This article explains the regional variation in the electoral rules governing village election in China. We argue that China’s fast urbanization and land development have undermined the quality of rural democracy because local government officials faced pressure to ensure “right” cadres elected, and therefore had motivation to manipulate election rules. A panel dataset covering two rounds of elections in 2005 and 2008 is utilized to test the hypothesized relationship. Our findings are robust to various refinements in measurement and model specification. These findings contribute to the general literature on land and democratization as well as the recent debate about competitive elections in authoritarian countries.
AcemogluDJohnsonSRobinsonJet al. (2008) Income and Democracy. American Economic Review98: 808–842.
2.
AcemogluDJohnsonSRobinsonJA (2012) The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply. American Economic Review102 (6): 3077–3110.
3.
AcemogluDRobinsonJA (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
4.
AghionPAlesinaATrebbiF (2008) Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities. Quarterly Journal of Economics123: 325–357.
5.
AlpermannB (1997) Provincial Legislation on Village Elections. China Information11 (4): 1–13.
6.
Austen-SmithD (2000) Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation. Journal of Political Economy108: 1235–1269.
7.
BalandJRobinsonJ (2008) Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile. American Economic Review98: 1737–1765.
8.
CaiY (2008a) Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China. China Quarterly193: 24–42.
9.
CaiY (2008b) Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China. British Journal of Political Science38 (3): 411–432.
10.
CuiETaoRWarnerTJet al. (2015) How Do Land Takings Affect Political Trust in Rural China?Political Studies63 (Suppl. 1): 91–109.
11.
DicksonB (2000) Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation. Political Science Quarterly115: 517–540.
12.
FornosCPowerTGarandJ (2004) Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980–2000. Comparative Political Studies37: 909–940.
13.
GandhiJ (2008) Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
GeddesB (2005) Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?Paper Presented at The Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2005.
15.
HuR (2006) Social Capital and Chinese Rural Residents’ Regional Participation: Factors Affecting Villagers’ Participation in Village-Level Elections. Sociological Research2: 61–85.
16.
KelliherD (1997) The Chinese Debate Over Village Self-government. The China Journal (37): 63–86.
17.
KreuzerM (2005) Germany: Partisan Engineering of Personalized Proportional Representation. In: ColomerJ (ed.) Handbook of Electoral System Choice. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.222–236.
18.
LandryPDavisDWangS (2010) Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties. Comparative Political Studies43: 763–790.
19.
LiL (2003) The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China. Asian Survey43: 648–662.
20.
LiL (2011) Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural China. Political Behavior33 (2): 291–311.
21.
LinGYiF (2011) Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization on Urban Land?Urban Geography32: 50–79.
22.
LipsetS (1959) Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review53: 69–105.
23.
LuYTaoR (2017) Organizational Structure and Collective Action: Lineage Networks, Semi-Autonomous Civic Associations, and Collective Resistance in Rural China. American Journal of Sociology122 (6): 1726–1774.
24.
MattinglyDC (2016) Elite Capture: How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights in China. World Politics68 (3): 383–412.
25.
MooreB (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston, MA: Beacon.
26.
O’BrienKJHanR (2009) Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China. Journal of Contemporary China18 (60): 359–378.
27.
O’BrienKJLiL (2000) Accommodating Democracy in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China. China Quarterly162: 465–489.
28.
O’BrienKJLiL (2006) Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Cambridge University Press.
29.
OiJRozelleS (2000) Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision Making in Chinese Villages. China Quarterly162: 513–539.
30.
OiJBabiarzKSZhangLet al. (2012) Shifting Fiscal Control to Limit Cadre Power in China’s Townships and Villages. China Quarterly211: 649–675.
31.
PerssonTTabelliniG (2005) The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
32.
PrzeworskiALimongiF (1997) Modernization: Theory and Facts. World Politics49: 155–183.
ZhaiNXiangG (2007) An Analysis of China’s Current Land Acquisition System and Policy Implications. China Administration261: 9–12 (in Chinese).
43.
ZhongYChenJ (2002) To Vote or Not to Vote: An Analysis of Peasants’ Participation in Chinese Village Elections. Comparative Political Studies35: 686–712.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
