On the basis of an extensive review of the literature, the authors have developed a framework of entry deterrence strategy. The major aspects of this framework are the interconnected elements of the competitive environment, the choice of entry deterrence strategy, ranging from strategies involving a single element of the marketing mix to corporate-level strategies; and the consequences that both the strategy choice and subsequent entry decision have for the incumbent. The authors’ framework explicitly acknowledges the role of perceptions in signal detection, interpretation, and decision making in the development of entry deterrence strategy. With their framework as a focal point, they review the extant literature to make it accessible to a wider audience and provide guidance for further research.
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