The study, using an autoregressive model and a time series of events data, tests whether Iran, Syria and North Korea have altered their behaviour towards the USA in response to the US occupation of Iraq. In particular, the study posits a modified theory of `strategic conflict avoidance', suggesting that perceived failings in US policy towards Iraq that manifest in low popularity ratings have, in fact, constrained the US president from initiating future aggressive actions. Potential targets of US aggression, rather than becoming more cooperative towards an unpopular US president, as suggested by strategic conflict avoidance theory, now become more hostile as they take advantage of public unease with an adventurous foreign policy. The analysis provides mixed support for the hypothesis, finding that North Korea has altered its strategic conflict avoidance behaviour in response to the Iraq occupation. Syria has become more hostile towards the USA, whereas, surprisingly, Iran is relatively uninfluenced by US domestic politics. The article suggests that coercive strategies might provide an opening in current US negotiations with North Korea, but also worryingly concludes, on the basis of the evidence, that the chances of a negotiated settlement with Iran are small.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, 2005. `Where Is the Islamic Republic of Iran Heading?' , Australian Journal of International Affairs59(1): 25-38.
2.
Axelrod, Robert, 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York : Basic.
3.
Bond, Doug; Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Lewis Taylor, 2003. `Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA)', Journal of Peace Research40(5): 733-745.
4.
Boyle, Michael, 2004. `Utopianism and the Bush Foreign Policy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs17(1): 81-103.
5.
Cha, Victor, D. & David C. Kang, 2003. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press.
6.
Clark, David H., 2003. `Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behaviour? A Model of U.S. Conflict Propensity', Journal of Politics65(4): 1013-1039.
7.
Coser, L.A., 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press.
8.
Cumings, Bruce; Ervand Abrahamin & Moshe Ma'oz, 2004. Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About North Korea, Iran and Syria. New York: New Press .
9.
Dassel, Kurt, 1998. `Civilians, Soldiers and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression', International Security23(1): 107-140.
10.
Dassel, Kurt & Eric Reinhardt , 1999. `Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad', American Journal of Political Science43(1): 56-85.
11.
Davies, Graeme A. M., 2002. `Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts, 1950-1982', Journal of Conflict Resolution46(5): 672-692.
12.
Davies, Graeme A. M., 2007. `US Presidential Popularity and Opportunities to Coerce North Korea: A Quantitative Test 1990-2000', International Relations of the Asia Pacific7(2): 129-153.
13.
DeRouen, Karl R., Jr., 2000. `Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note', International Studies Quarterly44(2): 317-328.
14.
Druckman, James N. & Justin W. Holmes , 2004. `Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and Presidential Approval', Presidential Studies Quarterly34(4): 755-778.
15.
Druckman, James N.; Lawrence R. Jacobs & Eric Ostermeier , 2004. `Candidate Strategies To Prime Issues and Image', Journal of Politics66(4): 1180-1202.
16.
Fearon, James D., 1994. `Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes', American Political Science Review88(3): 577-592.
17.
Fearon, James D., 1997. `Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs', Journal of Conflict Resolution41(1): 68-90.
18.
Fordham, Benjamin, 1998. `The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of US Uses of Force, 1949-1994', International Studies Quarterly42(3): 567-590.
19.
Foster, Dennis M., 2006. `An "Invitation to Struggle"? The Use of Force Against "Legislatively Vulnerable" American Presidents', International Studies Quarterly50(2): 421-445.
20.
Gaines, Brian J., 2002. `Where's the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, Congress, and Government Since September 11', PS-Political Science and Politics35(3): 531-536.
21.
Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Kyle Beardsley , 2004. `Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central American Conflicts', Journal of Conflict Resolution48(3): 379-402.
22.
Goldstein, Joshua S., 1991. `Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis' , International Studies Quarterly35(2): 195-209.
23.
Goldstein, Joshua S., 1992. `A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data' , Journal of Conflict Resolution36(2): 369-385.
24.
Goldstein, Joshua S. & John R. Freeman , 1990. Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
25.
Goldstein, Joshua S. & Jon C. Pevehouse , 1997. `Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict' , American Political Science Review91(3): 515-529.
26.
Heisbourg, Francois, 2003. `A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences' , Washington Quarterly26(2): 75-88.
27.
Huddy, Leonie; Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber & Gallya Lahav, 2005. `Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies' , American Journal of Political Science49(3): 593-608.
28.
James, Patrick & John R. Oneal , 1991. `Influences on the President's Use of Force', Journal of Conflict Resolution35(4): 307-334.
29.
Jervis, Robert, 2005. `Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained', Political Science Quarterly120(3): 351-377.
30.
Jervis, Robert, 2006. `The Remaking of a Unipolar World', Washington Quarterly29(3): 7-19.
31.
Kamrava, Mehran & Houchang Hassan-Yari , 2004. `Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's Political System', Muslim World94 (October): 495-524.
32.
King, Gary & Will Lowe, 2003. `An Automated Information Extraction Tool For International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design', International Organization57(3): 617-642.
33.
Leeds, Brett Ashley & David Davis, 1997. `Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes' , Journal of Conflict Resolution41(6): 814-834.
34.
Lemann, Nicholas, 2002. `The Next World Order', New Yorker 1 April: 42-48.
35.
Levy, Jack, 1989. `The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique', in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies. New York: Unwin Hyman (259-288).
36.
McAllister, Ian, 2006. `A War Too Far? Bush, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election', Presidential Studies Quarterly36(2): 260-280.
37.
Meernik, James D., 2000. `Modelling International Crises and the Political Use of Military Force by the United States', Journal of Peace Research37(4): 547-562.
38.
Meernik, James D., 2001`Domestic Politics and the Political Use of Military Force by the United States', Political Research Quarterly54(4): 889-904.
39.
Meernik, James D., 2005. `Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises', Foreign Policy Analysis1(2): 165-180.
40.
Meernik, James & Peter Waterman , 1996. `The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents', Political Research Quarterly49(3): 573-590.
41.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin & Brandon C. Prins , 2004. `Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force', Journal of Conflict Resolution48(6): 937-961.
42.
Mueller, John, 1973. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.
43.
Ostrom, Charles W. & Brian L. Job , 1986. `The President and the Political Use of Force', American Political Science Review80(2): 541-566.
44.
Pevehouse, Jon C. & Joshua S. Goldstein , 1999. `Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo? A Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions', Journal of Conflict Resolution43(4): 538-546.
45.
Popkin, Samuel L., 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
46.
Reiter, Dan & Allan Stam, 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
47.
Schultz, Kenneth, 1998. `Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crisis' , American Political Science Review94(4): 829-844.
48.
Schultz, Kenneth, 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49.
Simmel, George, 1955. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
50.
Smith, Alastair, 1996. `Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems' , International Studies Quarterly40(1): 133-153.
51.
Smith, Alastair, 1998. `International Crises and Domestic Politics', American Political Science Review92(3): 623-638.
52.
Takeyh, Ray, 2004. `Iran: From Reform to Revolution?', Survival46(1): 131-144.
53.
Voeten, Erik & Paul R. Brewer , 2006. `Public Opinion, the War in Iraq, and the President', Journal of Conflict Resolution50(6): 809-830.
54.
Williams, Michael, 2005. `What Is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory', European Journal of International Relations11(3): 307-337.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
