Understanding the moral dimension of policing: The need to normalise ethical reasoning within police practice

Abstract

This paper argues that more weight should be paid to the moral dimension of police work in light of recent challenges to police authority in the United Kingdom, most notably from Baroness Casey, but also from movements such as Black Lives Matter. We argue that MacIntyre’s (1985) idea of a practice helps reshape our understanding of policing in ways that redress these challenges. In particular, we emphasise the need to normalise ethical reasoning such that professional policing is framed in moral, as well as legal, terms. We suggest ways that this approach to policing can be developed through police education.

Introduction

In this paper, we argue that recent policing events in England and Wales highlight the inherently moral character of policing. This, we argue further, provides an opportunity to consider the merit of embedding a virtue ethics approach to police practice, drawing upon MacIntyre (1985), as a means of developing police officers’ character and decision making, and raising officer awareness of the importance of fostering normative relationships with the communities they serve. This would not only illustrate how officer awareness and decision making can be improved, but it would also highlight the moral as well as legal contexts of policing interactions and relationships.

There has perhaps never been a more important time than the current period to discuss what we see as the inherently moral character of policing practices. In the UK, the idea that failings and shortcomings within the police constitute a moral crisis in policing is articulated clearly in Baroness Casey’s (2023) Report into the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) (Casey Baroness, 2023). The MPS are not only the largest police service in the UK, but they also have a national and international functionality, taking pride in presenting themselves as the best police in the world. Casey Baroness (2023) not only challenges this claim, but she also recasts this pride as hubris and a lack of humility, such that she suggests the MPS has lost touch with the people of London. She suggests the MPS have become increasingly defensive and elitist and have deprioritised the public protection of women and children, especially, to such an extent that it is hard not to conclude that London faces a moral crisis in policing.

Casey Baroness (2023) damning assessment echoes sentiments towards the police that have gained traction in the USA, where abolitionist and defunding arguments advanced by Vitale (2017) have become increasingly influential, linked as they are to several flawed police shootings involving black males. As Vitale (2017) notes, in a culture where the police use firearms more frequently than in any other developed democracy, an instinctiveness to shoot first without consideration of other options has raised questions concerning police relationships with the communities they serve, and the morality of police decision making. The emergent Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests are a reflection of growing questions concerning the moral legitimacy of policing, and whilst there are unique aspects of the USA context from which BLM emerged, this level of moral questioning has spread globally (Fleetwood and Lea, 2022; Goldsmith and McLaughlin, 2022).

Recognising the morality in policing practice

The idea that the practice of policing requires a moral foundation is not new (Alderson, 1998; Kleinig, 1996; Neyroud and Beckley, 2004; Wood, 2020), nor is the promotion of virtue and character in policing (Delattre, 2011; KristJansson et al., 2021). Indeed, Reith (1948:68) previously suggested that ‘the moral influence of the country policeman on the community is not less than that of the parson, the doctor, or the teacher’. However, in practice these ideas remain cyclical and surface only when the next crisis occurs, but in between, policing remains to be seen both internally and externally as a practice rooted in legislation and law enforcement. To think of policing in moral terms challenges this orthodoxy, despite the well-established sociological accounts that stress the peace keeping role of police (Banton, 1964), which has no legal basis (Bitner, 1967), and more correctly posits police officers as street corner politicians (Muir, 1977), dealing in the rights and wrongs of people’s lives without necessarily engaging in legal practices.

In England and Wales, the College of Policing’s (2014) first iteration of its non-statutory Code of Ethics did little to normalise ethical decision making within police practice, especially at the constable level. The new statutory Code of Practice for Ethical Policing (CoP, 2023) together with a new Code of Ethics - Ethical policing principles (CoP, 2024) with Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing go further in promoting ethical conduct as well as challenging unprofessional behaviours which have featured widely in recent policing dilemmas. The Code introduces and emphasises a duty of candour and the new ethical policing principles (CoP, 2024: p.2) reflect ‘a series of guiding statements that should be used to help people in policing to do the right things, in the right way, for the right reasons. The principles also support a commitment to demonstrating: Courage in various aspects of decision making; Respect and Empathy by listening and understanding the views of others as well as recognising the emotional challenges faced by others, and finally Public Service by working in the public interest fostering trust and confidence. These are welcome changes with clearer guidance written in virtue friendly language emphasising that ‘the guidance does not and cannot cover every situation that someone working in policing might face’. This necessarily leaves open the question of how the new Code will lead to improvements in ethical decision making through professional practice, focusing instead on how ‘the guidance will assist in building a positive workplace culture by spelling out what good policing looks like” (CoP, 2024: p.2).

