The Opportunity Costs of Acting as a Super Power: U.S. Military Strategy in the 1980s

Abstract

For thirty years (1945-75), the super power roles performed by the United States were based upon its pre-eminent strength in military preparedness and economic wealth. Strategic analysts and political leaders assumed that as the leader of the Western alliance the U.S. would serve as a prime mover in resolving global or regional conflicts, and that its deterrence posture would help stabilize a durable world order.

These assumptions have now been called into serious question. Challenged by the superior economic performance of its allies in the Atlantic and Pacific security zones, and by the OPEC oil cartel in its economic security, the U.S. can no longer exert itself as a formidable super power. Neither can the Soviet Union, since it too, is obstructed by the nationalist challenges posed by its alliance partners.

The ability of the U.S. to restore its former pre-eminence is limited by pressing economic considerations. Faced by an unprecedented threat of inflation and slow economic growth, the U.S. must limit its defense efforts in the years ahead. If it invests too many resources in defense, industrial productivity and the value of the dollar will fall; and its vulnerability to the economic maneuvers of its allies and adversaries will sharply increase. If it should invest unwisely during the 1980s in its military appropriations, the U.S. will find its political leadership position severely undermined.

There are three claimants for military appropriations to prepare for the 1980s: (1) the strategic deterrent forces are to be enlarged and modernized, (2) theatre force levels in Europe are to be increased, and (3) naval deployments are to be extended in the Third World. It is questioned whether any of these increments can be successfully enlarged and if there will be a gain in political power by actually doing so. Even if $1,000 billion should be spent to improve U.S. military capabilities in the next few years, as is now planned, the U.S. will not be able to fulfill the super power responsibilities that it shouldered in the opening rounds of the Cold War.

As the leading military force in world affairs, the U.S. recognizes that it must calculate economic and political opportunity costs that can only inhibit its strategic ambitions. It is evident that a new formula must be found, both in theoretical and empirical terms, to revise the expectations of what super powers can hope to do in the next round of the Cold War.

Eleven Figures presenting financial and defense data accompany the analysis. The last reveals that between 1958 and 1978 U.S. military expenditures fell from 46 to 25 percent of the world outlay for defense appropriations. This trend cannot be quickly or decisively reversed.