Organized crime research has regained momentum in the post-Cold War era, yet the field remains dominated by single-society studies of low generalizability. This study reports findings from comparative analysis of perceptions of predatory organized crime conducted in 59 countries. Two hypotheses of predatory organized crime were evaluated. The state failure hypothesis argues that the failure of the state to deliver key political goods such as security, justice, and stability encourages criminal groups to perform state functions. The economic failure hypothesis holds that poor economic outcomes such as high unemployment, low standards of living, and a reliance on an underground economy stimulates the growth of criminal syndicates as suppliers of demanded goods, services, and jobs. Analytical results provided general support to both hypotheses. Judicial independence and black market activities were the strongest political and economic correlates of predatory organized crime. Policy implications for organized crime control in developing countries are discussed.
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