Abstract
During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, both Britain and Argentina defended their resort to military action on the basis of some sort of Just War principles. This article analyses the justifications given for the British resort to force. A summary of the history of the dispute and the legal arguments with regard to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands provides the context for this analysis. It is found that both Britain and Argentina have a strong, but not conclusive case. The rigorous application of Just War criteria shows that the British resort to force fails to satisfy each one. In particular, it is shown that British objectives went beyond possible just causes due to Argentine aggression. It is also argued that the British claim to have acted in the enforcement of international law is not tenable. An analysis of how the decision to send the Task Force to the South Atlantic was made, involving the Government, the Royal Navy and Parliament, reveals various extraneous factors and pressures. It is argued that the threat to the Government's survival as a result of the Argentine invasion was the main determining factor in the conduct of the conflict. The crucial turning-point was the week-end of the 1-2 May when the chances for a negotiated solution diminished after the sinking of the General Belgrano. Britain's military action also fails to satisfy the principle of proportionality. The main conclusions of this study are that Britain's resort to force did not satisfy Just War criteria, that a negotiated solution more just than the resort to force may have been possible, and that the Falklands conflict has not been successfully resolved despite Britain's military achievements.
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