Abstract
Beginning in 1968, a surge in plane hijackings, particularly from the United States, prompted a focus on security measures to combat this trend. Initially, deterrence strategies implemented through laws and adopted from international conventions proved ineffective. This article traces the evolution from selective passenger profiling to a 1972 U.S. security order to screen all passengers, triggered by the emergence of politically motivated hijackings and ransom demands, which changed the experience and nature of flight worldwide. It examines stakeholders’ perspectives, with pilots advocating for extensive profiling and screening, while airlines and airport operators favoured legal treatises, likely due to the lower financial burden of enforcement. This article examines the historical social and political context within which terrorism and counter-terrorism in the realm of air travel unfold.
Introduction
In August of 1968, The New York Times published an article entitled, Hijacking, and What Can Be Done About It. The piece was written in reaction to an unprecedented global wave of plane hijackings that had begun that year and would not relent until the end of 1972. It was a period in which 326 hijacking attempts took place worldwide, an average of one such occurrence every 5.6 days. Of those 326 attempts, 137 occurred within the United States, an average of one hijacking attempt every 13.3 days. “Airline pilots are obviously growing a little weary of forced side trips to such places as Algiers and Havana”, the article noted, adding a pessimistic prognosis: “Pilots, as well as airline companies, recognize that there is very little they can do in the air in the face of a determined gunman”. 1
The challenge was not only limited to facing a hijacker in the air, but also related to security on the ground, at airports. Airlines, the government, pilots, and airport authorities all agreed that stopping armed passengers from boarding planes was the best means of prevention. Yet, many strongly opposed frisking passengers and searching their luggage. As a result, it seemed as if there was no way to resolve the violence surrounding air travel. As a Washington Post editorial pointed out in 1961, upon the first hijacking of an American plane to Cuba: “In fine there seems to be no absolutely fool-proof solution to the problem in a world which still seems to include an alarming proportion of desperate screwballs”. 2
In this article, I will delve into the evolution of air travel security and scrutinise the roles played by various stakeholders in its development. How did the views of the government, airports, airlines, and pilot representatives influence changes in security procedures over time? How did the larger historical context shape the security scene around aviation? By examining this process, I aim to uncover the factors that have contributed to the transformation of air travel from an unrestricted experience to one marked by routine searches and pervasive surveillance. 3
A few studies have focused on this era of frequent hijackings. Some aim to identify means of predicting and preventing future incidents. For example, in his book How Terror Evolves, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage explores terrorist techniques and their development over time. He argues for an evolutionary theory of air hijackings similar to an evolutionary understanding of phenomena in nature. Another scholar, Robert Holden, focused on the contagiousness of air hijackings and, based on a mathematical model, concluded that only successful hijackings brought about further attempts at hijacking. Criminologists Laura Dugan, Gary Lafree, and Alex Piquero concluded that the placement of metal detectors and law enforcement personnel in airports in early 1973 resulted in significant deterrence and brought about a reduction in hijackings. Another group of studies centred on the role of legal treaties in helping to fight hijackings, for example, how the Tokyo and Hague conventions defined hijackings and held hijackers accountable for their crimes, deterring future incidents. 4
