Abstract
Seven theses and two consequences constitute the summary of the study:
Thesis 1: The Federal Republic of Germany can not be defended by means of conven tional weapons.
Thesis 2: The use of nuclear weapons in defence of West Germany would lead to nuclear self-destruction.
Thesis 3: For the Federal Republic of Germany there only exists a self-contradictory pol icy of deterrence (deterrence by means of incalculable risks for both sides).
Thesis 4: Between the superpowers there exists a strategy of deterrence which in its mili tary logic is not self-contradictory.
Thesis 5: Deterrence policy as pursued by the superpowers (however) results in an arms race.
Thesis 6: The arms race increases the risk of war.
Thesis 7: The attempt to maintain an equilibrium of deterrence through the arms race cripples the superpowers politically and militarily.
Consequences:
1. Precisely because it is highly questionable, the deterrence system opens up a margin of man oeuvre for the Federal Republic of Germany to utilize armaments decisions as a means for foreign policy.
2. In the appraisal of any policy, top priority must be given to contributions to the creation of a politically guaranteed world peace.
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