US-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition

Abstract

This paper examines alternative approaches for developing norms of competition that might help to avoid war-threatening confrontations between the superpowers. Analysis of the abortive Nixon-Brezh nev experiment with 'general principles' and of subsequent efforts to devise general 'codes of conduct' to regulate the US-Soviet global competition suggests that such approaches are not workable. The paper argues that more attention should be given by the superpowers to a 'case-by-case' approach that focuses on the relative interests of the two sides in each specific area. The paper outlines a typology of competi tive 'games' that takes into account differences in the relative balance of interests between the US and the Soviet Union in various parts of the globe and points out the implications of these differences for norms of competition. Norms based upon relative interests, however, cannot be expected to work relia bly in all instances because the superpowers often experience difficulty in determining their interests in a particular area and in communicating their interests to each other in a timely and reliable way. The pa per notes the efforts the superpowers have made in recent years to develop a diplomatic mechanism for frequent discussions of regional problems and suggests how these bilateral discussions could be im proved and made more useful.