What has been largely missing from these studies is an examination of the historical forces that led to the implementation of different security measures. One example of a study that did focus on historical context is Teishan Latner's “Take Me to Havana! Airline Hijacking, U.S.–Cuba Relations, and Political Protest in Late Sixties’ America”, which examined the hijacking of planes to Cuba in the late 1960s. Latner argued that many of these incidences were politically motivated, as in the case of social activists who might hijack planes to secure political asylum in Cuba. He also explored the collision of hijackings with diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. These incidents forced the two countries to conduct a dialogue they had not prepared for before. In his introduction, Latner adds a cautionary note: “Much of the academic scholarship on hijacking has been limited by an unwillingness to imagine hijackers as anything more than terrorists, mentally ill idealists, and common criminals. … Hijackers, collectively, must be located within a larger historical continuum, not as heroes or villains, but as transnational historical actors who belong within conversations about social change”. In line with Latner's efforts to advance a richer understanding of hijackings and their impact on diplomatic relations over time, I aim to examine the security of aviation travel and the stakeholders involved with respect to historical events and social context. 5
The Dawn of hijacking and deterrence measures (1961–67)
The first hijacking of American planes to Cuba took place with four attempts in the spring and summer of 1961, three of them successful. These hijackings followed the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion and the rise in tensions between Cuba and the United States. The U.S. government responded to the hijackings in a variety of ways all aimed at deterrence. On the legal front, the Senate unanimously voted in 1961 to approve an amendment to the 1958 Federal Aviation Act that made it a federal crime if “[anyone] while aboard an aircraft in flight in air commerce, assaults, intimidates, or threatens any flight crew member of flight attendant”. The new law also prohibited carrying onto a plane a concealed weapon and made the commandeering of an aircraft equivalent to the crime of piracy. The law stipulated especially harsh sentences of anywhere between twenty years of imprisonment to the death penalty. 6
In a news conference, President Kennedy called upon world governments to pass legislation that would criminalize the hijacking of planes. In deterring air piracy globally, the United States hoped to secure not only the safety of individual planes but also the public trust in air commerce. As a leader in the air industry explained, the United States had a strong economic incentive to protect this fledgling industry. 7
While the U.S. government advanced legal deterrence as its main policy, it also deployed a set of actions to make clear to future hijackers the mortal risks they were taking. In his news conference, President Kennedy revealed his administration had “ordered on a number of planes a Border Patrol man who will ride on a number of our flights, and we are also going to insist that every airplane lock its door, and that the door be strong enough to prevent entrance by force”. The administration introduced additional measures, such as scrambling hijacked planes with fighter jets, arming crew members, and shooting at the tires of hijacked planes before takeoff, all of which proved to be ineffective but testified to the desperation authorities felt in finding solutions to the problem. 8
In the end, wrote The New York Times, “there is some hope that the ‘fad’ will run its course; that the ‘lunatic fringe’ (the term used by President Kennedy […]) will turn to less dangerous forms of publicity-seeking or self-expression”. Shortly after the newspaper wrote these words in August of 1961, “the epidemic of airliner hijacking” ended, but a means to prevent hijackings had yet to be found. 9
From acquiescence to initial prevention (1968–September 1970)
Along with the social unrest of 1968, a new wave of hijackings began. These hijackers were no longer, as in the case of the 1961 wave, solely people suffering from mental health issues or criminals fleeing capture. This group counted Vietnam War draft dodgers, traumatised soldiers, and a significant number of members of the African American resistance movement among them. They hijacked planes to escape the United States due to fear of prosecution, hoping to find a safe haven free of racism in Cuba. 10
As the number of planes forced to fly from the United States to Cuba increased, airlines issued a standing order to pilots to fulfil hijackers’ requests and take them wherever they wished to go. Resistance was not an option. Only acquiescence. The following instructions issued to Eastern Airlines flight officers in March of 1968 typify the approach: The most important consideration under the act of aircraft piracy is the safety of the lives of the passengers and crew. Any other factor is secondary. Therefore company policy is: In the fact of an armed threat to any crewmember, comply with the demands presented. Do not make an attempt to disarm, shoot out, or otherwise jeopardize the safety of the flight. Remember, more than one gunman may be on board. … To sum up: Going on past experience, it is much more prudent to submit to a gunman's demands than to attempt action which may well jeopardize the lives of all on board.
