Democratization and International Conflict

Abstract

This study re-examines the link between democratization and international conflict. It is founded on the argument that the greatest threat to a democratizing incumbent's tenure arises from the ability of the old authoritarian elite or their supporters to overthrow the new regime for failed foreign policies. Given this framework, the article differentiates among transitioning states based on the strength of the old authoritarian leadership vis-à-vis the new democratic government. The institutional and political balance between the transitional forces and the remnants of the ancien régime is, in turn, considered a function of the legacies of past democratic and authoritarian rule. Leaders in redemocratizing states, and those with a longer legacy of previous democratic rule, should be more likely to initiate disputes, as they are more institutionally insulated from the old authoritarian elite. On the other hand, a stronger legacy of authoritarian rule is expected to lead to a more cautious foreign policy. These expectations are tested in a quantitative analysis of international dispute behavior for all democratizing states from 1950 to 1990. The results strongly confirm the hypotheses, lending validity to the theoretical explanation in this study that attributes differences among democratizing states in their conflict propensities to their institutional past.