“You Can Run but You Can'T Hide”: Using Rico to Fight Terrorism

18 USC ss.1961–1968.

Wallace Gregory J. “Outgunning the Mob” (1994) The ABA Journal, March 1994, p. 63.

135 Cong, Rec. S1652 (daily edn Feb. 23, 1989) (Statements of Senator DeConcini, commentary on the purpose of RICO).

Racketeering activity is defined as any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion… chargeable under state law… 18 USC 1961 (1988). A “pattern” is understood to require at least two criminal acts demonstrating some level of continuity and threat of future criminal action. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S Ct 2893, 1898–902 (1989), see also, Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., 473 US 179, 496 n.14 (1985) (‘it is continuity plus relationship which combines to procedure a pattern.’)

18 USC s. 1961(4).

US. v. Turkette, 452 US 576, 580–81, 101 S Ct 2524, 2527–28 (1981).

Id., p. 583, 101 S Ct, p. 2528.

As Brennan J, explained in H.J. Inc. v. Northern Bell Tele Co., 492 US 229, 239 (1989), at least two predicant acts be related and amount to or pose a threat of continuing criminal activity.

18 USC s. 1962 (1988).

For a critical analysis of the court's decision see Blickensderfer Matthew C. Unleashing RICO, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 867 (1994). (A decision giving effect to RICO's economic motive requirement would have made for sound statutory interpretations and a highly sensible result. Id. at 892).

114 S Ct 798, 801 (1994).

968 F 2d 612,614 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd S Ct 798 (1994).

Joan Biskupic, “Abortion Clinics Can Use Racketeer Law on Protests” (1994) Wash. Post, Jan. 25, at A1.

Supra n.9 at 804.

US 700 v. Mazzei 700 F 2d 85, 87–90 (2nd cir. 1983), cert, denied, 461 US 945, 103 S Ct 2124, 77 L Ed 2d 1304 (1983).

700 F 2d 51 (1983).

Cf. US v. Bagaric, F 2d 42 (2nd Cir.1983) cert. denied, 464 US 840, 104 Act 133 (1983) (a different Croatian terrorist group did qualify as a RICO enterprise because it had used extortion to raise funds to support its activities for which the court required only “some” financial purpose to be shown).

US v. King, 850 F Supp. 750, 753 (C.D. III. 1984).

Report of the New York State Policy Study Group on Terrorism 5, (1985).

50 USC s. 18–1 (1982).

18 USC s. 1203 (1988).

18 USC s. 2331 (1988).

18 USC s. 1951 (1988).

Id. at s. 1952.

361 US 212, 215 (1960).

18 USC s. 1952(a)(2)(1988).

US v. Parness, 503 F 2d 430, 438–40 (2nd Cir. 1974) cert denied, 419 US 1105 (1975).

US v. Muskovsky, 863 F 2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S Ct 1345(1989); US v. Paone, 782 F 2d 386 (2nd Cir. 1986) cert. denied 438 UA 1019 (1987); US v. Qaoud, 777 F 2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) cert denied, 475 US 1098 (1986).

See Lafave W. and Scott A. , Criminal Law s.5 2.7 at 115 (2nd edn 1986); see also Joseph Zvi , “The Application of RICO to International Terrorism” (1990) Fordham LR 1071, 1081.

Id.

See Joseph , supra n.26, at 1982, citing Muskovsky, 863 F 2d at 1331, 782 F 2d at 393, and Qaoud, 777 F 2d at 1118.

Tafflin v. Levitt , 110 S Ct 792, 795 (1990) see also Joseph at 1982.

See Joseph , supra n.29 at 1082, citing State v. Miller, 755 P 2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. Appl 1988).

See, for example, N.Y Crime. Proc. Law s. 20.20 (McKinney 1981) (limiting jurisdiction to acts within state or having effect within state).

See Joseph , supra n.29 at 1082.

Under 18 USC s. 1963 (1988), a forfeitable interest includes real property and tangible and intangible property, including rights, privileges, claims and securities.

See Joseph , supra n.29 at 1083 citing J. Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It (1986), p. 4

Id. citing Dobson C. and Payne R. (1987) The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80s, 291–92.