11
The fear of jeopardizing a plane's safety also meant air marshals were unlikely to abort a hijacking once it was underway. Federal Aviation Administration (hereafter FAA) acting administrator David Thomas surmised “our man would probably ride to Cuba. I don’t think he would endanger any lives”. The ineffectiveness of air marshals, he went on to explain, “is why we have not come here and asked for money for more agents”. 13
This policy of acquiescence resulted from the fact that policymakers, as well as airline heads, believed there was no way to stop hijacking altogether. Following a surge in hijackings, Thomas candidly confessed to Congress, “I frankly admit I don’t have a solution”. This acknowledgment from the head of the government agency responsible for air travel underscored the tenaciousness of the threat, at least in the immediate future, while Thomas and others worked to devise a resolution strategy. 14
There was, naturally, the possibility of conducting thorough searches of every traveller and their carry-on bags. However, airlines expressed concerns that such invasive measures could provoke negative reactions from passengers due to perceived privacy infringements. Furthermore, searches might spread fear among passengers about the possibility of being hijacked. Long lines, the invasion of privacy, and anxiety could cause passengers to opt out of flying and return to railroad travel. The head of FAA security, James Murphy, pointed to the risks of jeopardizing the rise of a new industry that would give the United States an economic advantage. “If we make Fort Knoxes of our airports, we’re going to choke off air commerce”, he warned. 15
The FAA and the airlines began to explore innovative ways to ensure security with minimum invasion of passenger privacy. A special FAA “hijacking task force”, headed by a physician and psychologist named H. Reighard and John Dailey, respectively, presented the idea of psychologically profiling passengers to uncover potential hijackers. Based on interviews with the family and friends of previous hijackers, the task force constructed a psychological profile of the “typical” hijacker that considered age, sex, method of ticket purchase (place, time, and means of payment), pre-boarding activity, and flight details (time of day, origin, type of aircraft, destination, and geographic direction of flight), among other aspects. 16
This task force, established on 17 February 1969, was also charged with finding a technological remedy to the issue. According to the mission's charter, “the primary focus was to develop, test, and implement a weapons detection system for screening airline passengers before boarding. Although certain detection devices were available at the time, they were deemed inefficient and posed a risk of exacerbating congestion in terminals”. 17 The task force suggested integrating profiling with detection devices. If ticket agents identified a passenger matching the hijacker's profile, they could discreetly guide them to a private area where security officers would scan them using a prototype metal detector. If the metal detector indicated a problem, and the person agreed, officers would then conduct a physical search. 18
In February of 1969, the FAA installed an experimental weapons detector at the gate of Eastern Airlines to test the effectiveness of combining psychological profiling with selective searches at Washington National Airport. After a midair incident in March of 1970, in which an armed passenger travelling on the Boston–New York shuttle killed one pilot and shot and wounded another, Eastern Airlines expanded the program to include several additional terminals. An airline that endured as many as eighteen successful hijackings between 1961 and 1968, Eastern Airlines now experienced no hijackings for a stretch as long as one-year-and-nine-months. Within the flowerpots and shrubbery of Washington National Airport alone, security personal found several discarded pistols, bullets, and knives. Airlines, airport operators, and other stakeholders viewed the Eastern Airlines model as an effective solution, though at times it led to mistaken identification and was not foolproof. Still, more airlines began to experiment with the model. 19
The FAA Acting Deputy Administrator, Oscar Bakke, thought effective detection systems would resolve the issue. As he made clear, he “believed that this approach holds great promise in solving the hijacking problem because it would prevent a potential hijacker from boarding the aircraft, instead of frustrating this crime”. The House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs also expressed its support for developing mechanical and electronic devices to detect weapons. 20
Alternatively, representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of State believed the problem could be largely resolved through diplomacy and extradition treaties, a viewpoint also shared by Congress. Given the limited geographical scope of hijackings between 1968 and 1969, which primarily involved flights to Cuba, U.S. officials were of the opinion that an extradition agreement with Cuba would serve as a sufficient deterrent. The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs asserted that “the main deterrent to piracy of U.S. carrier aircraft, in the opinion of the subcommittee, is to place the hijacker in the hands of U.S. courts for trial”. They highlighted the fact that from the early 1960s until 1968, there were only two convictions in American courts, and even those received minimal publicity. Since most hijackers resided safely outside the United States, particularly in Cuba, concerted efforts were made to negotiate an agreement with Cuba for the extradition of hijackers. It was believed that such an agreement, once attained, would effectively address the issue of hijacking. However, this agreement would not be reached until 1973, and in the interim period, the landscape of hijackings and the nature of hijackers underwent significant change. 21
International terrorism and anti-terror acts (September 1970–onward)
