Abstract
In the 1950s and 1960s the pre-container stevedoring industry was seen as the crisis area of Australian industrial relations and the state constantly intervened in an effort to improve its inefficient management and to curb its militant workforce. These attempts met with mixed success, occasionally proving totally counterproductive. Tbe key agents of the state were arbitration judges, members of the stevedoring industry regulatory agency and, most importantly, the permanent head of the Department of Labour and National Service and his two longest-serving Ministers for Labour; each of whom went on to become Prime Minister:
Througbout the period, the state sought to protect employers from their casual employees' considerable bargaining power; enbanced as it was by the full employment associated with the international post-war long boom. Although fully aware of the deficiencies of the shipowning groups that owned most stevedoring firms, the conserva tive federal government publicly always blamed industrial unrest on the machinations of a minority of union officials who allegedly were carrying out Kremlin instructions to subvert industry in the democracies. The constant negative response of employers, backed by the restricting and sometimes repressive policies of the state, left an indelible impression on the group-oriented stevedoring employees. As a result they carried over their increasingly suspicious mindset into the technologically transformed era of perma nent employment on containerised cargo.
1. These arms of the state included: the federal coalition government (certainly not monolithic), the Department of Labour and National Service, the Department of Shipping and Transport, the Department of Trade (under various titles), the Stevedoring Industry Board/Authority, the govern ment-owned national shipping line, the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court/ Commission, the Commonwealth Industrial Court (from 1956), the High Court, the Department of Defence, the individual service departments, the armed forces, the Commonwealth Intelligence Service/ASIO, six state governments plus that of the Northern Territory, the relevant state and Territory government departments, the twenty-five different instrumentalities controlling the ports and various law enforcement agencies.
2. The following assessment of Bland's role is the briefest précis of a forthcoming paper that considers Bland's influence at greater length. That paper contains detailed references but this summary of it rests on two broad sources: first, relevant state documents held in the Melbourne and Canberra depositories of the Australian Archives—notably those of the three Departments of Labour and National Service, Attorney General and Prime Minister and Cabinet—and second, interviews with Sir Henry con ducted by myself (1983 and 1994), Mel Pratt (1975) and Alan Martin (1988). I would like to record my thanks to the Australian National Library for giving me access to transcript and tape of the latter two interviews and to Professor Martin for providing supplementary information.
3. For details, see 'Transcript of Proceedings of Conference Re Turn Round of Shipping in Australian Ports. Convened by the Hon. H. E. Holt...17th August 1950..., Australian Archives MP324/3, Department of Shipping and Transport, Papers of Mr Dewey, Box I (Large Box).
4. The federation was there able to demonstrate the existence of discrimination against militant gangs by giving them the worst or smallest hatch-loads hut the practice soon re-emerged in Brisbane. For details of the remaining disputes of 1950-51 outlined later, see Sheridan 1997a.
5. One, single-page briefing by the coastal cartel identifies either explicitly or by implication at least fourteen interests—groups or individuals—each with their own object in view. E. R. Wilkins memo to P. W. Haddy, 20 April 1956, E217/193, Noel Budin Archives Centre, ANU.
6. Box 56, Z432 Noel Butlin Archives, Australian National University.
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