This paper reviews and attempts to show the applicability of three recent developments in political theory, all of which point out instances where “small” actors have strategic advantages over larger adversaries in conflict situations. The definition of the “size” of actors is not specified as a general concept. The first instance is based on the analogy between certain types of collective political choice situations and oligopolistic markets. The second is an interpretation of a class of two person games, and the third is an application of n-person game theory.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
2.
Olson, M.; Zeckhauser, R. (1966). An Economic Theory of Alliances. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 48/31: 266–279.
3.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press.
4.
Schelling, T. C. (1963). The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
