Enduring Misconceptions of Strategic Stability: The Role of Nuclear Missile-Carrying Submarines

Abstract

This article exposes many of the flawed assumptions about the submarine leg of the nuclear triad implicit in traditional strategic stability theory. It argues that the US strategic studies literature has put too much emphasis on traditional stability theory and that stability, whether defined traditionally or in modern terms, is more threatened by submarine-based nuclear weapons than is generally realized. The article notes that, although the possibility of a major nuclear surprise attack is becoming increasingly remote, insofar as there currently exist military incentives to launch such attacks it is due in large part to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which facilitate command and control decapitation strikes and threaten to negate options such as Launch on Warning. It moreover suggests that SLBMs are the strategic weapons most likely to endanger efforts to prevent loss of control in crises because: (1) US SLBMs do not contain Permissive Action Links (PALs); (2) in contrast to ICBMs, SLBMs regularrrl come into direct and potentially violent contact with enemy military forces in peacetime and are significantly more likely to come under direct attack in conventional war; and (3) SLBMs could make it particularly difficult for decision-makers to determine the source of a nuclear attack. The article concludes with several recommendations for enhancing strategic stability.