Therefore, and in recognition of recent developments from the College of Policing we still suggest that any code of ethics would be limited in the extent to which it can embody ethical reasoning in practitioners. Whilst codes of ethics with ethical principles can be helpful in providing practitioners with a guide based upon norms, conventions, and leadership, it can also become a substitute for what we are arguing for- improved ethical reasoning in the sense that it can purposefully guide action where it really matters at street level in the communities. Where this happens, a code of ethics can hinder the development of an ethical mind set. This is especially important in policing as frequently, police officers are faced with making decisions where all the available options are ‘wrong or evil’, even though they may be legally justified (Kleinig, 1996). It is in these situations where officers are required to call upon a sense of practical wisdom or ‘phronesis’ to guide them ‘where virtue is a choice to guide their action’ MacIntyre (1985, p.149). Furthermore, the officers who find themselves in situations having to make such difficult decisions are mostly those at the most junior ranks. It is one thing to promote ethical behaviour in police leaders (CoP, 2015, 2023), but policing occurs largely beyond the direct supervision of police leaders (Reiner, 2010). As Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) note, the office of constable makes policing unique with respect to the amount of authority invested in those new to the role and operating at the most junior ranks. This is what Winsor (2011) referred to as the x-factor of policing. Indeed, understanding this aspect of policing is what requires all police officers to take moral responsibility for their own decisions.

A focus for us is the day to day, routine and normalised shortcomings of police organisations that more generally undermine the confidence and trust of the public. The focus on institutional racism in the UK in light of the failed investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence in (MacPherson Sir William, 1999), highlighted that the failings in the investigation were not the result of a few bad apples, but rather illustrated more endemic and deep-rooted problems, a point extended, and amplified by Baroness Casey most recently (Casey Baroness, 2023). The police have been, and are still today, criticised for being too slow in responding to changes in society. The moral character of police has also been called into question and there are constant reminders of previous failings that only compound and highlight the lack of progress. It is hard not to be despondent about the future of policing and in this respect calls to defund or abolish the police are understandable (Vitale, 2017). However, the police remain important institutions in supporting and maintaining peaceful and well-ordered societies, and irrespective of what form policing takes, we argue that taking moral responsibility for decisions in how best to realise good policing, needs to be at the heart of what good policing is. Indeed, Loader (2016:428-9) places great emphasis upon the social effects of policing and how ordering police practices ‘can and ought to help build democratic virtues and culture, underpin and extend civic engagement and the associated life of communities and be a vehicle for generating social trust’. This places greater emphasis upon moral conduct and establishing normative relationships, based upon shared norms and values.

Despite all of the above, and the well documented challenges confronting police organisations today, we should note that many police officers share a desire to make things right. Manning (2019) notes that many police officers share a positive sense of what good policing is, and of the importance of exercising the requisite virtues to deliver it. The question becomes how to build upon this sense of purpose and desire to make things better?

It is also important that as a society we acknowledge the difficulties confronting the police when considering what needs to be done. We argue that the changes required are not easy and they cannot be achieved by the police in isolation. MacIntyre (2004) provides examples of why good policing cannot be reduced to simply following orders, or the laws and policies of the day. Good policing requires reflection upon the link between the facts as they are presented and what a moral, as well as a legal, response would require (Wood, 2020). The moral dimension in this equation, like the legal, practical and political components, cannot be established by the police alone, but rather require a meaningful engagement between the police and the communities they serve.

