EhrlichIsaac, “Deterrence: Evidence and Inferrence,”85Yale Law Journal209–227 (1975).
2.
DanzigerSheldonWheelerDavid, “The Economies of Crime: Punishment or Income Redistribution,”33Review of Social Economy113 (1975).
3.
KarpmanBenjamin, “Criminality, Insanity and the Law,”39Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology584 (1949).
4.
FogelDavid, We Are the Living Proof (2nd ed.; Cincinnati: Anderson, 1979), pp. 114–26.
5.
ChristieNils, “Utility and Social Values in Court Decisions on Punishment,” in HoodRoger (ed.), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 285.
6.
Fogel, supra n. 4 at 124.
7.
Quoted in RadzinowiczLeon, In Search of Criminology (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 178–79.
8.
Christie, supra n. 5 at 286.
9.
Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss. 767, 28 So.2d 581, 582 (1947).
10.
State v. Mayer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d. 585 (1955).11BeccariaCesare, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London: Almon, 1767).
11.
PalmerJan, “Economic Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment: A Review,”14Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency4, 5–7 (1977).
12.
BeckerGary, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,”76Journal of Political Economy169 (1968). J. R. Hicks comments on the value of theories to empirical research: “Our theories, regarded as tools of analysis, are blinkers in this sense. Or it may be politer to say that they are rays of light, which illuminate a part of the target, leaving the rest in darkness. As we use them, we avert our eyes from things which may be relevant, in order that we should see more clearly what we do see. It is entirely proper that we should do this, since otherwise we should see very little.” “The Scope and Status of Welfare Economics,”27Oxford Economic Papers (New Series)307, 320 (1975).
13.
Becker, supra n. 13 at 176.
14.
EhrlichIsaac, “The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement,”IJournal of Legal Studies259 (1972).
15.
VoteyHarold L.Jr.PhillipsLlad, “Police Effectiveness and the Production Function for Law Enforcement,”Journal of Legal Studies423 (1972).
16.
Carr-HillR. A.SternN. H., “An Econometric Model of the Supply and Control of Recorded Offences in England and Wales,”2Journal of Public Economics289(1973).
17.
EhrlichIsaac, “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,”81Journal of Political Economy521 (1973).
18.
EhrlichIsaac, “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,”65American Economic Review397 (1975).
19.
Ehrlich, supra n. 19 at 398.
20.
In his research, Ehrlich used multiple regression, a statistical technique for analysing the relationship between a dependent variable (whose behaviour is to be explained) and a set of independent or explanatory variables. The analysis uses a sample of data to estimate an equation in which the dependent variable is set equal to a weighted sum of the explanatory variables. The weights or coefficients associated with the explanatory variables are chosen to minimize the sum of the squared differences between the actual values of the dependent-variables and the values computed using the regression equation. A graphic representation of a regression equation with only one explanatory variable would be a least squares line drawn through the scatter of points generated by plotting the dependent variable on the vertical axis and the explanatory variable on the horizontal axis. For a review of the use of this technique in legal proceedings, see FinkelsteinMichael O., “Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings,”86Harvard Law Review1442–1475 (1973).
21.
BaldusDavid C.ColeJames W. L., “A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment,”85Yale Law Journal170 (1975).
22.
BowersWilliam J.PierceGlenn L., “The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment,”85Yale Law Journal187 (1975).
23.
PalmerJanCarlsonPaul, “Problems With the Use of Regression Analysis in Prediction Studies,”13Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency64, 80 (1976).
24.
EhrlichIsaac, “Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence,”85Journal of Political Economy741, 781 (1977).
25.
Danziger and Wheeler, supra n. 2, argue for positive incentives (i.e., income redistribution) rather than negative ones. They admit they cannot resolve the choice between reducing crime through income redistribution or through punitive policies, but insist that they have shown that such a trade-off does exist.
PollockFrederickMaitlandFrederic William, The History of English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), II, p. 451.
31.
PollockMaitland, supra n. 31 at 516.
32.
Becker, supra n. 13 at 195. Studies in Norway have substantiated the value of the fine as a deterrent: “recent research seems to indicate that a heavy fine would be regarded as a more severe penalty than a short prison sentence by a large section of the drunken driving clientele.” BrathholmAndersHaugeRagnar, “Reaksjonene mot promille-kjorere,”Lov og Rett (1974), cited in Christie, supra n. 5 at 289.
33.
SutherlandEdwin H.CresseyDonald R., Criminology (10th ed.; Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1978), p. 324.
