The present article provides a critique of holism (as developed in the writings of Heshusius, Iano, and Poplin) from the point of view of critical realism, primarily as the latter standpoint is explicated in the writing of the British philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar. Whereas the holists have been largely correct in their criticisms of the positivism and scientism that have characterized theory and practice in the learning disabilities field, it is argued that they run the risk of promoting a subjectivist standpoint with its own set of limitations.
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