On 6 September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (hereafter PFLP) attempted to hijack four planes simultaneously. This type of hijacking, motivated by political goals and not solely for transport, had begun two years earlier with operations by the PFLP and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) to hijack planes flying to or from Israel and Ethiopia. Following these hijackings, Israeli and Ethiopian airlines implemented strict security protocols, including rigorous passenger searches, baggage screening, and pilot training on disrupting hijackings. Yet in August 1969, the PFLP hijacked an American plane, a TWA flight travelling from New York via Rome to Tel Aviv, and diverted it to Damascus. All passengers were released immediately, except for two Israeli passengers. But unlike the responses from Israel and Ethiopia, this incident did not prompt changes in the security procedures of American airlines. 22
The September 1970 effort to hijack four aircraft at once would be different. All of the planes targeted by the PFLP had been scheduled to fly to New York. After the hijackers boarded the flights at different European airports, they directed two planes, a Swiss and an American airliner, to an airstrip in the Jordanian desert called Dawson Field. They redirected the third, a Pan Am 747 that was too large to land in Jordan, to Cairo, where, upon landing, they blew it up. The fourth and final cell attempted to overtake an El Al flight, but failed. 23
The PFLP terrorists took the Swiss and American planes and passengers as hostages, demanding the release of a large number of prisoners held by Israel and several European countries in exchange. If these countries failed to meet their demands, the hijackers threatened to blow up the planes with the passengers on board. Days later, seeing no progress in officials accommodating their demands, the hijackers blew up both planes along with a third from England. The pictures of the three planes, totalling US$50 million in value (equivalent to around US$400 million today), blasting into pieces on Dawson Field appeared on the front pages of newspapers and led television news programs worldwide. The PFLP's actions transformed hijackings into a tool for terrorist organizations to not only extract concessions from countries but also garner global attention for their cause. This evolution in the nature of hijackings required policymakers in Washington to adjust their approach to securing American air travel. 24
Confronted with the challenge of hijackings and their heightened potential for lethal outcomes and political ramifications compared to previous instances of transport hijackings, the Nixon administration took decisive action. President Nixon declared that “The menace of air piracy must be met – immediately and effectively”, adding, “Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations. Most countries, including the United States, found effective means of dealing with piracy on the high seas a century and a half ago. We can – and we will – deal effectively with piracy in the skies today”. 25
One act the administration took was to place air marshals on flights. The president ordered 1,100 air marshals onto planes effective immediately, up from only 17 such guards in 1968. The air marshals were mostly deployed to airlines such as TWA and Pan Am, which served international destinations, and to domestic routes that were considered at high risk of hijacking. Similarly, Nixon ordered, “to have American flag carriers extend the use of electronic surveillance equipment and other surveillance techniques to all gateway airports and other appropriate airports in the United States and, wherever possible, in other countries”. 26
The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (hereafter IFALPA) expressed opposition to centring anti-terrorist measures on air marshals. It feared violence during flights and urged the FAA to reassign air marshals to ground duties. J. J. O’Donnell, president of the Air Line Pilots Association (hereafter ALPA), the U.S. affiliate of IFALPA, stated that: Airline pilots believe the best way to stop hijacking is to prevent the crime before it occurs. Prevention is always better than apprehension, particularly if the apprehension is an attempt at 30,000 feet for a shootout with one of these hijackers. We also feel that more attention to airport security is important. We also believe that profile scanning must be increased.
27
The placement of air marshals on planes, indeed, had little effect on reducing the high incidence of hijackings. Unlike El Al, which operated a small fleet and could afford to put two air marshals on each inbound and outbound flight, American Airlines in 1972 collectively averaged 14,000 flights a day carrying 450,000 passengers and millions of pieces of luggage. It immediately became clear that placing sky marshals on every flight would be impossible. It was calculated that for a single sky marshal to encounter a hijacker he would need to fly an average of twelve million miles. 29
Slightly more than a year into the placing of air marshals on planes, ALPA again called on authorities to shift 75 per cent of air marshals, now numbering 1,400, from air to ground assignments. In their view, the psychological profiling and new detection devices used by security personnel were far more effective than having sky marshals on planes. And indeed, the FAA shifted air marshals from airborne tasks to working security at airports. Preventing hijackers from boarding planes, they concluded, was preferable to challenging them in the air. 30
The FAA and professional associations had reason to support the existing program of profiling and screening. From January 1971 to April 1972, airline security personnel detected 44,442 weapons and dangerous articles from scans and searches. As ALPA stated in December of 1971, psychological profiling had identified 99.9 per cent of hijackers, constituting a relative achievement. The problem was that leaving 0.1 per cent of hijackers undetected remained a significant and unacceptable risk. 31
Resisting financial extortion, tightening up security (1972)
On 7 March 1972, TWA headquarters in New York City received a bomb threat targeting its planes. The caller demanded two million dollars in ransom money, but the payment was not made. One bomb was discovered before it detonated on a plane in New York, while another exploded in the cockpit of a plane in Las Vegas. 32