Towards the practice of good policing

Beetham (1991) argues that one of the reasons why the public defer to power holders, such as the police, is when they recognise them as moral agents. The public expect the police to do the right thing and in the right way when they call for help. Indeed, Morrell and Bradford (2019) called for consideration of policing as a service that contributes to the public good. However, recently, policing in England and Wales and across international settings has fallen well short of the public good and reasonable expectations, leading to discussions which are more focused on police wrong-doing in ways that lead to public outrage, a corresponding blame culture, demands for external interventions and greater oversight of police work. Miller (2020) observes that this is understandable because aside from the physical harms suffered by some victims from police wrongdoing, it is important to also recognise the moral harms associated with this conduct and how these harms undermine the moral status of the victim. Whilst interventions and greater oversight may be necessary, and indeed inevitable in the current climate, we suggest that they are not sufficient to transform policing in the ways desired. We argue there needs to be a corresponding focus on articulating a positive vision of what good policing looks like, to inspire and motivate practitioners within the policing profession. In respect of this vision, Kleinig (1996, p.11) previously asked us to consider ‘on what moral basis can we justify the existence of an organisation with the powers customarily vested in the police?’ This remains an important question and one which is required to be re-visited as we see the moral crises in policing today as a manifestation of actions and decisions being taken by individual officers and police organisations that are inappropriate, ill-judged, and lacking in ethical insight. It is, in other words, an inability to understand the moral contexts of policing, which leads to ethically deficient actions and decisions.

Here we develop upon the findings published in a report by Kristjánsson et al. (2021), which promotes a virtue ethics approach to police reasoning and decision making rooted in the works of Aristotle. Aristotelian virtue ethics had been largely overshadowed in public life for much of the past two hundred years by two dominant schools of ethical reasoning, namely Kant’s deontological approach, and the consequential ethical reasoning associated with Utilitarianism promoted by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. However, virtue ethics underwent a revival from the 1950s onwards (see Crisp and Slote 1997) with a number of influential authors contributing to the renewed interest in virtue ethics (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 1978; MacIntyre, 1985). The approach to virtue ethics adopted by MacIntyre (1985) is of particular interest because he relates his understanding of what is good, and what is a virtue, in terms of the standards of excellence internal to a given ‘practice’, such as policing. This means that virtues are dynamic and fluid in common with the demands of police decision making, as opposed to fixed, universal, religious, political or moral ideals. They are contextualised dispositions that are only given meaning through the pursuit of excellence within a practice. Our use of the term moral is also contextualised in relation to the ethical reasoning that establishes what is the most appropriate police action within given circumstances. In the application of this distinctive approach to ethics, it is important to note that we are not talking about abstract principles to be applied in all circumstances, nor are we judging the morality of policing by the results of particular actions.

In applying these debates about virtue ethics to professional policing, Kristjánsson et al. (2021) draw upon the work of Morrell and Bradford (2019), Manning (2019) and Wood (2020). In particular, Manning (2019) and Wood (2020) have both supported the use of MacIntyre’s (1985) formulation of a practice as a lens to understand the potential for the development of phronesis and to improve moral judgement in policing. Phronesis is a key concept within an Aristotelian virtue ethics approach to moral reasoning. Wood and Tong (2009) drew upon Grint’s (2007) work in adopting the notion of phronesis to promote what they believed should be the primary focus of police education and training which is important if police decision making is to improve. Grint’s (2007:237) account of phronesis, defined as ‘practical wisdom’, emphasised a context dependency in understanding phronesis. In applying the leadership qualities associated with practical wisdom to a policing context, he describes phronesis as “the wisdom to understand what needs to be done in a particular situation, not just the skills and techniques to arrest the offender . . . Nor even just the knowledge of the law” (Grint, 2007: 238). As Manning (2019) illustrates in relation to stop and search, in order to avoid ‘risks to confidence of poorly managed contacts’ (Miller and D’Souza, 2016:474), an officer needs to establish legal, practical and moral dimensions of the policing purpose: (1) whether a search can be justified legally; (2) if it is practical to conduct the search in the given context; and finally, (3) morally, why should the search be conducted.

