.
and Manfred G. Schmidt, Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2003).
87.
Jeremy J. Richardson, “Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change,”Political Studies48, no. 5 (2000): 1006-1025.
88.
and Meredith Edwards, “Participatory Governance into the Future: Roles of the Government and Community Sectors,”Australian Journal of Public Administration60, no. 3 (2001): 78-88.
89.
See Rod Tiffen and Ross Gittins, How Australia Compares (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004), 4-4.
90.
In both Australian cases there is evidence that powerful policy actors had significant informal access to senior policy officials and decision makers. For example, there is evidence that groups in the cases were in direct contact with senior politicians, or in close commercial or working partnerships with government agencies. See Hendriks, “Public Deliberation and Interest Organisation” chs. 4 and 5.
91.
and Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, “The Strange Case of Regulating Lobbying in Germany,”Parliamentary Affairs51, no. 4 (1998): 559-567.
92.
There were, however, some powerful organizations, such as Siemens in the Consumer case, which declined to participate and successfully escaped any public criticism of their unwillingness to engage with the public.
93.
John Warhurst, “Locating the Target: Regulating Lobbying in Australia,”Parliamentary Affairs51, no. 4 (1998): 538-550, at 542.
94.
See Hendriks, “Institutions of Deliberative Democratic Processes and Interest Groups.”
95.
Quoted in Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 375-375.
96.
Ibid.
97.
and John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
98.
Quoted in Lyn Carson, “Innovative Consultation Processes and the Changing Role of Activism,”Third Sector Review7, no. 1 (2001): 7-22, at 21.
99.
Quoted in Sanders, “Against Deliberation,”372-372.
