In this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North–South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war) than North–North investment. We argue that North–South investment flows create a constituency within the US financial sector that is likely to support stabilising intervention – military intervention aimed at reducing political risk abroad. Examining political action committee donations from Fortune 500 financial firms with a cross-sectional Tobit model, we find that US financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South are likely to favour congressional candidates with a record of voting for intervention in developing countries. This study contributes to the literature on economic interdependence and peace, proposes an original method for capturing the revealed preferences of political actors, and enhances our understanding of the sectoral underpinnings of foreign policy-making.
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