In this article, I respond to Carl Ginsburg's (this issue) objections to my critique of Rogers and Maslow and to my view of the self (Geller, 1982). In addition, I explore a key issue having to do with the foundations of self-actualization theory in general, namely the justification of the end upon which self-actualization is based. I argue that such a justification is impossible or at least unlikely and that there is no compelling reason to accept any version of self-actualization.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Barry, B.
(1965). Political argument. New York: Humanities Press.
2.
Geller, L.
(1982). The failure of self-actualization theory: A critique of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (2), 56-73.
3.
Ginsburg, C.
(1984). Toward a somatic understanding of self: A reply to Leonard Geller. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 24 (2).
4.
Mead, G. H.
(1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5.
Mills, J. S.
(1957). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
6.
Rawls, J.
(1971). A theory ofjustice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
