States increasingly incorporate alliance obligations into the design of multilateral trade agreements to deter aggression. Regional economic institutions (REIs) are such an example. This policy activity raises the question of whether REI military alliance obligations send signals and function as institutional constraints that deter aggression. Hypotheses regarding the influence of (1) shared REI military alliance obligations on dispute initiation and (2) REI military alliance obligations on whether a potential challenger will initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target are tested. African REIs, states, and their dispute initiations from 1950 to 2000 compose the sample. Logit analysis of time-series, cross-section data is the method employed. African REI military alliances are an example of African international relations’ exceptionalism and innovation in institutional design. Findings suggest African REI military alliance obligations reduce the propensity for aggression between member-states and reduce the likelihood that a potential challenger will attack a potential target and a potential target will be the object of attack. The evidence in this article indicates that such commitments reduce dispute initiation among African states.
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