Arguably, this understanding of phronesis remains somewhat peripheral in policing, and it is no surprise that one of the key findings from Kristjánsson et al. (2021) was that police trainees associated more with a deontological rule-based form of moral reasoning. Manning (2019, p.209) reports similarly in his research, with one participant commenting ‘We are not so freelance as to have the free-floating ideas of this kind of autonomous thinking about the right and the wrong. We like it written down’. This is consistent with other empirical findings, where participants believed their source of moral authority is derived from their oath of allegiance to the Monarch, and their deference to the rule of law (Dixon, 1997). Raz’s (2009) ideas around the authority of law are also significant here (Manning, 2019).

A problem as we see it, is that no matter how comforting and reassuring it is to address ethical shortcomings with more guidelines, rules, and policies for officers to follow, and ever greater reliance on police leaders and external parties to enforce and monitor the practice of front-line officers, we argue that such endeavours will only lead to further rules, regulations, and policies down the line. Therefore, in order to break the cycle of continuous crisis/review/revise/crisis, more focus needs to be placed on ensuring police officers understand better the moral authority invested in their roles, and for these to be taken more seriously as critical to the development of decision making within good police practice. The moral authority integral to the office of constable carries a weighty obligation upon officers to do the right thing and this requires an ability to reason ethically in ways promoted within virtue ethics. Not surprisingly, the report from Kristjánsson et al. (2021) made, amongst its key recommendations, a suggestion ‘that virtue ethics needs foregrounding more in professional ethics education’, and ‘more attention needs to be paid to the moral and characterological grounding of policing’ (KristJansson et al., 2021, p.5). This recommendation is developed by KristJansson et al. (2022), which focusses upon a pilot study of a taught phronesis intervention. We support this recommendation and argue that phronesis needs to be understood and articulated in policing contexts to support the development of ethical policing and to redress the moral crises in policing today.

Embedding a moral purpose within policing in the UK

We have argued there are limits to which a code of ethics can in isolation provide the required understanding within practitioners of the moral purpose for policing. This is because ethical codes deal primarily with ethical dilemmas that are familiar to us; instances that are well known to practitioners and readily accommodated within normal professional practice. However, there will always be exceptional instances that fall outside of these known ethical parameters, which require more thought and consideration. Given the extent to which the requirements and expectations of policing have been changing so frequently over recent times, exceptional instances are likewise increasing to the extent that the known world of ethical dilemmas is becoming ever less helpful. Indeed, it can become a barrier if officers are too wedded to simply applying known responses to all situations, irrespective of whether they are appropriate or not. This is where Dancy’s (2004) preference for ethical reasoning over ethical principles becomes appropriate.

Also, and importantly, there are limits to embedding morality within police decision making, exclusively through engagement with those being policed. For example, Kleinig (1996, p.18) argues that through the exercise of their authority, a practice which often creates moral dilemmas, the police are engaged in normative social relations – the outcomes of which are dependent upon the recognition accorded to it by the audience. This demonstrates the importance for the police service to think carefully about the nature of their relationship with the public. Therefore, empirical studies into the moral or normative alignment (Jackson et al., 2010, 2021) between the police and the communities they police, help shape our understanding of police legitimacy and promote dialogue and community engagement. Moral alignment can provide a measure for understanding the political choices that direct how police operate within communities, and what is prioritised in terms of setting and allocating police resources, both formally through budget setting and accountability mechanisms, but also informally by establishing and recognising popular sentiments regarding the police. Whilst this political choice expression of the moral character of policing helps to initiate and animate debates about the moral purpose of policing, there are limits to which an explicitly politicised view of policing can be sufficiently independent to gain the necessary level of support across all communities being policed. Policing has to be both sufficiently engaged with communities in establishing its moral purpose, at the same time as retaining a sufficiently robust internalised sense of what the moral purpose of policing should be. In other words, there needs to be a balance between the competing notions of (1) policing by consent and (2) police independence.

