Rationalizations for State Violence in Chinese Politics: The Hegemony of Parental Governance

Abstract

This article asks why the Chinese state consistently resorts to violence when faced with domestic dissent. It concludes that both dissenters and state elites contribute to state violence by subscribing to the Confucian discourse of parental governance. Dissenters typically utilize moral suasion to argue for reform, while state elites respond with moral outrage. Underlying both discourses is the presumption that state-society relations reflect Confucian parent-child relations: i.e. filial children-subjects appealing for recognition from their benevolent but firm parent-officials. But filial piety inherently favours the authority of the parent-state over its children-subjects. Thus state elites feel justified in `rectifying' dissenters whenever they question the ruling order. This deep-rooted source of Confucian hegemony must be addressed when considering democratization in China. Otherwise, `democracy' in China will simply translate into `(authoritarian) business as usual'. For empirical evidence, this paper focuses on four protest movements from China's recent past: the Hundred Days' Reform of 1898, the May Fourth Incident of 1919, the March Uprising of 1947, and the Pro-Democracy Movement of 1989.