Abstract
Leadership attributes affecting the policy process are examined at two levels: the Head of Government's experience in foreign affairs prior to assuming office and, secondly, psychological factors accounting for degrees of dogmatism — the extent to which, in an international crisis situation, the leader is “open” or “closed” to relevant evidence and advice. The dogmatic determination of Prime Minister Anthony Eden and President Richard Nixon — who were widely regarded as foreign affairs experts — to proceed with their respective 1956 Suez and 1970 Cambodian military operations despite advice highlighting evidence that the policies were likely to be counterproductive suggests that expertise will not necessarily prevent irrational decision-making. Eden's and Nixon's actions were motivated not by domestic political requirements or foreign pressures, but by their powerful inner needs to meet a challenge in their area of expertise in order to counter deep-rooted personal feelings of insecurity and inferiority.
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