Why Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Gender Is Fundamentally Correct: A Response to John Finley

Abstract

In an important article, John Finley suggests a correction to Aquinas’s understanding of gender distinction. Disagreeing with Aquinas, Finley proposes that gender distinction (male and female) stems from the soul rather than from the body. In this essay, I will show that this is not a tenable position because it does not fit with either what we know about the physical development of sex differences or the unity of man and woman as a single human species. I will defend Aquinas’s fundamental insights into the root of gender distinction without defending his biological understanding of the process itself. I will argue that there is a single generic generative power in the soul that is determined by the matter to which the soul is united, to be expressed as either male or female. This paradigm, I believe, copes better than the one offered by Finley with phenomena such as intersexed persons and sex reassignment surgery. While I do not accept the idea of a feminine or masculine soul, the paradigm offered here does lead to the notion of the soul being feminized or masculinized on account of the matter that it informs.