Rallying Around the Podesta : Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time

Abstract

Diversionary theory argues that leaders threatened by domestic turmoil manipulate the ‘rally around the flag’ effect by initiating conflict abroad. This conflict mitigates the negative effects of the unrest, saving the leader’s position. Previous analyses of the diversionary impulse have proven inconclusive. This study expands the literature in three ways. First, it broadens the spatial and temporal domain by examining the seven major powers of Renaissance Italy (1250-1494). Since diversionary theory was developed by looking at the actions of states in the modern system, testing it in a different empirical domain is important. Second, it uses a directed-dyadic research design, which can examine directional hypotheses. For instance, does domestic unrest increase the probability that the challenger will initiate conflict, or do targets avoid states experiencing unrest? Last, the analyses simultaneously assess the effects of regime change (the highest form of unrest) and domestic turmoil on the conflict behavior of states. In other words, does unrest severe enough to change the political system create an incentive to rally the public to the new regime, or do these states experience a honeymoon of support? The analyses find modest support for the diversionary hypothesis. Oligarchies are more likely to initiate wars during periods of domestic unrest, while republics tend to initiate wars against city-states that experienced a republican reversal.