For an illuminating discussion on the merits of collective bargaining, see Laffer, K., "Problems of Compulsory Arbitration in Australia", International Labour Review, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 5, May 1958,
2.
and "Compulsory Arbitration" and "Collective Bargaining", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, October 1962;
3.
Isaac, J.E., "The Prospects for Collective Bargaining in Australia", Economic Record, December 1958,
4.
and "Dr Hancock on Collective Bargaining", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, October 1962.
5.
See, for example, the Karachi Resolution of the Indian National Congress, on Fundamental Rights, and the Congress Election Manifesto of 1936, in Reso lutions on Economic Policy and Programmes 1924-54, AICC, New Delhi, pp. 3 and 14. Professor Myers is of the opinion that the Indian National Congress emphasized state intervention, and the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938, passed by the Congress Government in the province, with its provisions restricting strikes and its emphasis on compulsory arbitration "heralded an era when industrial grievances would be settled through comprehensive state machinery rather than through collective bargaining of the parties involved". Myers, C.A. , Industrial Relations in India, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1958, p. 244. But what Myers, and many others, have not recognized is that another provision of the Act provided for the recognition of various unions as representative bargaining agents of the workers, which was the first necessary step in the development of collective bargaining. It was of course unfortunate that no union could achieve a representative status by enrolling 25 per cent of industry's work force as members. But "the Industrial Disputes Act of 1938 did seek to strengthen unions ...".
6.
See Morris, Morris David, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854-1947, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 189-90. The Congress Party has generally been against avoidable strikes and not against collective bargaining; in 1937, when it came into power in Bombay Province, it issued a statement of Labour Policy, which, no doubt, made it clear that the government would "promote legislation aiming at the prevention of strikes and lock-outs as far as possible", but at the same time stated that: "Government are, therefore, anxious to assist in removing real hindrances in the way of the growth of the organization and to promote collective bargaining between the employers and the employees. Means will be devised to discourage victimization of workers for connection with a labour organization and participation in legitimate trade union activity." Quoted in ibid., p. 188.
7.
For provisions contained in the contemplated legislation in 1950, see Mathur, A.S., "Labour Judiciary in India", The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, November 1964, pp. 239-255.
8.
A factual analysis of the forces that made the government drop these amendments and bills has been provided by Van D. Kennedy. See his "Sources and Evolution of Indian Labour Relations Policy", Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. I, No. I, July 1965, pp. 15-40.
9.
Government of India, First Five Year Plan , New Delhi, 1952, pp. 571-573.
10.
Kennedy, op. cit.
11.
Ibid. Recently, the interest in "closed shop" and "union shop" policy has been revived by the Ministry, by its inclusion in the questionnaire of the official National Commission on Labour. Question No. 44 seeks information regarding the extent of prevalence and merits and demerits of these policies.
12.
Cf. Sinha, G.P., "Industrial Relations System: the Indian Model", paper submitted to the first National Seminar on Industrial Relations in a Developing Economy, Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations, New Delhi, February-March 1965,
13.
and Sinha, G.P., and Sinha, P.R.N., "Principles Adopted by Wage Boards in the Determination of Wages in India" , Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. VIII, No. 4, January 1966, pp. 282-313.
14.
Government of India, Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline, New Delhi, 1966, p. 287.
15.
While the percentage of industrial disputes tackled through mutual settlement in India during 1956-62 has been on the average less than 25 (see Kanappan, S., "The Many Facets of Government Influence on Industrial Relations in India", submitted to the Research Conference on Industrial Relations and Economic Development, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, August 24-September 4, 1964), the percentage in Australia is reported to be 99 (see Laffer, K., "The Working of Australian Compulsory Arbitration" , in Roberts, H. S., and Brissenden, P. F. (Eds.), The Challenge of Industrial Relations in the Pacific Asian Countries , East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1965).
16.
First Five Year Plan, pp. 572-73.
17.
Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline , pp. 386-87.
18.
Roberts and Brissenden, op. cit. , p. 80.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Professor Myers reports that "Labour Minister of an important Industrial State, a member of the Civil Service, Central and State Govt. officials, a prominent economist associated with the Plans, officials of employers' associations and leaders of trade unions (INTUC and HMS), expressed such fears in their interviews with him. K. K. Desai, who succeeded V. V. Giri as Labour Minister, had already expressed his views on these lines in his public statements.
21.
Myers, op. cit ., pp. 257-261.
22.
Kanappan, S. , op. cit.
23.
See Mr Giri's opening speech at the twelfth session of the Indian Labour Conference at Nainital in 1952, Proceedings of the Indian Labour Conference, Delhi, 1952;
24.
and his presidential address to the first All-India Labour Economics Conference, Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2, April-July 1958, pp. 5-12.
25.
Punekar, S.D. , "Aspects of State Intervention in Industrial Relations in India: An Evaluation", paper submitted to the Research Conference on Industrial Relations and Economic Development, International Institute for Labour Studies, August 24-September 4, 1964.
26.
Isaac, The Journal of Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 145.
27.
Laffer, ibid., p. 146.
28.
Calculated by the author on the basis of statistics from the Indian Labour Year Book, in his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: "Criteria of Wage Determination: A Study of the Cotton Textile Industry of India", Lucknow University, 1966.
29.
The average income per union during recent years works out somewhere between Rs 2000 and Rs 2500 per year.
30.
For an analysis of the nature, causes and consequences of this phenomenon in a historical perspective, see Pandey , S.M., "Inter-Union Rivalry in India: An Analysis", The Journal of Industrial Relations , Vol. 9, No. 2, July 1967.
31.
For an empirical basis of these observations, see Pandey, S.M., "Trade Unionism in Kanpur: Growth and Structure", Ph.D. Thesis in Economics, Lucknow University, 1967.
32.
See Brass, Paul A., Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh , Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966 (particularly the chapter on Kanpur), for a searching analysis of this problem.
33.
Pandey, op. cit.
34.
Mutual recognition and acceptance have rightly been put by Isaac as the first among the necessary conditions for successful collective bargaining , Journal of Industrial Relations, op. cit., pp. 141-42.
35.
Myers, op. cit., p. 257;
36.
Mathur, A.S., "Statutory Dispute Settlement in India", and Mehta, Ashoka, "Non-Statutory Dispute Settlement in India", in Roberts and Brissenden, op. cit., pp. 91 and 104 respectively.
37.
This point has been clearly brought home by Kennedy, in op. cit.
38.
The same apprehension was expressed by officials, Congress and INTUC leaders in 1956 (see Myers, op. cit., pp. 286-287),
39.
and 1958 (see James, R.C., "Trade Union Democracy: Indian Textiles", The Western Political Quarterly, September 1958, p. 570).
40.
Certain state governments have gone ahead in this direction by making legislative provisions for the recognition of representative unions. These states are Bombay (undivided) (under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946), Madhya Pradesh (under the M.P. Industrial Relations Act 1960), Rajasthan (under Industrial Disputes Rajasthan (Amendment) Act 1958).
41.
For an account of the limitations of the present arrangements and various aspects of a scheme of compulsory recognition of "representative unions", see Mehrotra, B.N., "Recognition of Trade Unions in India" , Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. IX, No. I, April 1966, pp. 135-143.