The smuggling of bombs onto planes highlighted the need to implement a plan to secure “the ground” – the airport tarmac and field. FAA Director of Security Lt. General Davis warned that “a tremendous threat exists to airliners on the ground and in airport facilities”, making it essential to upgrade security around planes and runways. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) recommended safeguarding airports, “includ[ing], inter alia, armed guards in and around aircraft on the ramp”. The International Civil Aviation Organization (hereafter ICAO) suggested installing “adequate fencing of boundaries and public areas, with a limited number of controlled access points and the use of identity cards by authorized persons”. Airport operators also replaced their incandescent lights with floodlights to detect intruders more easily. 33
The extortion of funds from airlines occurred not only through threats of sabotage but also via hijackings. The trend began in November 1971, four months before the planting of multiple bombs on TWA planes. The first two hijackers to engage in this practice, Canadian Paul Joseph Cini and American D. B. Cooper, each hijacked a plane and demanded ransom. Over the subsequent months, the incidence of extortion rose as hijackers successfully compelled airlines to surrender large sums of cash. Similar to a bank robbery, extortion hijackings posed a significant risk to passengers, crew, and security personnel. 34
The escalation of hijacking and sabotage acts related to planes caused a tightening of security procedures. Up until then, FAA security measures were voluntary. As a result, airlines implemented stricter security measures, which included profiling passengers and searching the carry-ons of those flagged as risky. Air personnel began to conduct pre-boarding searches of planes from nose-to-tail. Airline agents double-checked passengers’ identities. Later in the year, the FAA required airlines to prevent boarding from passengers flagged through profile screenings and who did not clear detection or a physical search. In July 1972, the FAA ordered the screening and searching of all passengers on shuttle flights. 35
Changes in airport security led Newsweek to report that, “At times last week, it may have been easier to crack the security at San Quentin than to slip aboard an airplane at a U.S. airport”. The article then added that “Magnetometers for detecting concealed weapons were in evidence as never before, and airline check-in clerks were almost as likely to order a search of their customers’ baggage as to wish them a good flight”. 36
In light of the growing security risk, Lt. General Davis demanded airlines practice determined resistance. “We must instill in all parties, airport operators, airlines management, and flight crews, an increasing determination to resist hijack and extortion demands to the fullest extent possible consistent with the safety of any human lives that are involved”, he said. This marked a major shift from an earlier policy of acquiescence. 37
Counter to the fear expressed by airline representatives that passengers might abandon airplanes for alternative means of transportation, “passengers were relieved rather than irritated and managed to maintain an edgy stoicism”. Despite the inconvenience and delays passengers experienced, they understood the need for the new and somewhat invasive security measures and felt assured that thanks to the search and screening, their flight would not take a detour to Cuba or any other country. 38
Airlines also came to understand that passengers now expected some kind of security check before boarding, and “that security is necessary to protect profits”. Still, in the eyes of some, the airlines were not going far enough to protect passengers and flights. According to one senior security official at the FAA, “Some airlines are in the program wholeheartedly but others just give it lip service. A lot of times company policy never filters down to personnel at lower levels”. 39
Airline executives and airport operators, on the whole, expressed reluctance towards implementing searches that would increase operating costs. Instead, they preferred addressing the issue of hijacking by seeking global consensus on legal conventions mandating the extradition of hijackers. 40
Concurrently, the government took action on the legal front. With the onset of the wave of hijackings in 1968, the United States ratified the 1963 Tokyo Convention, which mandated that the state where a hijacked plane lands allow it to proceed on its journey. However, the Tokyo Convention did not stipulate the trial or extradition of hijackers. It was only with the formulation of the Hague Convention, largely influenced by the United States, that this treaty established the jurisdiction over a hijacker in the state where a hijacked plane landed. The convention required the state to either extradite the hijacker or “submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. 41
The airlines had demonstrated a preference for conventions and an ambivalence towards counter-terrorism measures, which often placed a financial burden on them. Jerome Huisentruit, representing the Air Transport Association (ATA), commented on the draft of the Hague Convention, stating, “This is the instrument which will be a big step toward solving the hijacking problem as more and more countries of the world become parties to it”. However, it was states that were frequent destinations for many hijackers, such as Cuba and Algeria, that declined until decades later to ratify this convention. 42
In Congress, George J. Bean, Chairman of the Federal Affairs Committee, presented the view of the Airport Operators Council International (AOCI) and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE): The most effective solution to the problem is the elimination of safe havens or sanctuaries for the hijacker or political terrorist, so that no airport or nation can serve as an avenue of escape for the criminal. Airport operators are, however, firmly convinced that the deterrence effect of the recent anti-hijacking agreement with Cuba will be substantially greater than the transforming of U.S. airports into armed camps on a permanent basis, as the Administration is proposing. The elimination of safe havens removes the chance of hijacking success, while armed guards at airports merely increase the risk to the hijacker, escalate the level of violent action required and may involve tragic consequences to innocent people in terminal buildings.