The challenge, as we see it, is to develop a sense of moral purpose in policing, without allowing this moral purpose to be directed excessively by external and partisan views that ultimately undermine the reasons for having police in the first place. This is where we return to MacIntyre’s (1985) virtue ethics approach to understanding a practice. MacIntyre (1985) argues that some sense or understanding of the application of a virtue also requires an understanding of what are deemed to be the characteristics of moral and social life in the community in which the practice is taking place. We argue, this could be understood as localised understandings within communities as it is likely that throughout England and Wales, the incongruence of norms and values within communities will lead to a variance in moral dilemmas for policing (Manning, 2019). What should remain consistent is that, according to MacIntyre (1985), the exercise of a virtue . . . Should be informed by the telos or the ultimate goal which guides their actions. From this, we argue that it is the virtues internal to the practice of good policing which should guide police officers and citizens towards their telos in which it is possible to determine or agree upon the common goals of good policing. Indeed, Loader (2016) argues that the police represent far more than being agents of crime control and order maintenance; their practices are symbolic of the kind of community they are policing by the way in which they police that community. This requires a different way of thinking about what many police officers consider to be police work, where the medium is to apply pure technical skills (MacIntyre, 1985) or applying the law and policy without further regard for those affected and whether they have been treated fairly or with respect and dignity (Bowling, Reiner, 2010).

As MacIntyre (1985, p.193) argues ‘a practice [in this case, policing] is never just a set of technical skills, even when directed towards some unified purpose’. He defines a practice as:

Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended (Ibid:187).

As examples, MacIntyre (1985) suggests, bricklaying in and of itself is not a practice, unless it is directed as part of an architectural project; planting seeds in isolation is not a practice, if not framed within wider farming endeavours. Applying MacIntyre’s (1985) definition of a practice we argue that day-to-day police work (utilising technical skills and legal knowledge) is not a practice in a MacIntyrian sense. However, morally good policing is a practice through which police officers may strive to achieve the standards of excellence internal to it.

The pursuit of excellence in policing, then, is motivated by a clear sense of what the good of the wider community is. This sense of community interest is not considered as something external to the understanding of what good policing is but is rather an integral part of the internal logic of police practice. Arguably, this reinforces the requirement to explore when and where there can be agreement upon the virtues of ‘good policing’ as part of an ongoing dialogue with communities (Manning, 2019). This would include consideration of MacIntyre’s (1985) suggestion that in any practice, those who participate will relate to it in different ways and their perceptions will include consideration of the norms, values, purposes, and standards expected from that practice and the relationship of everyone to it (Manning, 2019). For example, Herbert (1997) suggests, it is in the spatial context of policing the streets where social action between the police and the community takes place and in which, some police officers construct their own notions and strategies of social order’. This can mislead police officers’ self-perceptions concerning the ‘telos’ of policing leading to the internalization of alternative normative orders concerning how they should or ought to act, based upon legal regulation, bureaucratic control and exercising moral supremacy as good over evil (Herbert, 1997). These can be seen in contemporary symbols in policing represented as the ‘thin blue line’ and are, to an extent, the representations of the cultural beliefs observed by Bowling et al. (2019) and Muir (1977).

For this reason, we see the College of Policing’s revised Code of Practice (2023) together with the Ethical policing principles (2024) and guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing (2024) as useful developments, in the extent to which it recognises the need to promote a more ethical culture in which ‘staff are supported and directed to use the ethical policing principles in decision making and to demonstrate professional behaviour’. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to ensure that officers do not experience the revised Code as nothing more than a poster stuck on a police station wall without further explanation, or as a box of tricks used in a very instrumental way, as was reportedly the case with the previous iteration (Manning, 2019).

Achieving phronesis through practice

There are many different aspects of police practice that can be considered through a virtue ethics lens, for example, vetting applicants at the point of police recruitment, considering the specific challenges of covert police operations or armed response teams where ethical reasoning from practical wisdom is so important. Indeed, virtue ethics does not work in the abstract in the way other ethical theories operate, and the strength of a virtue ethics approach is the extent to which it is only given meaning in real life situations and practices. Here, we focus on police training and education, and suggest how the focus of learning for new entrants into policing, and indeed for more experienced officers on in-service and continuing development programmes, can be based upon a virtue ethics understanding. We argue that only by providing an environment that fosters ethical decision making will police training and education programmes redress the shortcomings and failings identified by the Casey Report (2023). As Brown (2009, p.23) reminds us, Aristotle observed that, Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them and are made perfect by habit.

