Abstract
In Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie presents a strong argument for refuting the belief that the socalled arms race is caused by an inherent technological imperative. This is an empirically rigorous and highly readable book about what first seems to be an area only accessible to experts. Based on over a hundred-and-forty interviews with various people, politicians and engineers involved in the US nuclear program, the author unravels the open-endedness of technical development. The achievement of high accuracy in nuclear missiles is believed to have brought about the shift from countercity to counterforce strategy. The author shows that this linear model of technology-influencing politics overlooks both technical uncertainty and the political shaping of technology. Drawing on the social construction of technology (SCOT) approach, he demonstrates the conventionality of knowledge claims and argues that determinism only paralyzes action toward change. However, there are still barriers to large-scale change within the bureaucratic politics of technology he describes. Hence this work needs to be related to broader political issues in peace research.
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