43
Escalation of violence and the shift to total screening (December 1972)
As the frequency of extortion hijackings increased, some became significantly more violent. Two hijackings in the fall of 1972 aroused deep concern among FAA officials. In the first, four men, Charles Tuller, his two sons Bryce and Jonathan, and their school classmate William Graham partook in a robbery gone awry in which they murdered the bank manager and a policeman. The men escaped to the Houston airport, where they killed an Eastern Airlines ticket agent and wounded a serviceman while forcing their way onto a plane. Next, the foursome ordered the pilot to fly to Cuba, and the flight's twenty-nine passengers became hostages under their control. This was the first hijacking of Cuba in which someone other than a hijacker was killed. 45
Only twelve days later, on 10 November 1972, an even more dangerous hijacking took place. Three fugitives (Henry Jackson, Lewis Moore, and Melvin Cale) hijacked a Southern Airways flight departing from Birmingham. They demanded a ransom of US$10 million (around US$75 million today after adjusting for inflation) to free the 31 passengers and crewmembers onboard. After receiving only US$2 million (around US$15 million today), they threatened to crash the plane into a nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Over the next 29 hours, the hijacked plane travelled 4,000 miles and landed nine times at eight different airports in three countries (the United States, Canada, and Cuba). At one stop, the hijackers shot and wounded the co-pilot and a few passengers. When the plane landed in Orlando, FBI agents shot out the plane's tires to ground it. Nevertheless, the hijackers took off to Havana, where they landed on a foam-covered runway. The Cubans arrested, tried, and jailed the hijackers. The Cuban authorities also returned the ransom money to the United States. 46
These two hijackings, both linked to robbery and extortion and executed by fugitives from justice, aroused a public outcry. In shooting out the plane's tires, the air pilots and airline associations argued, the FBI had risked the plane and its passengers. They demanded security measures tightened even further. In response to the incident, J. J. O’Donnell stated, “If it was in my power alone, I would shut down America's air industry until such a time as the proper guarantees for safety to passengers and crew were made by the Federal Government”. 47
In an editorial, The New York Times criticized the government for its inaction. “How many more airline passengers must fly with terror”, it asked. “How many more airline employees face death or serious injury before the United States Government, the international community and the airlines put safety before politics or profit and take decisive action to curb aerial hijackers”? 48
In fact, a month earlier the U.S. Senate and House each passed a bill authorizing President Nixon to boycott any country that harboured plane hijackers. Unlike the House bill, the Senate also required full screening of all passengers and their carry-on luggage with metal detectors, an expense of US$3.5 million (around $25 million today) for 1,500 units for use in 531 airports, along with the stationing of police officers at airports, an additional expense of US$47 million (around US$350 million today). The White House did not want to take on this last expense and pressured the House not to compromise in a conference with the Senate, tanking the bill. 49
These two extremely violent hijackings, however, deeply concerned government officials who feared the crime was now attracting especially ruthless individuals with no regard for human life. Furthermore, the risk of a plane crashing into a nuclear facility alarmed the Nixon administration. Lt. General Davis warned of contagion that would turn hijackings into a more deadly experience. “The immediate problem that confronted the government were how to cope with this new breed of air criminal and how to do it quickly before there was a repetition with tragic results”, he wrote. Secretary of Transportation John Volpe explained: “We have determined that the most effective procedures possible must be instituted as a means of preventing acts of piracy, which are showing an increasing disregard for human life”. 50
It was clear that existing procedures did not suffice. Psychological profiling and targeted searches with a magnetometer uncovered most but not all potential hijackers. The problem was that those who were able to bypass the profiling and screening went on to hijack several planes a year in the United States. In addition, those who were able to bypass the security measures, such as terrorists and convicts, were frequently trained in military manoeuvres. Security officials at the FAA resolved to find a foolproof system, and in December 1972 issued stricter security regulations. Beginning early the following year, all airlines would be required to search all passengers and all baggage at all 531 U.S. airports, a regulation that would later develop into the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974. This meant that in 1973 alone, airlines would search an estimated 185 million passengers. Following the implementation of the regulation the number of hijackings dramatically dropped. 51