Police training and education has to provide the space for reflection upon moral conduct and phronesis in day-to-day decision making; police education and practice has to provide the environment which leads to the formation and habitual use of necessary virtues within police practice.

We acknowledge that this is a significant challenge, as evidenced by Kristjánsson et al. (2022) who sought to gather a more detailed understanding of the development of phronesis amongst a cohort of police students from five universities engaged across various entry routes. Not least, it is difficult to replicate the nature of moral decision making made under the pressure that police officers frequently experience, and the nature of police work makes it more difficult to embed learning in practice in the way this is achieved in other professional areas, such as within a university hospital. Nonetheless, there are small steps that can be taken in the right direction that will help to develop officers’ phronesis and MacIntyre’s (1985) approach can be used as a lens to think of policing as a practice with standards of excellence internal to it, which link professional and ethical conduct with technical skills towards morally good policing.

MacIntyre (1985) argues that virtues are required to aid individuals in their quest to achieve the standards of excellence internal to practices such as policing. Our focus here is not on any particular virtues such as courage, honesty, integrity, justice, and wisdom. They are necessary but the important point to note here is how the selected virtues are used to direct the pursuit of excellence, which ultimately defines the practice. Millie and Hirschler (2018) argue that many police recruits already identify with such virtues at the time of joining the police, and this is something that is important in considering the selection processes for police recruits. However, where this is not the case, initial police training and education needs to be directed towards ensuring recruits acquire appropriate character traits after joining.

The study by Kristjánsson et al. (2022, p.19) sought to ‘practically improve participants levels of phronesis or practical wisdom’ whilst piloting a tool to measure the intervention. As mentioned earlier, one of the problems they experienced was the capability of replicating an environment which would resonate with officers who have yet to experience or have limited experience of such situations. Kristjánsson et al. (2022, p.19) also note that the topic of ‘professional ethics’ is not a subject taught in the police programmes they engaged with. It is the case that any such teaching will only be included if the validating university values its introduction and designs a degree course with professional ethics at its core. Kristjánsson et al. (2022, p.28) also experienced some issues across their intervention where participants considered the moral language to be unfamiliar or too complex. The extent to which officers need to be taught ethical theories is not our focus here, neither is it our intention to replicate Kristjánsson’s (2022) study. Importantly though, an absence of ethical theory does not negate the idea that police officers can acquire an understanding of policing practice that is more than simply applying law and policy unto a passive citizenry. In other words, the habit of ethical thinking and decision making in policing can be developed within officers who do not have a theoretical understanding of phronesis. Such officers are more likely to develop an interest in ethical theory over time, but not necessarily; what is important is that officers can demonstrate ethical reasoning in, and across, various policing contexts as appropriate.

This approach can also be seen through the promotion of Schön’s (1983) understanding of reflective practice in policing (Christopher, 2015). This emphasises the reflective capacity of individual officers and their ability to think more deeply about their encounters, without necessarily having to study the concept of reflective practice. However, as with the need to create an environment that fosters habitual ethical reasoning in order for phronesis to be realised, so too with reflective practice, police organisations need to be supportive in creating professional environments in which learning and understanding opportunities are routinely embedded components of officers’ duties (Wood and Williams, 2016). Sklansky (2008) in particular has questioned this supportive aspect of policing, noting that police organisations have not traditionally treated their own employees well. Wood (2020) also emphasises a third dimension within Schön’s (1983) articulation of reflective practice, and that is the social contexts within which a practice operates, which demands a level of understanding and support at a societal level to allow a practice to flourish. Policing currently does not have this level of societal understanding and support in the ways that other areas of practice do, for example medicine, law.

