Mervyn Frost and the Constitution of Liberalism

Abstract

The article looks at Mervyn Frost's `constitutive' theory of international ethics. Following Hegel, Frost shows how individuals are constituted with moral worth through their position within a society, which Frost extends to include the society of states. He uses this method to tie together a list of settled norms in international relations, producing a `background theory' supporting the claim of these norms to ethical worth. The article suggests Frost is on weak ground in two particular areas. First, his concentration on the post-Cold War era and his characterisation of the Cold War as an ethical desert rob the theory of crucial historical sensitivity, leaving unanswered questions about the origins, development and evolution of the settled norms and the role they have played. Second, Frost bases the value of his constitutive ethical theory on its ability to resolve difficult questions in international relations, rather than on its being worthy of respect for its own sake. This raises the question of the `practical' rather than `purposive' basis of the theory which is suggested as being a deeper, cosmopolitan assumption about individuals as the object of ethics. It is respect for individuals that underpins his theory, not the way in which the settled norms constitute those individuals. Finally, the review essay suggests that this hidden Western cosmopolitanism and lack of historical sensitivity reinforce the need for a greater ethical engagement with the question of power in the development and evolution of norms in international relations.