Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that asset owners favor parties on the center-right. This assumption, however, ignores the possibility that party positions may shift over time and across contexts. The electoral payoff from ownership thus depends on how the policies of the major parties treat those assets. In this article, we argue that the prediction that asset holders support right-of-center parties rests on the position-taking strategies of parties. We test this expectation with evidence from six elections in Australia and with a dataset of post-election surveys in 25 advanced democracies. Utilizing different measures for key concepts, both analyses support our claims. Study findings identify the supply side of electoral competition as an important condition for patrimonial economic voting and, more generally, confirm the role of parties in mobilizing voters around issues on which they have a competitive advantage.
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