This reinforces the enormity of the task at hand, and it is not something that can be achieved by individual police officers or police leaders in isolation. However, we feel that there are opportunities being missed. In this respect, we consider an opportunity to approach virtue ethics in a practical way within the tri-part reviews (TPR) that are a core feature of integrated degree apprenticeship programmes (Lester et al., 2021). The TPRs are used on police degree apprenticeship (PCDA) programmes, one of four CoP sanctioned entry routes into policing in England and Wales and bring together the student officer with a tutor from the degree programme and a work-based supervisor from the operational team. Lester et al. (2021:10) focus on the TPRs as an opportunity to establish a signature pedagogy for policing, what they describe as a “pervasive and routine feature of education for the profession”, in order to advance a more in-depth, reflective and nuanced understanding of the professional role. However, they also note that in order for this to happen, it is important to establish a shared understanding between the academic and professional partners, and the student learner. This entails ‘establishing effective triadic working relationships that place the learner at the empowered centre of an occupational community of practice’ (Lester et al., 2021:26). Moreover, Lester et al. (2021) stress that this ‘occupational community of practice’ needs to be established at the very outset. This clearly did not happen in the early development of the PCDA or indeed the other entry routes into policing. The support for the programmes amongst police leaders, police training staff, operational officers and university lecturers has been mixed, often because of a lack of understanding. Also, because of the time delay between someone applying to join the police and actually joining a police force, many of the initial student officers on these programmes did not realise that they were joining a degree programme and were clearly unaware of any occupational community of practice.

This clearly presents a challenge because the task at hand is to establish an occupational community of practice after the programmes of learning have started. As Lester et al. (2021) note, at the moment TPRs on policing programmes have been used primarily for administrative checks on a student officer’s progress rather than for engaging in reflective and meaningful discussions. However, Barnett and Burrell (2024, p.154) cite positive evidence of TPRs being used towards ‘in-depth reflection on decision making and learning more about the lived experience of student officers’ in a way that further dialogue and reflection upon ethical decision making could be developed. Therefore, we see the TPRs as an opportunity to start that journey, by offering all three players in the triadic relationship moments to question, probe and discuss what good policing looks like. This is something that could be explored from a virtue ethics perspective, by engaging with the TPRs and asking questions that demand deeper, more reflective responses that demonstrate awareness and understanding of the moral responsibilities that accompany the burden of being a warranted police officer. This is a matter which the tutoring by officers who have acquired phronesis could resolve early in police education.

Concluding remarks

We have argued that policing is inherently moral and therefore good policing requires police officers to make moral judgements routinely throughout their professional practice. We argue that this applies in all societal contexts, in which police officers are subjected to democratic controls and liberally framed expectations, such as a human rights framework. We have focused attentions on the UK context, and in particular endeavours by the College of Policing to emphasise the ethical components of police work through both their Code of Ethics and routes into policing, and the corresponding characteristics and qualities required of police officers and police leaders with the responsibilities to develop policing in this direction. However, we also note that there is much work to do for ethical policing to become normalised and routine in articulating and expressing what good policing means. If ethical considerations are seen as external and outside of what policing is essentially concerned with, then police ethics will continue to be received by police officers as abstract, impractical ideals that get in the way of good policing. To take things forward and to promote ethical police practice that is aspirational, purposeful and reaffirming of the positive reasons officers had for joining the police in the first place, we need to ground ethical policing in the concrete and contextualized instances of police practice. This in turn requires officers to be supported by their own organizations to achieve this end, and this needs to be understood and appreciated within the communities in which officers operate. None of this is likely to happen overnight, and as things currently stand, there are challenges in using the educational routes to move things forward. There is not the space in this paper to provide a detailed course structure, and our intention is certainly not to add to what is already a content heavy and crowded curriculum. Instead, our intention is to promote the centrality of ethical thinking, professional decision making and practical judgement in good police work. This has to be at the heart of police learning. As a starting point, we see an opportunity to embed a virtue ethics approach to TPRs. We see conducting TPRs through a virtue ethics lens as a meaningful and practical way of embedding ethics in policing. By this we do not simply mean teaching police officers about ethics or getting them to learn a set of principles or virtues in the abstract. Indeed, in the first instance, the approach must be to get police students thinking ethically and approaching all aspects of their work with an ethical mindset, without necessarily realizing this is what they are doing. Over time, thinking ethically becomes second nature and at that point more candid and explicit conversations about ethical theories can be pursued, but are not necessary. However, the focus must always be on the development of an occupational community of practice for policing, using virtue ethics to enhance police practice. We anticipate a challenging journey but having a place to start is always useful.