Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict

Abstract

Many researchers have reported empirical support for the liberal proposition that increased trade between states reduces their propensity to engage in militarized conflict. However, the literature has been less vocal on the effects of interdependence once actual conflict has started. The author, who builds on the opportunity-cost explanation for the commercial peace, first shows how that explanation can fit a bargaining framework of conflict. It is then argued that if trade reduces conflict by raising its opportunity costs prior to its onset, the prospective opportunity costs should remain high during conflict as well and decrease its observed duration, a prediction that can also be derived from a simple war-of-attrition game. The proposed inverse relationship between interdependence and conflict duration is evaluated empirically, using all militarized interstate disputes between 1950 and 1992. The author utilizes both continuous and discrete-time duration models and considers a number of alternative model specifications and concept measurements, and the results are generally supportive of the tested hypothesis. In addition, a two-stage model of dispute onset and duration is estimated, which reveals that more probable disputes are also longer, but the observed selection pattern does not seem to influence the positive effect of interdependence on the hazards of dispute termination.