Priorities for the G20 Finance Track

Abstract

Emerging markets and developing economies are currently facing major challenges from global shocks, including a slowdown in global growth; food and energy price increases; decline in risk appetite of international investors; unsustainable debts in low-income countries; and ongoing climate risks. National policies have not sufficed to meet these challenges. Efforts at the national level must be complemented by changes in the global economic and financial architecture designed to make the world a safer place. In this article, we focus on the financial aspects of such reforms. The financial agenda as we see it has seven key elements: (i) reform of central bank swap lines, (ii) reform of IMF-contingent credit lines, (iii) SDR reallocation, (iv) reform of credit rating agencies, (v) creation of currency hedging instruments, (vi) inclusion of climate-resilient debt clauses in new debt instruments and (vii) steps to streamline the debt restructuring process. We detail this agenda and urge the G20 members to implement the recommended measures.

JEL Codes: E44, E58, E61, F34, F36, F38

Keywords

G20 Countries Emerging Markets Developing Economies External Debt Financial Reforms Central Bank Swap Lines IMF Contingent Credit Lines

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