The authors develop a theoretical extension to the basic transaction cost model by combining insights from dependence theory with the TCA approach. They introduce offsetting investments as a means of safeguarding the specific assets of small firms in conventional channels. The traditional TCA safeguards are insufficient here, because vertical integration is not feasible for the small firm at risk and long-term contractual protection is not present in conventional channels. Data from 199 manufacturers' agencies support the theoretical predictions. Agencies with more specific assets invested in their relationship with a principal attempted to bond themselves more closely to their accounts to safeguard those assets. Such bonding efforts resulted in a lower level of dependence on the principal because the agencies were better able to replace the principal if necessary. Also, their financial performance was improved when dependence was reduced, provided levels of specific investments were relatively high.
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