This comprehensive and all-encompassing security plan faced opposition from airport operators and airlines. They advocated for flexible airport security measures with the option to gradually reduce them over time. An airport operator representative told Congress, “I don’t think anyone expects that the law enforcement requirement for anti-hijacking will remain constant. It will fluctuate. Hopefully, based on recent experiences and success, particularly in the international field, the requirement will be reduced”. Airline representatives shared this sentiment, stating, “We believe that the system of 100% search is one that will not be tolerated too long by the American public”. They further emphasized, “We certainly believe that everyone would like to return to a more selective system similar to the one which was replaced on January 5, 1973, as soon as possible”. 52
It was the intensification of airport security in 1974, marked by the introduction of X-ray machines, which led to the discontinuation of the air marshal program. This adjustment aligned with the perspective of pilots’ representatives, who unlike the airlines and airport operators emphasized the necessity of maintaining high levels of vigilance in pre-boarding screening and searching procedures. As one representative stated while addressing Congress, “We are equally gratified to see that our long-sought requirement for 100% passenger screening has at least become a reality … [but] we are alarmed over the prospect that false complacency coupled with financial pressures may lead to a softening of the requirements, or even worse, a return to voluntary screening or voluntary compliance”. While the airline industry viewed total screening as “cumbersome, expensive, [and] time consuming”, it was the pilots’ viewpoint that ultimately prevailed, remaining in effect thereafter. 53
Conclusion
Between 1968 and 1972 the experience of air travel in the United States, as well as worldwide, significantly changed. From an effort similar to that of boarding any other means of public transportation to a process that required identification, exposing one's personal belongings to search and seizure, and allowing intrusive physical encounters, the securitization of air travel entailed a change in the practice of basic values. These measures were largely successful. By the end of 1972, the number of global hijackings had significantly dropped. In the decade that followed, the average number of hijackings on flights departing from U.S. airports declined from the previous 29 to just 9.3 such acts per year.
The change was incremental. At first, the FAA introduced psychological profiling with the intention of flagging only a small number of people. As hijackings escalated from a means of transportation to acts of international terror to robberies in the air, the number of selectees grew, resulting, in 1973, with the regulation to search all passengers. This comprehensive search of all passengers and their belongings meant the abandoning of profiling passengers. Whereas at first airlines feared passengers would oppose such penetration of travellers’ privacy, by the end of the hijacking wave, passengers not only accepted the searches, but some were even relieved to encounter them. Clearly, in the context of air travel, the anxiety over security had overcome the preference for one's privacy. 54
The routine sweeping of planes caused airports to transform and become a growing target for terrorists. Airports transformed from spaces in which people roamed about freely to secure facilities, similar to police stations or prisons. Security personnel oversaw and controlled entry into large swaths of the airport layout, and airports came to require passengers and workers to present identification cards for access. Security personnel, previously nowhere to be seen, now patrolled the departure and arrival halls armed head-to-toe. Fences and security towers arose around the airfield. In some countries, police cars monitored the perimeters of airports and their roads. The 1974 introduction of ICAO's Annex 17 listed the responsibilities of airports in regard to screening, prevention, and rapid response to attacks. This document would become the securitization standard not only in the United States but also worldwide. 55
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
