In Search of Security: Relative Gains and Losses in Dyadic Relations

Abstract

Neorealists and neoliberals both agree that if states are primarily concerned about security, cooperation will be difficult to achieve and maintain. Cooperation is difficult because states worry that others may gain more from the agreement. I show, in contrast to these expectations, that security concerns do not necessarily impede, and can in fact provide the foundation for, cooperation between states. I suggest that the distributional battles often witnessed between states can be signs of negotiations along the Pareto frontier rather than evidence of relative gains concerns. My argument is based on the recognition that a state's security is not always, or even often, best served by maintaining its position in each dyadic relationship as the neorealists claim. If a state can utilize the resources gained from an agreement with one state to influence and protect itself against other states in the system or if a state anticipates that third parties may play a role in some disputes which may arise in the future, then the relationship between a state's security and the gains realized by another state is not straightforward. A state's security may be enhanced, dimished or remain unaffected by the gains realized by different states in the system. It is inappropriate then to assume that when security concerns predominate the chances for cooperation have diminished; security concerns may in fact provide the basis for cooperative relations. The analysis also suggests that empirical expectations about the cooperative or conflictual potential of different systems cannot be readily inferred as the incentive to cooperate will vary depending upon the dyad in question.