Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind: State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and Economic Relationships

Abstract

An important question in the conflict processes literature concerns what types of international relationships are more likely to lead to peaceful interactions. Both security and economic ties have been posited as powerful determinants of conflict, yet their effects are often examined independently from one another. Furthermore, a debate exists as to whether it is states’ ties to the international order or to each other that are most important in determining conflict. A resolution of the competing perspectives would expect that two states that have a tight network of security and economic relationships, both to each other and to the international order, should be extremely unlikely to engage in hostile action against each other. Surprisingly, a series of multinomial logits using non-directed dyads from 1951 to 1985 suggests that dyads with tight economic and security ties at both the state-to-state and statetosystem levels are only slightly less likely to engage in dyadic disputes than those without such simultaneous ties. However, this study finds that both (1) tight security and economic ties to the international order and (2) tight intra-dyadic security and economic ties have important, independent effects in limiting dyadic hostility. This suggests that the states within a dyad have two separate paths to more peaceful interactions - the first lies in tightening ties between states, the second in strengthening dyadic security and economic ties to the international order.