Service Delivery to the Handicapped

Abstract

Subdivisions of the federal government, acting as the implementation agents of Congress, have proliferated beyond the expectations of most knowledgeable persons. As this growth in numbers has taken place, a corresponding increase in the amount of tax dollars required has been experienced. An impressive portion of these support dollars are partitioned by agencies to fund programs that have been approved at the agency's discretion. Competition among bidders for these funds reflects the widespread interest competing institutions have in federal programs and in the various other benefits coming to the successful institution.

The process for competing is well documented, and readers of this formidable set of rules and regulations would be correct in assuming that the process is both widely known and accepted. Relying only on this documentation, offerors for federal contracts should conclude that they are entering into a truly competitive arena, one best characterized under the “best contract” maxim. Here, careful review of offers by highly competent experts always discloses the most productive offer at the lowest price to the government.

Yet the number of formal appeals to the government's official hearing body continues to grow. Thousands of contract-award protests are filed each year, and this does not take into account the many reluctant, unsuccessful offerors who suspect bias but who elect not to pursue the matter formally. Many highly respected professionals are beginning to feel more inclined to ask questions and to demand definitive answers.

This being the case, there must be opportunities for what first appears to be an objective review/award process to become subjective. In examining the federal procurement code and the recent decision of the Government Accounting Office (GAO), inconsistencies and ambiguities are revealed immediately. There are many opportunities for subjectivity, bias, personal preferences, and the like to repudiate the foundation of the federal procurement activity: integrity of the competitive process.

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References

Carnegie Corporation of New York , A Public Trust. New York: Bantam Books, Inc. 1979.

Comptroller General of the United States , Decision: File B-190530, Matter of the Ohio State University Research Foundation. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Jan. 11, 1979.

DHEW/USOE Grant and Procurement Management Division, RFP 77–50 (NIMIS II). Washington, D.C.: Author, May 2, 1977.

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