Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Arms control risk calculations are not made in accordance with a rational actor model. Judgements about the verification risks entailed in participation in an arms control agreement are made within the framework of Cold War anxieties and influenced by political and bureaucratic considerations. In approaching the strategic and theater nuclear arms control agenda of the 1980s, it will be necessary to devise verification regimes which not only provide reliable security guarantees against 'strategic breakout', but which also promote confidence among arms control policy-influential groups and strengthen coalitions in favor of participation in the agreements. At the same time it will be necessary to avoid inordinately intrusive inspection and verification procedures which hinder progress in arms control. This study explores the utility of a broad range of verification regimes which may be appropriate for future SALT, TNF and MBFR agreements in terms of their technical efficiency, contribution to confidence-building and minimalization of the inspection regime's intrusiveness.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Aspin, L. , 1979. 'The Verification of the SALT II Agreement.' Scientific American. Vol. 240, no. 2.

Greenwood, T., 1976. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control. Adelphi Paper no. 88.

Jacobson, H.K. and Stein E. , 1966. Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. Ann Arbor : Univ. of Michigan Press.

Jackson, W.D. , 1978. Ending Nuclear Tests: The Search for Political Agreement (Occasional Paper). The Mershon Center, Ohio State University .

Katz, A. H., 1961. Hiders and Finders. Rand Paper P2432.

Katz, A.H. , 1979. Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State. Washington:- Heritage Foundation.

Milburn, T.W. and Watman, K.H. , 1979. SALT II- Verification. Mershon Center Quarterly Report , Columbus, Ohio State University .

Potter, W.C. , 1980. Verification in SALT. Boulder : Westview Press.

Rathjens, G. , 1977. 'The Verification of Arms Control Agreements'. Arms Control Today. Vol. 7, no. 718.

10.

Slocombe, W. , 1976. 'Learning from Experience: Verification Guidelines for SALT II.' Arms Control Today. Vol. 6, no. 2.

11.

Smith, G. , 1980. Doubletalk. New York: Doubleday.

12.

Talbot, S. , 1979. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and Row.

13.

Talbot, S. , 1979. 'Scrambling and Spying in SALT.' International Security Fall 1979.

14.

Wolfe. T. , 1979. The SALT Experience. Cambridge : Ballinger Publishing Co.

15.

U.S. Congress, 96th Session, Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, 1979. Principal Findings on the Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty.

16.

U.S. Congress, 96th Session, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1979. Hearings: The SALT II Treaty, Parts 1-6.

Verification in Arms Control: beyond NTM

Abstract

Get full access to this article

References